

PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE

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I

In times of social crises one's mind turns towards matters which are universal in scope. Interest in the individual, the personal, 'the human all too human', seems to recede. The preoccupation with the universal marks a turning away, not only from the individual but also from the present. The future acquires an even greater fascination than usual, and we weave our dreams around salvation, the Kingdom of Heaven, the City of God, the future Good Society, our war aims, the reconstruction of the world after the war, and the establishment of ultimate justice of man to man.

Lucius Cassius, whom Anatole France presents as keenly aware of the ills undermining the Roman Empire in the year 80 $\frac{1}{4}$ after the foundation of Rome, had a poignant thought about this preoccupation with the future. Cassius looked with apprehension at the insolent luxury in which the great of his contemporaries were living, at the base avidity of what we would call today the middle class, and at the cruel depravity of the populace. He had this to say:

"It is true that we apply ourselves incessantly to the penetration of the impenetrable future. We work at it with all our strength and with all kinds of means. At times we seem to try to achieve our end by meditation, at times by prayer and ecstasy. Some consult the oracles of the gods; others, not afraid to resort to means which are not permitted, consult Chaldean soothsayers or draw Babylonian lots. Impious and vain curiosity all this! For of what use is our knowledge of things to come, since inevitably they will come? Yet the wise, they even more than the vulgar, desire to pierce the future and project themselves into it, as it were. This they do

undoubtedly because they hope thus to escape the present, which causes them so much sadness and disgust. Why should not the people of today be tempted by the desire to flee from these miserable times? For are we not living in an age replete with cowardice, abounding in ignominies, and fertile with crime?"¹

This escape into the future, while psychologically understandable even to such a rationalist as Lucius Cassius, presents a serious obstacle to the development of scientific or realistic thinking. Humanistic disciplines such as history, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and psychology are more impeded by this obstacle than are other branches of scientific thought. The chemist, the biologist, the surgeon, the epidemiologist have opportunity to work even more intensely in times of great wars; their work, despite or because of these critical circumstances, not infrequently yields additional valuable contributions to our knowledge, theoretical or applied. The last war taught us a great deal. We learned about the synthesis of acetone, about certain types of gangrene, about respiratory diseases and encephalitis and typhus. Unfortunately, we learned comparatively little that was new about human psychology.

The major contributions of psychoanalysis and psychiatry with which we are familiar today were made or were clearly outlined either before the last war or a considerable time after it, seemingly independently of it. The psychologist and the sociologist seem always to be baffled by the severe cultural crises which they are called upon to witness, and they retreat almost automatically to their scientific origins: philosophy, belief, faith, and hopes for the future. That the psychoanalyst should not be an exception in times of crises is but natural. During such times his interest in purely clinical matters is at best considerably reduced; his interest in more general, theoretical problems appears to be enhanced.

This turn towards more general problems bears another

¹ Anatole France: *Sur la pierre blanche. Œuvres complètes illustrées*. Paris: Caomann-Lévy, Editeurs, 1925.

imprint of the spirit of the times: the psychoanalyst's attention begins to be drawn more closely to social and cultural issues. On the one hand his scientific 'escape' tends to dis-individualize the individual by the increasing emphasis on the organic and physiological—this secretly feared and openly worshiped fate under the guise of pure physiology or pure biology in human psychology. On the other hand he overindividualizes the individual and stresses both his alleged mastery over and alleged captivity at the hands of social and cultural actualities. As a result he assumes in relation to the world the rôle of the prophet of a better day to come, of a mental hygienist who would transform man in general into a better man in general and thus society in general into a better world in general. In his relation to the patient the psychoanalyst is then driven by the very nature of this attitude to assume the rôle of romantic sympathy—that affective consonance which makes him view the individual's problem not in the objective light of clear-cut observation but in the subjective light of such evaluative orientations as love, goodness, justice, dignity, happiness. In other words, *inter armas silet psychologia* as an objective, scientific discipline.

It is pertinent, therefore, that psychoanalysis, which owes the major part of its life and creative effort to those three decades which encompass the last two armed conflagrations, should pause to take stock and assess its position as a science and its relation to its own subject matter. This suggestion does not intend to imply any tendency to take stock in order that psychoanalysis may arm itself for the conquest of some indeterminate, nebulous future. We should recall Lucius Cassius and ask ourselves: Why succumb to curiosity about things to come, since inevitably they are going to come for those who will survive to see? There is a much more important task to perform; we must understand our present, for without such understanding we shall have neglected and squandered our past and shall contribute nothing to the future.

An understanding of the present is, of course, difficult to achieve. We may study the past, but the study of the past,

while arduous, is always easier than that of the present; we are detached from it, it is not an actuality, and we derive from it a certain sense of self-agrandizement, if for no other reason than the awareness that we are still alive and active, strong enough to peep into Napoleon's headquarters as well as his bedchamber, to pass on the weaknesses of Julius Caesar, the garrulousness of Cicero, and the psychosis of Nietzsche. We may 'study' the future, plan it. This, too, is a rather satisfying occupation. For history, the future which has become the past, is not yet here to tell us wherein we are wrong, and when at some remote subsequent time it will have become a reality, we shall not be here to give an account of ourselves.

The present finds us participants therein and observers thereof. It is seldom complimentary, since it must make us aware of our frailty, particularly in times of crises. It offers no other emolument than the possibility of mere knowledge—a piteous pittance indeed, particularly when it is a knowledge of unrest, strife, murder, and hatred. And we are keenly aware that the future is unknown to us, unknown by definition.

We should not lose sight of the fact that to assess our position in the present requires a considerable sacrifice of our most cherished affective propensities, narcissistic in nature and very difficult to relinquish. Under these circumstances the most we may hope is that a candid attempt will be made rather than full success achieved.

II

Let us turn back about four hundred and fifty years and put ourselves for a moment in the place of the common man of those days. That common man was a pious, God-fearing soul who knew all about the Bible but nothing of the Bible itself. His acquaintance with this document, unless he was a cleric, did not go beyond sighting it at a distance, open or closed, on the altar of his church. All good, he knew, came from the Lord, and all evil from the devil. The finer differences between good and evil he knew not, except on the basis of

what he was told on good authority and dogma. The origin of the universe was no mystery to him, for he knew the story of Adam and Eve. He thought of Adam as a prototype of himself, of Eve as a prototype of his wife. The world was made up of good, white-skinned Europeans with an occasional sprinkling of dark-skinned Alexandrians, Carthaginians, or Phoenicians.

Into this world suddenly came the news of a new land populated with red-skinned beings, biped and in all other respects quite similar to the respectable descendants of Adam and Eve. Not only had no one ever suspected their existence before, but even the existence of the land they lived in had never been revealed in the Scriptures. It seemed that the whole story of Adam and Eve had to be revised. It never was officially revised, but man had to undergo a terrifying inner revolution.

This revolution, precipitated by the restless curiosity of the early Renaissance and set into full flame by the discovery of new facts, new lands, and new peoples, took a heavy toll in human lives and learning; it also aroused the souls of the faithful to greater fervor and aggressive sacrifice. New worlds had to be conquered spiritually and delivered into the merciful hands of the Lord. The history of the Society of Jesus during the life of Ignatius Loyola is the story of a restless challenge of authority and a fervent submission to the law. The life of Francisco Xavier is illustrative of the times. He set out, not as the practical, dull trader Marco Polo of two centuries before, but as a vibrant personality inspired with a divine restlessness and a burning need to convert the Orientals. The four intervening centuries have demonstrated that Xavier failed to save Asia, but he did succeed in dying a heroic martyr at the shores of the China Sea.

This example of a turbulent age is typical in that it demonstrates the accentuation of mysticism and the philosophy of martyrdom which appear whenever new facts and new knowledge fail to preserve a deeply rooted tradition and release an endless anxiety which man is unable to ward off except by means of profound absorption in faith and self-denial. It is

worth while pondering on the vicissitudes of man's spirit during those two and a half centuries which were ushered in by the Renaissance and ended in French Rationalism. That period, in a less concentrated manner, was not unlike the critical period of the last thirty or forty years, when rapid advancements in science and technology, rapid growth of an industrial, world civilization, somehow failed to harmonize what they made man do with what the growth of democratic ideals and universalism made man think. A critical situation arose which imposed the full force of its impact in the form of anxiety, aggression, ideologies of mastery and conquest, and world wars.

In the meantime, following the general trend of scientific growth, psychoanalysis was born. Although it was born as a purely therapeutic procedure, or out of therapeutic intent, it soon became something more. It became the foundation of a scientific, general psychology. To think of psychoanalysis today purely as a therapeutic technique is equivalent to thinking of chemistry and physics as mere pharmaceuticals and electrical engineering. Psychoanalysis was the last in the line of human scientific endeavors to complete the process started by the Renaissance, of liberating science from theology and metaphysical philosophy. Of all branches of human knowledge, psychology remained longer and more deeply enmeshed in philosophy and religion. The contribution of Freud from the historical point of view is even greater than from the medico-psychological standpoint, for it was psychoanalysis that laid the foundation and began the structure of the descriptive, detached, scientifically correlated psychology of man. It was the first, and is thus far the only, scientific discipline which opened the road towards a free understanding and an unhampered synthesis of man's behavior as a human animal and as a social unit, of man's living as a person and as a cultural unit. This is the true achievement of Freud, who is the last true representative of the Renaissance in contemporary history.

But events move more rapidly now than in the days of Roger Bacon or Copernicus, and the modern counter-reforma-

tion set in more quickly. Freud's work, despite fifty years of ceaseless effort, has hardly begun, but in the atmosphere of the present day crisis the reaction against it has developed rather rapidly. Two groups of reactions can be singled out in this process: neo-Thomism and culturalism.

Neo-Thomism, neo-mysticism, the roots of which may be observed in the development of Jungian thought, is taking greater and greater hold in Europe and is becoming more pronounced in the United States. This orientation accepts the world crisis in a manner of resolute confusion and rejects psychoanalysis because it must deny the very possibility of an objective psychology of man. Paradoxical as it may appear, there is a deep affinity between the mysticism of Marshal Pétain and the 'soldier-priest' Weygand, and the neo-Thomistic, proselytic spirit of the young professor of the University of Chicago who recently startled a conference of social scientists by speaking to them about 'God and the professors' and telling them that only by a return to St. Thomas will education and science, and indeed the whole world, be saved, that Hitler is a direct result of the godlessness of our civilization, and that a victory by Hitler would be less dangerous than the positivism which permeates modern thought.

This retreat into defeatist mysticism naturally leaves no room for a dispassionate study of the psychology of man. Psychoanalysis, in the face of this orientation, can do only what any science can and has done in the past. It can only persevere in its own scientific endeavors. 'It cannot argue or fight; it can only study and attempt to understand. It is very doubtful whether this deep regression into the thirteenth century in modern dress, appearing as it does on a large scale of social thought, could be retrieved or otherwise 'cured' by mere rationalistic argumentation, for faith and scientific fact in matters psychological can never meet. Fortunately, there are few neo-Thomists among psychoanalysts, and neo-Thomism, the child of the present day cultural crisis, may be considered but one of the many 'dangers from without' with which psychoanalysis has never lost familiarity since it embarked upon its

scientific work. For some time to come psychology will have to continue to strive for its liberation from the domain which has always seemed to absorb it, from abstract philosophy. For some time to come philosophy, in coöperation with anatomy and physiology narrowly conceived and narrowly practiced, will continue to indulge in subjective descriptions of pseudo-objective phenomena, seeking physiological equivalents of emotional states, the nature of which remains unknown, and voicing moralistic reprimands in pseudorational logic against certain natural aspects of man's affective life.

III

If neo-Thomism is to be considered merely a resurrection or a reëmphasis of the old opposition coming from without, culturalism in certain of its aspects should be considered a danger from within. The antithesis, culture versus biopsychology, is based on a misconception, inferring as it does that the psychoanalyst rejects the importance of cultural factors and deals only with obscure biological phenomena unrelated to man's psychology normal and abnormal. That this implication, not to say assertion, is untenable can be proven merely by a glance at the history of psychoanalytic literature. The reverse is truer; it is the culturalist who constantly rejects the biopsychological factors in favor of social actualities. Before it can become possible for us to establish the possible truly scientific relationship of psychoanalysis to the whole problem of culturalism, we must try to understand certain particular aspects of this culturalistic orientation.

It will be noted that the psychoanalytic culturalist does not succeed in giving us a clear conception of what he understands by culture. That he feels he knows what he means by culture there is no doubt; but to take it for granted that everyone understands what he means is both an unwarranted assumption and a presumption. One is reminded of an anecdote told of the days when the Prince of Wales, the present Duke of Windsor, visited the United States and, of course, Philadelphia. At a dinner given in his honor he sat, of course, between two

women. Every time the eyes of the Prince wandered along and across the table and paused for a moment on some one of the guests, the woman to his right would pleasantly tell the Prince, 'That is Mrs. X; she is a Biddle'; or the woman to his left would call His Highness's gracious attention to Mrs. Y, 'also a Biddle', and point out that the gentleman further to his left was also a Biddle. The Prince smiled pleasantly. Dinner over, the heir to the throne turned discreetly to his aide-de-camp, conversant with things American, and asked, 'Bartlett, what is a biddle?'

What is culture? At times it appears to be our industrial economic system. At others it seems to be a sum total of the demands which society makes upon the individual—moral, economic, physical, and purely social. At still others it seems to mean the habits of thought and the general inertia and routine of social life to whose influence the individual is exposed. It may also mean the fortuitous circumstances and prejudices which are rationalized in terms of public tradition and which make demands upon the individual. The genesis of culture is not very clear. It has a past, of course, and a present. The importance of the present, however, is more frequently stressed. It often seems as if culture coming from somewhere makes the man; yet just as frequently there is an inference that man makes the culture which makes the man.

The culturalist is seriously preoccupied with actual social conflicts and he lays particular stress on so called humanistic attitudes, attitudes which spring from what is commonly called 'social conscience'. To bring this motive forward as the major determinant of scientific work is, to say the least, a point of questionable merit, since science may not limit its search for facts even by moral considerations of the highest order. Social conscience was originally the monopoly of religions. Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism all espoused a cosmology which gradually became theocratic. At first man was taught about the Kingdom of Heaven, and gradually he turned to the emulation of his Creator and developed a series of systems by means of which that Kingdom could be established on

earth. One wonders at times how much of this tradition of theocratic social idealism has been smuggled into economic materialism, and to what extent Marxism, for instance, is a child of socially militant Christianity.

The crisis in which we are living, replete as it is with anxiety, propitiates the reëmphasis of the rôle of man in his own life to a point far beyond his natural biological endowment. As a result, psychology with all its terminological armamentarium has drifted imperceptibly into the old overestimation of man's capacity and regressed to the attitude that man can and must understand and do everything. Thus psychology has turned again to culture as man made and as making man.

Of all psychoanalytic concepts the unconscious alone seems to have escaped expulsion from the system of the culturalist, although not entirely unscathed. The unconscious appears to be merely cerebration in the sphere of unawareness. It has become almost anthropomorphic (a reproach, by the way, leveled by the pure culturalist at the psychoanalyst), thinking and reacting in an orderly manner, in a manner consistent with the principles and traditions of cultural influences or the counteraction against certain cultural exigencies. This tendency to credit the unconscious with a considerable amount of orderliness and consistency is natural for a system of thought which wittingly or unwittingly allies itself with the ego's fantasied omnipotence of understanding and doing. Freud's major discovery about the unconscious seems to have been overlooked. After all, it is not so much the fact that we have an unconscious which appears important in psychology, but that the unconscious is subject to the primary process. It is paralogical. It has no conception of opposites or causality; it is anarchic in its composition; it does *not* think. What appear to us as well-knit fantasies and a complexly woven net of thoughts are merely attempts on the part of the ego to be the unwitting and unwilling interpreter of the unconscious in terms of the ego; as Freud has put it, this is what it would sound like and look like, these are the images and thoughts

which would appear in our minds if and when the unconscious became conscious. As long as the unconscious does not enter consciousness, it functions under the principle of the primary process. If we take this primary process into consideration, the whole problem of culture in the system of psychoanalysis will become less confused.

IV

Culture in its totality, whatever its origin and whatever its evolution, does of course express itself through the actualities of everyday life and everyday pressures on man's egocentric drives. In so far as it imposes certain demands on the individual, it is restrictive in nature. If we go no further and limit ourselves to the restrictive aspects of culture, we shall gain some understanding of what it is the culturalistic psychoanalyst means by culture. He means the sum total of frustrations which society imposes upon the individual throughout his life from the cradle to the grave. It is obvious that, if internalized, these frustrations represent the individual's conscience, social conscience if you wish; and if not internalized, they present to the strivings of the individual severe obstacles which must be repressed by the social conscience. The latter will be represented as the superego, while the repressed strivings will recede into the reservoir of the unconscious, which is subject to the primary process. To overlook this means to overlook the fact that man cannot give up his nature any more than any other animal, and that man, no matter how lofty, is not a machine in which thwarted strivings may disappear into nothingness by means of some mysterious spiritual combustion.

What happens within the frame of cultural life to this mass of unconscious strivings? These strivings do not remain forever repressed, and while they remain repressed they are not fully repressed. They will and they do come out of repression into full expression by way of endless displacements, secondary elaborations, identifications, and projections. This fact, while frequently recognized by many, was not, however, considered

from the point of view of its immense rôle in that formation of man's life which we call culture, civilization. Everything—from the ceremonialized recognition of wars as legitimate methods of settling international conflicts, to revolutions, horror stories, smutty stories, melodramatic sensations in newspapers, prize fights, erotic novels, love-making in the theatre, blind loyalty to the political leader, deep religious devotion—without exception, everything in our civilization represents an endless series of returns from the repressed of murder, sexual curiosity, passivity, all those things which are officially repressed within the individual but which must come out in greater and greater measure and in a steady flow in a more or less stable civilization.

Yet it is very striking that this feature of the return of the repressed, the permissive aspect of human cultural existence, seems to be overlooked. It is the restrictive aspects of culture that are always stressed. Psychology, and by this I mean psychoanalytic psychology, may not and does not fail to take into account these phenomena, and in so far as it does constantly take them into account, it naturally bears in mind the sum total of the biopsychological endowment with which man has to operate within the frame of his cultural existence. From this point of view there seems to be no reason for quarreling with the culturalist or for considering him a 'danger from within'. And yet he is that danger.

V

Psychoanalysis, as has been pointed out, represents the first attempt in the history of science to study man as he is. Before the advent of psychoanalytic psychology the psychic apparatus was not only a *terra incognita* but a forbidden terrain. The simple and obvious fact that man, no matter how perfect a being he fancies himself, is a being whose life, including his psychic apparatus and including his culture, is a form of biological adaptation was overlooked, and man was not permitted to correct his error of oversight. In this age-long and perennial

injunction against the critical study of the human psychic apparatus, traditional prejudice, religion, and science joined in a common effort. It was only through fifty years of psychoanalytic research that this chain of opposition was partially broken.

In the meantime, a severe cultural crisis has shaken the world to its foundation. Social problems have come to the fore. A social revolution is taking place under our own eyes and over our own heads. We are part of this upheaval. We cannot escape it. Seemingly stable traditions have been dislodged with eruptive suddenness and vigor. The libertarian ideals nurtured for almost a century and a half since the American and French Revolutions have suddenly become drowned in the sanguinary flood of a world conflict.

Two trends become accentuated and are released with unsuspected force as if overnight. First, man becomes suddenly willing to bow unquestioningly to dictatorial leadership, as if in striking emergence of a long-repressed wish to prostrate himself before the hero and to shout in mortal ecstasy, as in the days of ancient Rome, *Ave, Imperator, morituri te salutant*. Second, the same man becomes a fratricidal murderer, a plunderer, a reservoir of hatred without guilt, of cheerful destruction without remorse. One need not be prejudiced or unusually emotional to consider the conscious ideologies of those states which are most dynamic and vibrant as plain ideologies of organized gangsterdom here and there sweetened with the saccharine of social justice. This is a unique period in history; since the belligerent march and plunder of the hordes of Genghis Khan and Attila, never has there been a period in history in which the cult of sadism was so strong or so overt. Both the adherents and the opponents of these ideologies are suffused with anxiety because no one knows on whom or when the avalanche will fall. The sight of man is at best not a pleasant one, to himself or to his fellow human beings. Conscience, or superego, which in the cultural sense acts almost as an instinct, almost like a biological drive, is troubled and buys for itself an imaginary

bit of peace by masochistic submission, a submission compensated for by the right to vent one's sadism on those whom the hero chooses to call enemy. It is difficult, it is impossible in this atmosphere of anxiety and sense of guilt for man to be detached and scientifically curious. Such a detachment, his sense of guilt tells him, is equivalent to sin. Such a scientific curiosity, his sense of guilt tells him, is idle and vain. He must hate someone and he must do something.

As a result, those of the human community who are not actually engaged directly or indirectly in combat—the scholars, the intellectuals, the representatives of liberal thought—are driven by way of escape to retreat to the old position of fantasizing man the ruler of the universe. In this they unknowingly join in the ideologies of those who are engaged in mortal strife, for those ideologies are based on the megalomaniac belief that it is man who makes history with his own hands. These intellectuals and scholars, horrified at the sight of man's nature, have nothing left to them but to deny this very nature and to abandon the thought, even the suspicion, that man is a biological unit.

Thus, in his weakness and frailty, in his shame of himself and in his sense of failure, in his uncertainty about the morrow, man rises to a fantasy of strength, of nobility, dignity, success, of the self-assured molder of the future. But to achieve this he must give up even the awareness that he is a human, psychobiological apparatus. He must deny the major part of his own psychology and adopt a fantasy of the omnipotence of his thought over history. Psychology as a science must then disappear, for true psychology is too true to allay one's anxiety in the midst of a conflagration. The danger from within is a real danger for psychoanalysis, because the emphasis on the omnipotence of man and his culture brings us back to the days of purely cognitive psychology, which was a philosophy of life tending to deny man's true nature.

Thus, among the many values which are going and will go under as a result of this world conflagration, psychoanalysis too may have to go under, perhaps never to return, since its

basic interest is exactly the thing man does not dare to know—the conative psychology of himself. Perhaps, too, it is necessary to recognize that culture, whatever it is and no matter how enlightened, based as it is on a well-organized and functioning superego which permits the return of the repressed only piecemeal and in a manner of the primary process, has a fundamental, irreconcilable conflict with true scientific psychology and will always tend to abolish it. Culture recognizes only that part of man which serves it, and for this eternal serfdom it gives him as a prize the fairy tale of his omnipotence in his very servility.

Therein lies the danger which is real, and which finds its expression in certain culturalistic trends in psychoanalysis. We should note that these trends do not spring from psychoanalysis as a science, but from the nature of man and some of his oldest ideologies.

Perhaps it would not be out of place to conclude with another reference to Anatole France, to the same Lucius Cassius who was afraid of some of the things of which some of the neo-Thomists or culturalists are afraid today.

Said Appolodoros to Cassius: ‘“The two sexes are not as distinguishable and separated from each other as one would think. There is a lot of man in many women and a lot of woman in many men. Here is how this mixture is explained.

‘“The ancestors of the men who inhabit the earth today were made by the hand of Prometheus, who in order to form them kneaded clay in the manner of a potter. He did not limit himself to the fashioning of one couple. He had too much foresight and was too industrious to decide to let the whole human race depend upon one seed. Hence, he undertook to manufacture with his own hands a multitude of men and women, in order thus to assure humanity the advantage of numbers. To pursue this difficult task in a more orderly fashion, he first modeled separately all the parts which were to make up the bodies of men and of women. He made as many lungs, livers, hearts, brains, blood vessels, spleens, intestines, uteri, vulvæ, and penises as were necessary; he thus

made up with subtle artistry and in sufficient quantity all the organs by means of which human beings could breathe, nourish, and reproduce themselves perfectly. He forgot neither the muscles, nor the tendons, nor the bones, nor the blood, nor the humors. Then he cut the skins, preparing to put into them all that was necessary.

“All these parts of men and women were at length finished and nothing was left but to assemble them, when Prometheus received an invitation to have supper with Bacchus. He went, his forehead adorned with a wreath of roses, and he emptied more than one of Bacchus’s cups.

“He was quite unsteady on his feet when he returned to his workshop. His brain darkened with the vapors of wine, his eyes unclear, his hand uncertain, Prometheus, to our great misfortune, got back to work. When he began to distribute the human organs, the whole thing appeared to him as a game. He did not know what he was doing, but whatever he did he enjoyed with a great sense of contentment. Every now and then he would by mistake give a woman what should have gone to a man, and to a man what belonged to a woman.

“Thus our first ancestors were composed of disparate parts which did not fit each other very well. Our ancestors copulated as they wanted to or by chance, and they reproduced as inchoate beings as they themselves were. It is because of this fault of the Titan that we see so many virile women and so many effeminate men. His fault explains the contradictions which we find at times among the firmest of persons, and the fact that the most resolute spirit may betray a weakness at any time. And finally, that is why we are always at war with ourselves.”

‘Lucius Cassius condemned this myth, because it failed to teach man to conquer himself and because, on the contrary, it induced man to make concessions to his nature.’²

² *Ibid.*

SOME PSYCHOANALYTIC APPLICATIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FIELD CONCEPT

BY THOMAS M. FRENCH (CHICAGO)

The Ego's Task of Integration and the Psychological Field

For a number of years I have been interested in reëxamining psychoanalytic knowledge from the point of view of the integrating task of the ego. There have been three main phases in the development of psychoanalytic thought. At first, interest was centered chiefly upon the id, upon the repressed forces. The repressing forces at this time were for the most part merely annoying obstacles in the way of investigation of the repressed unconscious. Then came a phase of interest in the superego, in the repressing forces. At present we are entering a phase of interest in the functions of the ego.

I regard it as a symptom that we are not yet fully out of the superego phase, that much of the present psychoanalytic interest in the ego still centers about the mechanisms of defense, and about the struggles of the ego to defend itself against excessive demands of the id. As I have pointed out elsewhere (10) the defensive function of the ego is comparable to the activities of a government when its very existence is threatened by a revolution. Under these circumstances its normal peacetime function is apt to be very much disturbed, perhaps even thrown badly out of gear. Study of the normal functioning of the ego must be a study of its synthetic integrative activity.

The chief difficulty in the way of studying the integrative functioning of the ego is the fact that it is so unobtrusive (12). When a machine is operating smoothly we are not aware of its mechanisms. Only when something gets out of order are we reminded that its normal smooth working is something that needs to be analyzed and understood.

From the Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago, Ill.

There is, however, a way to get around this difficulty. Let us as observers put ourselves in the ego's place. As observers we try to reconstruct the ego's problem. The center of our interest is the ego's task of practical adjustment (8, 9). We are interested in the ego's task of adapting its needs to the realities of the external world and of reconciling conflicting needs. The ego's ability to solve these problems will depend upon past experience. We attempt to reconstruct the problem of the ego in the light of the individual's past experience. In the light of the actual history of this individual, how must his problem look to the ego? In the light of past experiences what kind of understanding of the situation is possible? What would be the best possible solution, the best possible compromise between conflicting needs? Then having deepened our insight into the ego's problem by imagining what would be the correct solution if we were in the ego's place, we next compare the actual behavior of the individual with the ideal solution of his problem that we have reconstructed. In this way we gain an impression as to how the problem really looked to the ego, as to the character and adequacy of the practical insight that the ego was able to bring to bear upon its task.

At this point let us borrow a term from the experimental psychologists (17, 19, 20, 21). From the individual's behavior we attempt to reconstruct just how a situation must have looked to the ego at a given moment, just what kind of a practical understanding the ego must have had of its task. This picture of the situation, this actual practical understanding of the ego's integrative task—this we shall designate as the 'psychological field'.

*Exceptions to the Fundamental Similarity Between the
Laws Governing Rational and Irrational Behavior*

The fundamental insight upon which psychoanalysis is based was Freud's discovery that when put back into its proper emotional context even the most irrational neurotic behavior was found to have sense and meaning. From the very beginning

up to the present day, this has remained the basic principle of psychoanalytic investigation—to try to understand irrational behavior in terms of the common-sense psychology of everyday life. The essential contribution of psychoanalysis has been to establish the principle that the psychological laws that enable us to understand rational behavior are also applicable to highly irrational behavior.

A few exceptions remain, however. I shall mention only two. One is the primary process, the highly bizarre and incorrect method of dealing with mental contents that is the distinguishing feature of the unconscious. Neurotic symptoms and dreams are found indeed to be understandable in terms of everyday psychology, but the thought processes that characterize the dream work and the mechanisms of symptom formation seem totally different from the ordinary processes of rational thinking.

In previous studies (9, 11) I have attempted briefly to illustrate the thesis that by studying the dream work in terms of the ego's practical grasp of its integrative task it is possible to reduce the differences between primary and secondary processes to a single quantitative principle. In the present study I shall first review very briefly the conclusions from these earlier studies and then attempt to apply the psychological field concept to a critical consideration of some of the theoretical assumptions underlying our views concerning psychoanalytic character types.

The Concept of the Psychological Field—Application to the Study of the Dream Work

In dealing with practical problems we think not in words but in terms of a practical grasp of the situation with which we are confronted. We are guided from moment to moment not so much by logical thoughts as by a sort of practical understanding of what we want and of the real situation that confronts us in trying to get it. This sort of practical understanding of our real situation in relation to our needs is what we designate by the concept of the psychological field.

The psychological field concept is also applicable to conflict situations. A conflict only makes our practical problem more complex. The intellectual task in such conflict situations is first to examine the reality situation with both goals in mind in order to determine to what extent the two wishes may be compatible with one another, to determine whether or not some compromise may be possible. This is obviously a more complex intellectual task than it would be merely to seek means to achieve either one of the two goals alone. To cite a psychoanalytic example, the little boy who is attached by sexual and tender bonds to both of his parents has obviously a more complex problem to solve than he would have if the father were merely a feared obstacle blocking the way to the boy's love of his mother.

Too intense a conflict not only increases the complexity of the ego's intellectual task of understanding the conflict situation but may also impair the ego's capacity for intellectual grasp. As an extreme example we may cite the proverbial tendency to 'lose one's head' in a crisis.

Under such circumstances it becomes impossible to grasp the complexities of the conflict situation. The ego must content itself with a much simplified, highly condensed version of the situation, or with the attempt to grasp just one small part of the total situation and then another and another in succession, in the way that Harold Lloyd on the screen progresses from one half-understood dilemma to another. In this way arise the peculiarities of the primary process which Freud has designated as the distinguishing feature of the unconscious.

In a recent paper (11) I attempted somewhat sketchily to illustrate this thesis by applying the concept of the psychological field to the study of the dream work. I stated there that the language of the unconscious, when judged by the standards of logical thinking, is incorrect, strange, even bizarre; but that when understood in terms of its practical grasp of situations it becomes quite comparable to the practical thinking that dominates our everyday activity; that when studied from this

point of view as an attempt to understand a practical problem, the peculiarities of the primary process resolve themselves into the consequences of a single principle: the need of the ego so to condense and simplify its grasp of the conflict situation as to bring its problem within the range of the ego's synthetic capacity. Indeed when we allow for this need for oversimplification, the symbolic language of dreams often astonishes us with the epigrammatic clarity with which it portrays the essentials of an emotional conflict.

Application to the Study of the Psychoanalytic Character Types

In a short paper published in 1908, Freud called attention to three groups of personality traits—orderliness, parsimony, and stubbornness—that are quite regularly associated with evidences of an 'intensified erotogenic significance of the anal zone in the innate sexual constitution'. These observations were extended by Sadger (22), Ferenczi (7), Jones (15), and Abraham (1) and suggestions were subsequently made correlating other character traits with fixations upon other erotic zones—notably, dependent receptive and aggressive demanding tendencies with oral-erotic fixations (2, 13) and the capacity for unambivalent giving and for well-integrated social adjustments with the establishment of the primacy of the genitals (3).

For a long time the favorite explanation of these correlations was the one originally suggested by Freud, that the anal-erotic character traits, for example, developed by sublimation of or reaction-formation against hereditarily conditioned predominance of the anal zone in the erotic constitution. Thus the excessive emphasis upon orderliness and cleanliness is understood as a reaction-formation against overaccentuated interest in excrement and filth. Stinginess is explained as resulting from the transfer of libidinal interest from stool to money, and stubbornness as a defiant resistance against giving up this infantile interest in filth at the behest of the mother's attempts to train the child in cleanliness.

Numerous anecdotes, cited in the psychoanalytic literature,

seem to put this explanation upon a very solid basis, in as much as they seem to prove conclusively that the enumerated anal character traits often do arise like neurotic symptoms either by direct sublimation of anal-erotic impulses or by reaction-formation against them.

Nevertheless, from other points of view this conclusion seems somewhat confusing. We are accustomed to think of an individual's character or personality as an organized system of behavior patterns that have arisen by progressive adaptation to external reality as represented chiefly by the child's relation to the parents. To discover that an individual's character is so completely dominated by an innate desire for stimulation of the anal mucous membrane seems now to rob this development of all adaptive significance. Psychosexual development is described as a biologically fixed succession of dominant erotic zones—first oral, then anal, then phallic—and now character formation seems to resolve itself into sublimation of or reaction-formation against the gratification of these partial, erotic impulses. We seem to get a picture of personality development as a sort of mosaic of unrelated traits derived from the independent activity of the different erotic zones. It seems obvious that this must be an extremely one-sided view of the process of personality development.

Already in Abraham's article on the anal character (1) and still more so in his paper on contributions of oral eroticism to character formation (2), we see evidence that Abraham is struggling with this problem. In the paper on the anal character (1) there is already a valuable hint as to how the very convincing evidence of the origin of anal character traits can be reconciled with our notion of personality development as a progressive process of adaptation. Abraham does not emphasize so much the increased significance of the anal zone in the inherited sexual constitution, but discusses much more fully the fixation of interest upon the anal zone as a consequence of the way that the training in cleanliness was managed. From this hint we may perhaps infer that for these patients who seem so fixed on the anal zone, the training in cleanliness actually constituted

a traumatic experience which led to a fixation to this period of development. Under such circumstances it would not be surprising that the personality of these individuals should be so dominated by the partial erotic aim of the stimulation of the anal zone. The anal personality traits would have the quality of a stereotyped neurotic symptom rather than the adaptable character of a sublimation, and would constitute, like any neurosis, a restriction of the more freely adaptive character of normal personality development.

In the paper, *The Influence of Oral Erotism on Character Formation* (2), Abraham introduces another point of view that brings these observations still further into harmony with the idea of personality development as a progressive adaptive process. Nearly half of this paper is devoted to the discussion of dynamic interrelations between oral and anal eroticism and between the character traits associated with them.

Alexander in later studies (5, 6) has an increasing tendency to go still further in this change of emphasis. He is accustomed to describe the typical course of personality development (4) from a strictly dynamic point of view as a process in social adaptation. Later (6) he reformulates familiar psychoanalytic mechanisms in terms that avoid the implication of the libido theory. He makes the very interesting attempt to analyze psychodynamic mechanisms into typical 'emotional syllogisms' or patterns of dynamic interaction between different tendencies within the personality. In the emotional syllogisms that he enumerates and describes, a prominent rôle is played by the generalized 'vector tendencies', receptive, eliminative and retentive which Alexander substitutes in place of the erotic zones and which group together tendencies of a 'similar direction', for example, oral eroticism with the character traits ordinarily associated with it.

Especially in the concept of the emotional syllogisms does Alexander approach the psychological field concept which is the subject of the present discussion. The concept of the vector tendencies is valuable in focusing attention upon biological function rather than upon the erotic zone. By obliterating the

distinction between the different tendencies within each vector group, however, it tends to obscure the question in which we are now interested, the question as to just what is the relation between the erotic zone and the character traits associated with it.

Returning to this question, if we wish to stress still more the integrated adaptive character of normal personality development, we might indeed raise the question as to whether the classical explanation of the association between personality traits and erotic zones should not be reversed. Instead of looking upon the personality trait as a sublimation of the partial sexual impulse, we might raise the question¹ as to whether, in normal development, the choice of one or another particular erotic zone may not be determined by the adaptive needs of the organism. Such a concept would indeed be helpful in explaining the fact that our patients' psychoanalytic material varies from day to day with emphasis now upon one and now upon another erotic zone in accordance with quite definite dynamic mechanisms. Only in cases of traumatic fixation, we might postulate, would the direction of causation be in the other direction, from erotic zone to character trait, in an attempt to master the traumatic memory.

Illustrative Clinical Material

It will be of interest to illustrate the problems discussed by reference to some clinical material. The material is from a middle-aged male patient under analysis for a gastrointestinal neurosis. After he had been in analysis for a number of months

¹ This suggestion has been most clearly formulated by Horney (14). It is already implicit in Alexander's (5) explanation of disturbances in the receptive, eliminative and retentive bodily functions as results of the corresponding vector tendencies. The most consistent attempt to apply this point of view to concrete problems is probably the recent anthropological study by Kardiner (16) in which he attempts to explain in detail the attitudes of different primitive peoples by reference to the nature of their childhood training and to the needs left unsatisfied in the social organization of each people studied. Landauer (18) in a recent article has also emphasized the importance of a number of details of childhood training in the genesis of anal character traits.

his funds were suddenly tied up by the banking moratorium. For a week he had been preoccupied with attempts to secure advances of credit from various acquaintances in order to continue his analysis, although the analyst had assured him that he would not be pressed for payment during the emergency. Under these circumstances he brings the following dream:

It was in X (where the younger of his two sons was born) and the patient was riding in a taxicab in the front seat. At first the driver was in the back seat. Then he also was in the front seat. The patient saw the machinery exposed on the footboard at the patient's side. He put his foot on it and got his foot caught momentarily in it. It seemed to slow up the machinery a bit. Then his foot was released. They went along familiar streets to Y Street near the office of the charitable organization of which the patient had been a director. There was where the woman was giving birth to a child. She was in an oven. Someone thought this was too hot for her. He said no, these were the proper conditions to facilitate birth.

The following are some of the more important associations. The oven reminds him of a crematory where he has seen the bodies of dead people. He recalls pictures of burial, a marble sarcophagus, capitals of pillars. He took his wife to the hospital in a taxicab when she was going to have her second child; but he believes the dream has to do not so much with the birth of his own younger child as with his own mother and the birth of his brother. The driver in the back seat suggests back seat driving. The patient once visited the town of X again after he had given up his work there and was taken to the office by a friend, Z, on a rainy night when the driving was somewhat dangerous. Z was an engineer whom the patient much admired. Putting his foot into the machinery suggests to the patient that his illness has thrown a monkey wrench into the machinery. . . . One of the contributors to the charitable organization lived on Y Street. Her name escapes him. She once told him that she had included a certain sum in her will to be given to the person in charge of the organization when she died. The

patient has had dreams of going back to X and seeking to arrange for credit there.

The woman's feet in the oven are very thin like his mother's thin feet and legs. He speculates that if his mother were to die he would have the love of his father. He fantasies that his younger brother would die too. He imagines a small baby of repulsive appearance like a frog which becomes a foetus in the middle stage of development. It reminds him of his brother. The brother is jovial and could get his mother to laugh as the patient was never able to do. The sarcophagus reminds him of an extravagant tomb he has seen. He thinks of his father's comment on the extravagant scale of his brother's living. . . .

The patient's wife was very ill following the birth of this second son. She contracted an infection in the hospital. She had a woman doctor. Another doctor was consulted and performed a curettage, but still she did not improve until finally a third doctor was consulted who was successful with her. . . .

The analyst, who knows that the patient's wife is under analysis, suggests that he resents the expense of his wife's analytic treatment as he had this other time. The patient replies that he is certainly not conscious of such a feeling, but comments on his niggardliness, a trait which he has in common with his father and with all Scotch people. He adds that he does not take pleasure in giving Christmas presents' as many people do. . . . He resents the refusal of funds by an organization to which he applied. . . . He pictures a man with his foot in a mire unable to move. The patient will have to manage somehow even if he can't get out. . . .

Later in the hour the patient recalls that Z pressed a bond into his hand at the time of the wife's illness, but that he, the patient, refused it.

This dream can be better understood by reference to a bit of the patient's early history. His mother had died when he was very young and after a time his father had remarried. The stepmother had soon won the little boy's affection by nursing him through a severe illness but this only increased his frustration and resentment when one year later a half-brother was

born. The dream we have just quoted illustrates one of the ways in which he sought consolation for this severe emotional trauma. He turned away from the faithless stepmother to a deep unconscious feminine attachment to the father and tried to console himself with the father's often repeated statement that he had married the stepmother only to give the patient a mother. Apparently there was also something in the father's unconscious attitude that corresponded to this wish of the patient for, as the patient grew older, the father also objected to every one of the girls in whom the patient became interested and when the patient finally married, the father developed a neurosis. In other words, the patient's and the father's neuroses (whose symptoms were also rather similar) had something of the character of a *folie à deux*.

When his first child was born the patient seems to have identified himself with him; but the second child stirred up again all the old resentment that had been aroused by the birth of the half-brother. For a few years the patient staved off a neurosis by plunging energetically into his work. The neurosis finally developed when this attempt at compensation failed.

In the dream that we have presented for discussion the central theme is the patient's feminine wish towards the father which the patient has now transferred to the analyst. He is being taken by the analyst to the hospital as he himself took his wife to the hospital for the birth of their second child. This wish however is too masochistic. Just as he had wished his stepmother to die in childbirth, he now puts himself in the place of his own wife who nearly died under similar circumstances. He rejects this feminine masochistic solution and puts his foot in the machinery to slow it up a bit. The analyst is driving him too fast to the realization and living through of his masochistic wishes and the patient tries to slow up the process. When his resistance finally relaxes he has found another solution. He has projected his feminine wishes in the form of a woman whom he now repudiates and condemns to torture or death. The woman selected by the dream has

obviously been chosen only for her symbolic significance and therefore can represent also the hated feminine rivals, step-mother and wife. With one stroke he can condemn to death both the feminine rival and the repudiated feminine part of himself.

Thus as we reconstruct the dream work we see the patient's ego attempting one possible outlet after another as a solution for his emotional dilemma. He would like to take the step-mother's place with the father and let the stepmother die in childbirth but neither the father nor the patient's conscience would tolerate that. He next attempts to bring these wishes into harmony with his father's and his own conscience by identifying with the stepmother in a suffering rôle, but this wish is too masochistic to be openly accepted by his ego. He struggles against it, tries to slow up the analysis and in this way achieves in the analysis an exceedingly condensed gratification of his wish for a masochistic relation to the father and of his narcissistic protest against it. He puts himself into a position where the masochistic gratification is forced upon him without having to acknowledge the wish for it.

In order to understand the implications of the ego's final attempt at a solution of his conflict it will be necessary to pay attention to a couple of allusions that we have not yet brought into consideration. He wishes his wife and his stepmother to die in childbirth. He also repudiates his own feminine and masochistic desires towards his father. All right! Let both wishes be gratified in the form of a woman who represents the hated women as well as his own repudiated femininity! But where is the gratification in all this? What satisfaction will the patient have, to take the place of the gratification of the feminine wishes he has repudiated? The answer to this question is revealed in the dream choice of the two figures who are to play the male and female rôles in the manifest content of the dream. The man who is driving the patient to the hospital is one who once offered the patient money. The woman who is to be cremated is one who once included the patient in her will. The attempted solution is plain. Instead of receiving a

child from his father, he is to receive a gift of money. His mother and his own repressed feminine wishes shall die. In their place he will have money. Money is no rival, does not have to be pleased. By means of it one may hope to make oneself independent of the need for other people and to live in self-sufficiency.

But the patient's ego is still not through with this problem. In this dream we have again a confirmation of my often repeated thesis that dreams must take account of unwelcome realities. The patient has no money and even when it is proffered he already is so much in need of self-justification that he cannot put himself further under obligation by accepting it. When Mr. Z. offered a bond he refused it and when the analyst offers to be lenient about pressing payment of his bill the patient cannot accept that either. Therefore the dream ends with a note of frustration and revenge. The woman who represents both his wife and the feminine side of himself in analysis will have it 'made hot' for her.

Personality Development as a Process of Progressive Organization and Adaptation

Thus in this dream, a random sample, we see most conclusive evidence for the fact that personality is no mosaic pattern of traits derived from different erotic zones. In this dream each of the three most important erotic zones, every one of the three vector tendencies, plays a rôle. The ego operates with the different erotic zones as a general operates with the units of his army, according to the strategic necessities of the campaign. When the separate army units begin to dominate the situation, then we have evidence of a high degree of disorganization. When we find such disorganization in the personality we call it a neurosis or a psychosis.

Even the concept that the integrated behavior of the organism is the result of a sort of equilibrium between 'elementary' vector tendencies probably takes too little account of the central integrating influences in shaping normal behavior. Generalized vector tendencies not yet directed towards concrete

objects are convenient abstractions but probably do not exist in real life and certainly not as 'elementary' biological tendencies. Even a basic drive like hunger craves a particular kind of real object, food, not just to receive something.

Every sort of activity involves many subsidiary processes which might be classified in part as receptive, retentive and eliminatory, but which include also many other more specific processes. Let us take for example a factory which receives raw materials and tools, retains these materials during their process of elaboration and finally disposes of the finished products. Other raw materials may be retained for future use and even waste materials and finished products may be retained for a time before they can be properly disposed of. It would be obviously absurd to speak of receiving, retaining and eliminating as 'fundamental tendencies' of the factory, or to think of the integrated activity of the factory as the result of a dynamic equilibrium between receptive, retentive, and eliminatory 'tendencies'. Quite obviously such 'tendencies' are only subordinate parts of the total integrated activity. If at any time the taking in of raw materials or holding them or getting rid of them become ends in themselves, this would obviously be evidence of a disintegration or disorganization of the normal activity of the factory.

Similarly in the organism it is misleading to speak of vector tendencies as 'elementary' biological tendencies. Nor is it a matter of indifference what is received or retained or eliminated. What shall be taken in or retained or disposed of will depend both upon the nature of the total integrated activity and also upon the phase of development of that activity (nearness to completion, etc.) in relation to the relevant external situation. In other words, in normal behavior, receiving, retaining and eliminating are merely subordinate parts of a more highly integrated activity which can be understood only in relation to a total psychological field. When this more highly integrated activity becomes disorganized however, as in dreams and neuroses, then the impulses that previously were part of an integrated pattern become dissociated (9) and displaced

upon objects that have merely a symbolic value. It is in this way, as I understand it, that the so called 'vector tendencies' arise as products of disintegration of more highly integrated patterns of adaptive behavior. This view I would offer in contrast to the concept that seems to underly much of our present psychoanalytic thinking—the concept that the integrated adaptive behavior of the organism somehow arises by combination of or by dynamic equilibrium or interaction between pre-existing 'biological tendencies' or erotic zones. This more usual view I believe takes too little account of the central organizing influence of the biological and psychological fields that constitute the integrative function of the ego.

We may perhaps best conclude by a necessarily schematic suggestion as to the real significance of the psychoanalytic character types when translated into a language that takes adequate account of the dynamic, adaptive and organizing process in the development of personality. Briefly characterized, the oral character deals with life in terms of elementary primitive self-preservative urges which confront him either with the helpless dependence of the human infant or with the primitive dangers of the jungle. The genital character is oriented about the task of integrating one's own needs to the needs of other people. This is a complex and rather unstable form of organization and requires modification or inhibition of elementary self-preservative urges in deference to the needs of others. In order to be able to take into account the needs of others it is necessary to be able at times to project one's needs and accept vicarious in place of direct gratification. Guilt reactions and masochistic behavior are the result of failures in this attempt at social integration. The anal character attempts to avoid both the dangers of the jungle and the complex task of social integration by becoming self-sufficient and living in an impersonal world in which people are treated as things and everything is subjected to impersonal laws.

I must warn you, however, that every personality is different and that this brief summary of development that I have just presented is merely a schematic outline.

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INSTINCT AND THE EGO DURING INFANCY

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The point of departure for this paper is the opinion that psychoanalysis has created a picture of early infantile experience whose claim to adequacy and validity is in some ways questionable. Thus some analytic portrayals of the actual infant seem far more the projection of analytic theory and adult passions than scientific observation. This picture of infancy has been constructed chiefly from our special knowledge of unconscious sexual fantasies and the libido theory. The value of these two contributions needs no confirmation; what does require our attention is the frequency with which our conclusions concerning infancy imply the untenable assumption that the unconscious mental life of the adult (or of the postinfantile child) is a replica of the infant's experiences.

A comparable error would be for the student of organic evolution to assume that anatomical ontogeny *exactly* repeats phylogeny. Freud's remarkable generalization (7), for example, that both the oral pervert and the neurotic, whose symptoms are due to the repression of 'perverse' fantasies, perpetuate the sensual pleasures of nursing, is fully justified by analytic data; but the conclusion that the nursing infant's actual experience is the same would be unsound. Freud, of course, never made so preposterous a statement, nor, so far as I recall, has any other intelligent analyst; yet similar assumptions are implicit in many discussions of normal infancy. We should, therefore, it seems to me, focus more clearly the more probable assumption that the residuals of infancy which we study in later life are themselves the end results of very complex developments, not restatements of primary experiences.

I propose a few modifications of our present description of infancy which seem indicated by the present knowledge of

psychoanalysts and of child psychologists. 'Infancy', or the 'infantile period', will be used in Freud's sense of the first five or six years—the 'preschool' period; and my discussion will be confined chiefly to the first one or two years. I shall discuss particularly some differences between infantile and later sexual experience which are usually disregarded by analysts; the early development of the infant's bodily tools for mastering the environment, and the relationship of this early learning period to neurotic compulsion and to ego development. I shall propose the thesis that psychoanalysis has neglected the overwhelming evidence that the need to learn how to do things, manifested in the infant's practice of its sensory, motor, and intellectual means for mastering its environment, is at least as important as pleasure seeking mechanisms in determining its behavior and development during the first two years of life. These functions were referred to frequently by Freud (7) in his early remarks on the ego instincts, but never thoroughly examined nor developed by him. Yet their more adequate formulation is fundamental, not only to our better understanding of the infant, but also to our knowledge of ego development.

I

We shall first discuss the subjective significance of sexual fantasies to the child itself. There is no question that analysis of the adult unconscious enabled Freud (7, 10) to recognize sexual fantasies which do occur in great profusion in infancy. But psychoanalysis has usually ascribed to them a compulsiveness, an unsatiated need for gratification, which very probably is justified only when the fantasy is either associated with anxiety in infancy, or else is cathected by a sexual instinct which has been biologically reinforced after puberty. We should take fully into account the evidence of lack of compulsiveness in many direct observations of infantile sexuality, and we should be on guard against ascribing to all childhood behavior the emotional intensity which is apparent in the neurotic episodes of the child, and in both the erotic and neu-

rotic tensions of adults. This means that the goal of infantile erotism is not normally orgasm; it is not normally a compulsive need unless it is associated with anxiety and therefore differs dynamically from the adult's.

Two of many similar observations will illustrate these comments. A boy and a girl of three are playing in 'innocent' fashion. The girl then lies down on her back and flexes her legs. The boy lies upon her, and they make coitus-like movements. The girl says, 'I be mama'; the boy says, 'I be Dad'. After half a minute or so of this play they stop and turn to an entirely different game. A second example of erotism in infancy is also pertinent to the much discussed problem of the 'discovery of the vagina'. A girl one and a half years old lies down on her back, spreads her legs, and titillates her clitoris with a finger. She then reaches for a newspaper, tears it into strips, and jabs these strips quite sadistically at her vulva lower down. Obviously, she has enjoyed sensual pleasure from stimulation of the clitoris followed by the fantasy of being penetrated, for the flexibility of the paper precludes its value as an instrument of frictional pleasure. After half a minute, she gets up and plays at other games.¹

These are indeed typical illustrations of the presence of erotic sexuality in infantile fantasy and play—what the analyst of adult patients would expect. But what may be surprising to him is the absence of compulsiveness in these children's sexual behavior. In later life comparable situations would culminate definitely in one of two ways: orgasmic gratification, or frustration followed by clear indications of unresolved tensions and conflict. Yet there was no indication of conflict immediately

¹ This observation may be interpreted as a female or as a bisexual fantasy, for obviously she is acting the part of the penetrator. In either case the notion that there is not only a clitoris but an orifice to penetrate, and that not the anal orifice, but one approached from the front, seems clearly demonstrated. At the age of three this girl was observed pointing eagerly at her clitoris, calling it 'button', then at her vagina, calling it 'ga-ga' (anus), and finally, but with far less evidence of interest and affect, pointing in between and saying 'wee-wee' (urine). The later observation seems also to show knowledge and interest in both clitoris and vagina; whether she regards the vagina as like the anus, or as the anus, cannot be proven.

disturbing the subsequent play of these children, or their happy relations with each other and adults.²

Anna Freud, in *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (6), calls attention to a closely related fact: 'Voluntary participation of adults in the [child's] distortion of reality is always bound to certain strict conditions. . . . The good will of the adult for the child's mechanism for denying reality ceases at the moment when the transition between fantasy and reality is no longer carried out smoothly, instantaneously, and without friction. . . . [It ceases] at the moment when the activity of the child's fantasy ceases to be play and becomes automatism or compulsion.'

This seems to me one of the most vital statements of Anna Freud's book. I believe this interaction of adult intolerance and compulsive play is true not only of the adult's attitude towards the child's denial of reality, but is true of his attitude towards play and behavior in general. This means that when a child's fantasies, or its expression of them in behavior, evoke anxiety in it ('real anxiety' in infancy, according to Anna Freud's terminology), there is conflict, and this produces compulsive behavior to which the adult reacts with a tendency to retaliate or condemn.³ These facts seem to me to go a long way towards explaining why children's play does not generally appear to the adult to be as much sexually motivated as psychoanalytic theory leads him to expect. For only when erotic

² The author concedes freely that this and later observations are incomplete, and that evidence of the most important conflicts and anxiety is often most completely repressed. The danger of misinterpreting data in terms of theoretical presupposition, which is emphasized here, as well as the danger of jumping at conclusions from superficial evidence, always involves a problem of judgment.

³ Dr. Bertram Lewin, in discussing this problem, questions that the child's compulsiveness is responsible for the adults' intolerance. This is certainly true of the child's initial violation of adult taboos, and that the adults' own guilt and allied mechanisms are responsible, I of course fully agree. But when the child's acts are not compulsive, the child quickly adapts to the adults' intolerance by concealment of its acts in secret play. The child is thus constantly establishing an equilibrium between its impulses and the parents' morality, unless this adjustment is disturbed by an inability to modify compulsive behavior.

presentations are compulsive do they repeatedly exceed the limits set by adult tolerance, whatever this limit may be in the individual parent. And they suggest that critics of analytic theory should not be dogmatically refuted when they argue that the child who obviously and persistently confirms Freud's theory of infantile sexuality is acting neurotically.

II

Analysts should reconsider another premise which is implied in a large amount of analytic literature, that an unconscious complex (a group of fantasies and memory fragments which are closely related emotionally) reproduces with some exactitude the ideation of the infant. Freud was long ago compelled to modify his original discovery of primal scenes by reinterpreting them as memories of fantasies. I think we should go a step further in reconsidering to what extent the unconscious fantasies revealed by the analysis of adults actually resembles the infantile mind.

This fallacy of seeking to define infantile life in terms of adult 'complexes' is especially well illustrated by the controversy regarding the development of female sexuality. A review of this literature reveals two very striking facts: the diversity of theoretical views, and (excepting Melanie Klein) an amazing lack of disagreement about the clinical observations from which these theories are derived. What is controversial, are the various psychoanalytic reconstructions of infantile experience from this material. Jones (21) approaches the point I am making when he affirms that his material illustrates the complexes described by Freud, but regards them as secondary neuroses and not valid proofs of the fundamental nature of the girl child.

The positivism of each contributor to this controversy has been engendered by the effort of all to reconstruct female infancy on the premise that it is more or less a mimeograph of adult unconscious fantasies. Were that actually the case, so many conclusions from similar data could not be so well argued. If, however, we renounce the implicit premise that the adult unconscious fantasy is a fairly literal reproduction of infantile

experience, the controversy seems less perplexing and the positive values of these contributions become clear. Melanie Klein's interpretation (23) of infancy in terms of violent primitive aggressions and the associated anxiety represents a more emotional distortion. That she has described fantasies which do exist and are vital in the development of certain character types can be confirmed; but that they are cathected universally in infancy with the passion and compulsiveness of the acting-out paranoid is a serious distortion of normal infantile experience.

The discussion of female sexuality illustrates a broader thesis. An adult's desire to grasp a pencil or a wisp of smoke is very commonly the expression of an erotic fantasy; yet it would be silly to consider that an infant in the cradle who grasps a thumb is experiencing a genital fantasy. The infant is performing an important act for that age which later on will be compulsively important only if it is either useful or erotized. Similarly, an adult's strongly cathected interest in blood and wounds commonly signifies the repression of a castration fantasy. A one-year-old girl, while under observation, showed pleasurable excitement in her first cut, the appearance of the blood, pride in the bandage, and subsequently she bandaged her doll. These reactions do not necessarily imply an association as yet with fantasies about her sexual organs. Such fantasies, however, were much in evidence towards the end of her second year. When visiting a little boy at this time, she sat on the floor and was preoccupied with holding a wooden fish in the position of a penis. In the next couple of months she frequently used clothespins in this way. During this period the realistic investigation of the bodies of others was frequently in evidence. But the only objective evidence of anxiety in this little girl occurred when this interest was subsiding. At a bathing beach she saw the penis of a small boy; she suddenly stopped playing, looked startled, and she was upset for several hours. (Probably she had concluded from her initial inquiries that her father and brother were the only two possessors of penises, and the disillusionment aroused an overt anxiety which

the original discovery had not.) Nevertheless, there were no further indications of anxiety and conflict subsequently. At four and a half she and her brother were seen a few times mutually exhibiting their genitals and playing that they were urinating in each other's presence. Even at this late age, this overt erotism did not display compulsive features; there was no evidence of conflict or difficulty in turning to other games when interrupted.

That the period of fantasizing the clothespin phallus and overt curiosity may have been significant in this girl's sexual development, there is no reason to doubt. That these fantasies and experiences will contribute to a fantasy complex similar to other girls but specifically characteristic of this individual, and that definitive anxieties will be unconsciously associated with it, there is every reason to expect. The earlier experiences will become ingredients of the total cathected experience, but not inevitably the determinant or the model for the castration fantasies of the adult. We are, therefore, unjustified in assuming a mental problem in this infant on the basis of these experiences (excepting probably the shock reaction at the beach) or as having the significance, and particularly the compulsive characteristics of similar trends in later life.

Jeanne Lampl-deGroot (5) has recently described this fallacy of 'transposing back' analytic data in these words: 'I think it is an error in method to assume that when there is a genetic relation between various events those events are identical. The fact that A follows B does not mean that A is the same as B.' 'It seems to me,' she continues, 'that if we are not continually on our guard against equating later developments with their earlier stages we shall inevitably be led into imagining the existence of mental processes in early periods of life where we have no means of verifying our assumptions empirically. . . . For by assimilating early stages with late ones it passes over the developmental processes and is thus seen to be a genetic-dynamic method only in appearance.'

It is my full agreement with this warning that initiated the discussion I have presented here. This is not a denial that our

analytic knowledge of infantile complexes obtained in the individual case from memories and skilful reconstructions are sometimes correct. But it means that this material represents the unconscious survival of a fantasy system in which the infantile neurosis had culminated; that it is not so frequently the origin as it is the result of the neurotic-making complex before repression. The infantile memories recovered in adult analysis should, therefore, be regarded as critical end points of the infantile neurosis which have been repressed, but not necessarily pictures of the most important or characteristic experiences of the infant's life.

III

The further consideration of the two forms of play discussed above—the transiently, repetitively, satisfying, and the compulsive—leads to a vital aspect of childhood development which has been too much neglected by analysts. I refer to the development of ability to master a segment of the environment. The primary need to perform those functions which serve this purpose I shall refer to as an ‘instinct to master’. By this I mean an inborn drive to do and to learn how to do. This instinct appears to determine more of the behavior of the child during the first two years than even the need for sensual pleasure.

‘Instinct to master’ is perhaps not the best terminology. ‘Instinct’ is open to the usual objection that it is used throughout in the special psychoanalytic sense of drive, of a biological need experienced mentally as emotion, and impelling the organism to tension-relieving behavior. The term ‘instinct to master’ (or ‘mastery instinct’) is suggested by Freud’s occasional references to a *Bewältigungstrieb*; but his usage seems to serve as a convenient evasion when its classification as an ego or sexual instinct was uncertain, whereas my purpose is to contrast its rudimentary manifestations with those of the sexual instincts. As used in analysis (15), the ultimate aim of the sexual instincts (libido) is always sensual pleasure or its derivatives, whether the specific pleasure is of the sex organs or

some other erotogenic zone; whereas the aim of the instinct to master, as I shall use the concept, is the pleasure in executing a function successfully, regardless of its sensual value. Nor is it necessarily identical with sadism, for sadism is a response to a sexually cathected object, while the objective of the instinct to master is the alteration (sometimes the cognition) of an external situation. The 'instinct to master' is at least an appropriate term because all manifestations of this instinct, (such as manipulation, locomotion, comprehension and reasoning) seem in various ways to serve the ultimate purpose of adjusting the environment to oneself. Its simplest manifestations are the use of the sense organs, the peripheral muscular apparatus, and the rational association of ideas. Eventually, the functions developed in response to this instinct are integrated as that ego, some of whose relatively mature manifestations have been extensively studied, but whose rudiments have been given scant attention by analysts.

We are accustomed to think of the newborn as fully equipped for at least one adjustment to his environment, that of suckling. What we often overlook is that suckling is not only an inherited reflex, but also a 'practiced' activity. A normal newly born child makes complete sucking movements when the lips are stimulated, but there is a gap between the first reflex response and proficient suckling in most normal infants—sometimes minutes and sometimes hours. So, even in the performance of this earliest function, the child usually requires some practice before it achieves fully efficient performance; and we are, therefore, usually (if not always) justified in differentiating two phases in the development of this earliest paradigm of both libidinal and mastery instincts: the reflex phase and the phase of acquired proficiency and gratification.⁴

These same two phases are clearer in the early development of other behavior forms which serve the infant's need to extend

⁴ It is interesting to note that even the breathing of the newborn is anticipated by prenatal respiratory movements. For intensive studies of the development of foetal reflexes see Leonard Carmichael's monograph (4) and studies of the human foetus by Davenport Hooker (20a).

its control of its outer world. We should not overlook the early development of the special senses as essential tools for environmental mastery; and the evidence available indicates that the adaptation of the organs of hearing, sight, touch, etc. to variable conditions is attained by periods of concentrated practice. The development of motor abilities, such as grasping, reaching, handling, turning over, sitting up, etc., is much better understood. Gesell (14) has proven that these functions appear without special training as responses to the maturation of the neurophysiological apparatus necessary to perform them. He has shown that each neuromuscular ability appears at very definite times in the infant's life. But their effective use is not immediately established; each is practiced over a period of weeks. In achieving locomotion, for example, the child repeats a step supported by both hands, by one hand, then uses neither, but steps towards a place of safety; then it relies on a single support, and eventually tries walking unassisted. During these weeks a considerable amount of its behavior will be concentrated in practicing these stages of learning to master space with his legs. But, when the child has learned to walk, this compulsion to repeat over and over a certain locomotor movement, to practice it for its own sake, disappears, and the function is then at the disposal of the ego for use in a multitude of situations.

The development of the vocal organs also illustrates these two phases in the development of an ego function. Before the infant uses words as such it learns to make each component sound separately. Often it practices a new consonant for days or weeks, especially when alone, often in its crib at night. And when the child has learned one, it goes to work on another. That its practice of each sound is repetitive until the mechanism of production is mastered, is characteristic of this behavior.

That these crude observations do actually point to a fundamental principle of human behavior has been shown more scientifically by the thorough studies of Myrtle McGraw (25). Her studies are oriented primarily by her interest in the *process of development*, and in expanding knowledge of child

psychology as to what behavior, or patterns, appear in infancy and when; and by showing the basic principle involved in their emergence, recession, and interaction. Her method has been to make serial observations on selected samples of infantile behavior. (What she calls 'action patterns', I have referred to here as 'partial ego functions'.) From her data she has demonstrated that the development during infancy of every one of a series of useful motor abilities shows at first a reflex pattern; and that after a period of inhibition of the reflex, this pattern reappears as a cortically controlled function which is no longer a stereotyped reflex, but a function which is modified and developed by use. She describes the increased tendency to use and practice these functions during the latter phase (25a), and comments as follows: 'Development of these deliberate or voluntary movements progress from a disorganized and poorly controlled to an organized and integrated type of movement' (25b). 'Learning and maturation are not two distinct processes but are two aspects of the same process. To attribute behavior growth in infants more to one than the other is therefore unwarranted' ⁵ (25c).

My thesis is that the principle manifested by these two active phases (disregarding the intermediary phase of the inhibited reflex) is also at work in complex functions of play and work involving the total personality, and that they are developed from those partial functions which have been best studied by the genetic psychologists' direct observation of infant behavior. The translation of such objective results as McGraw's into theory of instinct provides a broader concept which enables us to formulate the relationship of bodily function to biological need and emotional drive, and to extend our vision of the

⁵ This distinction between the 'reflex' and 'cortically modified' use of the same structure has long been recognized by psychobiology as the distinction between 'mentally integrated' and 'mentally unintegrated' action patterns. In the words of Dr. Adolf Meyer (26): 'I usually draw the attention of the student to the knee-jerk and the voluntary use of the leg for a kick. A good kick of a ball has a time and choice and comprehensiveness-pattern different from the reflex knee jerk. What holds for a kick holds throughout the mental and non-integrated isomorphs.' This conception has long been a fundamental principle of psychobiology.

interrelation of infantile and adult, neurotic and normal behavior, all in terms of a fundamental principle. Even at the risk of some complication of terminology, we need to analyze the process by which infantile behavior which satisfies the basic need to master develops, and the relationship of rudimentary partial function to fully developed adjustments of the total organism.

For the facts which we have mentioned show that mature behavior is a synthesis of abilities (27, 28) which are first developed in little pieces during infancy. The development of each little piece, prior to more complex integration, follows a plan common to all: the emergence of a physiological ability to perform a reflex pattern; a period of practice and learning; and mature proficiency in using this function. The *reflex phase* is characterized by its stereotypy, and its close relationship to specific stimuli rather than useful objectives or emotional need. The *learning phase* is characterized by independence of stimulus, evidence of the need to practice repetitively, and increasing ability to modify the stereotyped pattern in useful ways. *Maturity* of the partial function is characterized by proficiency to use the apparatus at will, without further practice, its adaptation to adjustments of the total personality rather than its exercise for its own sake, and its increasing integration with other partial functions.

It is the learning phase which specially interests us here. For the infant must learn to use the neuromuscular apparatus before it can do what it wants, and this purpose is achieved by the practice and adaptation of the originally reflex apparatus. In the need to practice a partial function until proficiency is attained, we see the first objective evidence of the instinct to master at work. As with all other instinctual manifestations, the tendency of the infant to be absorbed in a new activity for days or weeks provides evidence of the recurrence of the drive. There is often a definitely compulsive quality to the need to practice the unlearned function which is not apparent in the normal exercise of the proficient function later on. This quality of compulsiveness is reminiscent of the stereotyped

response to stimulus characteristic of the reflex stage, and it also resembles compulsive behavior whose neurotic manifestations have been especially studied by psychoanalysis.

These facts suggest a very broad and important generalization: that *compulsiveness* (as of the abnormal play of later infancy discussed earlier in this paper, and of neurotic traits at any stage of life) *is always a regression to the normal stage of the unlearned function; and that compulsiveness is always associated with an inability to exercise proficiently a function, simple or complex, which gratifies the need to master.* When ability to exercise a function to control and modify a situation has been attained and is not frustrated, compulsive manifestations disappear. But they recur throughout life, whenever control of the apparatus is undeveloped or its effective use is prevented by internal or external causes. Undeveloped or obstructed functions, therefore, always evoke compulsion, but functions which achieve their goals do not, whether the goals be libidinal, egoistic, or—as is generally the case—both.

This process of learning is therefore the foundation of ego development. The more mature the ego the less evidence there is of the compulsive type of repetition in any of its forms. From this viewpoint, the ego may be defined as the sum of those integrations of partial functions which enable instinctual energy to be discharged so adequately that the repetition compulsion is not in evidence. The primal purpose of the ego seems to be the development of the means for such complete discharge of instinct tension that the latent repetition compulsion does not become manifest.

An example of the normal recurrence (or 'regression to') the infantile phase of the unlearned function is the precoital sexual experience of the adolescent. We are prone to contrast mature erotic object relationship with neurotic inhibition, and to recognize that the latter are so nearly universal in adolescence as to be practically 'normal'. But psychoanalytic study of the rôle of successive displacements of infantile love objects in reducing the anxiety which inhibits the immature has led to our overlooking the equally important coincident process

whereby the adolescent learns by a succession of erotic experiences to appraise more and more realistically his love objects, and the genital relationship with them. Development of the ego functions, as well as displacement of infantile objects, are therefore essential for sexual maturity. This aspect of the complex process of adolescence (which is duplicated by successful therapeutic analyses) seems to me very similar in kind to the development of simpler motor abilities. Both contain the sequence of biological preparation, activity of the repetition compulsion during a learning period, and its disappearance when maturity of any function is achieved.

We find the reactivation of (or regression to) the learning phase of infantile development of partial functions, also in the ego component of all neurotic symptoms, character traits, and behavior. The greatest therapeutic achievement of psychoanalysis has been the demonstration of the etiological rôle of infantile fixation, unconscious conflict, anxiety, and the guilt mechanisms in producing these symptoms (11). I wish here only to call attention to the fact that all transference neuroses show some disturbance of matured ego function by the conflicts with which we have been long familiar. In previous publications (16, 17, 18, 19), I have shown the primary rôle of defective development of certain ego functions in the etiology of other personality disorders (paranoid personality, schizoid personality, passive feminine character, psychoses, etc.).⁶

⁶ A further observation by Gesell (14) on the development of neuromuscular function is specially significant. This is the fact that in exceptional cases where a child learns to walk before it learns to crawl, continuous observation will show that there is always a subsequent period during which for a short time it practices crawling soon after learning to walk. Such observations indicate the probability that no function, simple or complex, is definitely established until the genetically earlier phases of that function have been attained and exercised. Evidence of the working of such a law in such complex functions as social behavior and object love seem brilliantly illustrated by the therapeutic aspects of psychoanalysis. In successful cases, we clearly demonstrate how an infantile, a childhood, or adolescent phase which has been repressed ('passed over'), must be experienced before a social function or sublimation to which it contributes can mature. Thus, a patient had between puberty and the age of twenty-two experienced a nearly complete inhibition of masturbating impulses and erotic approaches to girls. At twenty-two he had himself circumcised and between

We may summarize some of the conditions which release that compulsive repetition of an effort which is characteristic of the phase of the unlearned partial function as follows:

1. In the voluntary exercise of sensorimotor patterns before the capacity for efficient performance has been achieved by practice:
 - a. Special senses;
 - b. Functions contributing to motor mastery of the environment (suckling, manipulation, locomotion, etc.);
 - c. Speech, intellect.
2. During a period of learning new patterns of a more complex nature, prior to the attainment of efficient performance:
 - a. Some forms of play;
 - b. Mental and muscular work;
 - c. Adolescent sexual behavior.
3. When the exercise of a matured function is disturbed by:
 - a. External frustration (parents, analytic transference neurosis, limitations imposed by other individuals or a group);
 - b. Anxiety and guilt (psychoneurosis);
 - c. Realistic anxiety (real dangers, traumatic neurosis, panic);

that time and his analysis had enjoyed a considerable amount of erotic relations which at times achieved nearly normal and mature fulfilment. In the first months of his analysis, coitus was replaced by tentative approaches, the dominance of erotic investigation over coital desire, mutual masturbation fantasies, and other activities more characteristic of normal adolescence than of a man of his individual experience. Unless such delayed living of omitted phases are achieved the repetition compulsion persists, either in its manifest form as neurotic symptom or character trait, or in its latent form, as an inhibition and avoidance of that function; it is as true of early motor functions studied by Gesell, as of the complex manifestations studied by the analyst.

In discussing this point, Dr. Edward Liss has commented: 'I think the significance of your paper lies in the fact that the repetitive act may at certain emotional levels be a perfectly healthy phenomenon. For therapeutic purposes, this cannot be emphasized enough, because the technique of Melanie Klein would be definitely contraindicated in the repetitive phase and yet quite in place in the compulsive phase. It also brings up the question of criteria for determining the need for psychoanalysis before the age of six.'

- d. Survival of a dominant compulsive pattern of instinctual discharge which is not subordinated to reality principle or superego (*Schicksalneurose*, negative therapeutic reaction, impulsive personality).
4. When functions essential to normal adult object relations have not matured (psychosis, psychopath, ego defect neuroses 16, 17).

IV

Three stages in the development of any ego function have been sketched; the physiological preparation of an ability; the development of its efficiency by use and practice; its mature proficiency. Even this slight knowledge of the rudiments of ego development permits us to glimpse a concept which will explain early developmental stages dynamically without limiting our comprehension to interpretations of pregenital libido, sadism, and anxiety. For it suggests that *function initiates the wish*; that the development of the ability to execute a certain function may determine, for example, the pregenital aims by which libidinal gratification is sought during a certain phase. The familiar psychoanalytic explanation of development of needs in terms of transformations of the libido alone implies that we strive for what we want; but consideration of the development of the ego indicates that in many cases what we may desire or choose is determined by what we are able to get.

For example, it is customary for analysts to think of the 'anal phase' as determined by a biologically produced increment of the desire for anal types of sensual pleasure at a certain age, and by the efforts of educators to deprive the child of this pleasure. There can be no doubt that both anal pleasure and parental frustration do determine an important group of fantasies associated with anal functions. But this does not prove (unless it be an obsessional child) that there is always and inevitably a definite period of the child's life when these dominate its development and produce incessant conflict with whomever trains the child.

The occasional statements by mothers that some babies show

a spontaneous desire to control their excretions before training is instituted need not necessarily be erroneous because they do not accord with analytic theory.⁷ It seems quite probable that bowel control, like hand, voice, and postural control, is normally initiated by the neurological capacity to use the sphincters. This, then, would illustrate the general principle that what a baby is able to do it wants to do. Excretory control is established easily by the children of those races, for example the Chinese, who do not feel our European dislike of faeces. It is practiced by animals. Astute observers seem pretty certain that it is the rule rather than the exception for infants who are trained early during the first year to go through a later period of breaking training. And finally, it contradicts all knowledge of the universal desire to exercise neurologically possible functions to believe that the anal sphincters are the only muscle group under partial voluntary control which the human being does not spontaneously desire to exercise efficiently when he can.

For two months, a three-year-old boy was frequently occupied with games of 'making coffee'. These sometimes bordered on compulsive behavior in the intensity of emotion he showed while playing them, and his resistance at times to distraction. His favorite of many ways of 'making coffee' was by manipulating three ash trays in imitation of a Silex machine, but he reduplicated this with many materials. He poured sand on his head and called it, 'making coffee'; he pushed the dog into the piano and called it 'making coffee'; he slid down father's back and the backs of chairs and called it 'making coffee'. There were many anal associations to the game, and during this period he was specially interested in his own 'ga-ga' (faeces or anus), and those of animals, trolley cars, other people, etc. He sometimes called coffee 'ga-ga'. He talked about, 'coffee go in at top, come out below'. He referred to his faeces as coffee. He identified with coffee in sliding down father's back. Anal fantasies were the most constant associations to these

⁷ Dr. René Spitz recalls that Anna Freud would often remark in the Vienna Child Analytic Seminar: 'At two, children become clean anyway.'

games, but they were not the whole story. Almost every emotional interest of this period of this boy's life was associated with them. The top of the ash tray was called a mouth. He would jam matches rhythmically into a hole between ash trays, and then poke his sister with them. Desire to display these achievements was conspicuous. And finally the game had developed from his special interest in watching his mother make coffee and being forbidden to use the real Silex. It was also a continuous elaboration of a special interest, which he had always displayed, in mechanical manipulations. To appreciate only the importance of the anal sublimation in this play is to overlook very important determinants of its exceptional intensity and duration—the overdetermination of the libido-revealing fantasies, the solution of the real frustration by identification with mother, and the fulfilment of the instinct to master the environment by the creation and skilful use of the imitation of a real mechanical device. The excitement and pleasure of the games was determined not only by the libidinal wishes, though its near compulsiveness did display their intensity and his anxiety at renouncing their gratification. But the pleasure was also determined by his ability to function skilfully, displayed with a pride like that of a child in its first unassisted walking.

It therefore seems worth while to assume that libidinal aims may be as much a consequence of development of ego functions as that function is a response to desire for sensual pleasure and its derivatives. These two principles are of course supplementary and not contradictory. It is not necessary to deny that a progression of pregenital primacy may be biologically conditioned in order to affirm that the choice of pleasurable aims is determined in part by an ability to achieve them.

One further generalization may be risked. This is the notion that the development and exercise of ego functions predominates in early infancy (approximately the first two or three years) and determines the aims of pleasure instincts, while libidinal activity becomes relatively more and more decisive

as the culmination of the œdipus complex⁸ is approached. Both the critical and constructive aspects of my discussion are especially pertinent to the first one, two, or three years of life, whereas Freud's description of the libidinal motivations and fantasy life of the fourth and fifth years needs less amendment.

CONCLUSIONS

This article is a preliminary effort, based chiefly on psychologic and psychoanalytic data already available, to prepare for more intensive study of the early development of partial functions eventually synthesized into the ego.

I have suggested that that basic psychobiologic urge of human beings to control as large a segment of the outer world as is compatible with their individual limitations and those imposed upon them is manifested in early infancy by the exercise of rudimentary sensorimotor functions. I have called this drive an 'instinct to master', and have emphasized that pleasure is derived from this instinct by the effective use of those sensory, motor, and intellectual functions physiologically available. That the central nervous system is not only a utility, but serves a basic instinct to master in the sense of emotional drives which are gratified by performing these functions, seems clearly indicated by the immediate desire of the infant to use each ego function and to perfect it as soon as this has become physiologically possible, and by the perpetuation of these satisfactions through life whenever an executive function is efficiently performed whether for its own sake or in the service of other instincts.

The primacy of a desire to exercise a function is especially

⁸ I agree with Melanie Klein's view (23) that there is an earlier development of intensified object relationship with the parent of the opposite sex than was recognized by Freud, culminating in the second year. The girl whose play with her clitoris and vulva at eighteen months (p. 35) had at this time been manifesting an increasing intensification of need for her father. I believe, however, that this early heterosexual object relationship does not display the compulsive erotism and aggressive jealousy of the later œdipal period and of later adolescence, and has been correctly evaluated by Lampl-deGroot (5).

apparent in the earliest year or two of infancy. Three stages in the use of each component are apparent after it has appeared on the neurological scene: first, the 'reflex stage' of stereotyped stimulus response; second, the 'learning stage' of unperfected use and modification, when the need to practice the function repetitively is conspicuous; and, third, the mature stage of proficiency, normally accompanied by subsidence of compulsive use of the function and its secondary utilization for realistic, erotic, and social aims.

The further development of ego functions and their synthesis are profoundly affected by environmental influences whose consideration I have not entered into here. Among these are frustrations, education, discipline, and especially the individual tolerance of parents and nurses. Still more profound effects result from the infant's relations with its love objects. Not only does the quest for love exert a selective influence upon the choice of available functions to exercise, but the infant's earliest identifications with the behavior and attitudes of others profoundly affect its ego development. An important example is the early identification with those attitudes and actions of the 'phallic' (or masterful) mother recently emphasized by Brunswick (3). As I have shown from clinical material in previous papers (16, 17, 18, 19) the failure to establish this and other primitive identifications is responsible for the pathological ego defects apparent in some adult character neuroses and psychoses.

Ego psychology has so far dealt chiefly with the description of functions which have already attained a high degree of development and integration. This presupposes a degree of ego maturity which is probably not fully attained until the latter portion of the infantile period (preschool years). Many analysts have contributed to the study of defenses against neurotic anxiety; this has been a vital advance in our comprehension and treatment of personality problems, but it has incidentally led to an unbalanced trend to regard defense mechanisms and the executant functions of the ego as identical (20). Yet present knowledge of ego development justifies

the extension of our present theory. We should recognize that the earliest phases have already been fruitfully studied by nonanalytic psychiatrists, and that their contributions are supplementary and not contradictory to ours. Development is complex, and a complete picture of it escapes our knowledge and comprehension. But we can be sure, not only that a dynamic and genetic relationship exists between the pleasure of suckling and genital love, but also between the baby's first success at placing a thumb between two fingers whenever he wills, and the ability to tolerate his neurosis, and to perform his work in the adult world.

ADDENDA

INSTINCT TO MASTER. I am especially indebted to Dr. Frank d'Elseaux for the stimulation of his informal discussion of this topic at a seminar.

Our use of the 'instinct to master' is most closely approached in the presentation by Bernfield (1) of the *Bewältigungstrieb*, and by Kardiner's view (2) of the biological significance of the ego instinct in traumatic neurosis and epilepsy.

Dr. René Spitz states that the instinct to master begins with the cathexis of the organs. This clarifies the relationship between the concept of an instinct to master which I am presenting here and the broader concept of the ego instincts. I should regard the ego instincts as primarily devoted to the organic processes essential to life and growth; and those drives to which I refer as the 'instinct to master' as a later application of these to the use of those organs, particularly the skeletal motor systems, sense organs, and higher brain centers, whose function is manipulation of the environment.

In his discussion of this topic, Dr. Paul Federn points out quite rightly that the contrast between libido and ego is not Freud's distinction but mine (3). It is not my intention to deny the libidization of the ego described by Freud, but to emphasize that the ego develops by the integration of a multitude of functions which serve the instinct to master. These functions are normally at the service of the libido in obtaining gratification, either as instruments for mastery of environment or libidinal actions which may be disturbed by their narcissistic cathexes. Freud has referred (4) to 'that general instinct of mastery when we find it serving the sexual function we call sadism'.

Dr. Lawrence Kubie criticizes the hypothesis of an 'instinct to master' on the ground that all those manifestations which I discuss (sucking, walking, etc.) are neurological patterns, and the need to exercise them is inherent in the physiological pattern rather than in an 'instinct' to use them in the psychoanalytic sense. He contends that the child does not really 'learn to walk', but merely executes an inevitable reflex. I believe my further discussion will show that the instinct to master is apparent in the need to exercise, adapt, and modify the neuromuscular pattern, whose primary existence is certainly not

denied by me. McGraw (25d) puts it this way: 'Although the acquisition of the power of walking erect is obviously dependent upon a degree of maturation or ripening of the nervous system it nevertheless has the essential elements involved in a learning process.' Dr. Kubie's acceptance of the fact that, when one bites to hurt, or walks to get to mother, one is truly gratifying an instinct, is beside my point; for these are exploitations of the motor pattern for the gratification of other instincts. I wish to show that the desire for motor function is primary, and its application for libidinal or sadistic purposes a later development.

That most manifestations of the instinct to master cannot be empirically differentiated from sadism, I fully grant; for the instinct to master serves or is merged with sadism when the situation to be mastered involves control of an object, or the representation of an object, which is loved. But I think such observations as the following suggest the justification for considering it primarily an asexual drive. A child struggles to use a pencil for the first time in its life, and eventually draws two straight lines. It gazes at these, then points to them, studies them and eventually calls them 'mama' and 'daddy'. Similar phenomena are observable in other handiwork of infants, in which a drawing or a block structure is first made, then named or made the material of a fantasy. This secondary libidinization of the apparatus of the instinct of mastery (building, drawing) by fantasy is far more fundamental to the mental life of infancy than is apparent later on. But I am not at all sure that pleasure in the adult use of tools is entirely libidinal, though it is undoubtedly true that it usually does represent an unconscious sexual fantasy.

THE 'LEARNING PHASE' AND THE REPETITION COMPULSION. In my presentation of this paper, I stated that the need to practice the partial function during the learning phase, as well as the compulsive play of later infancy and the compulsiveness of neurotic symptoms in general, were manifestations of the 'repetition compulsion'. This was criticized by Drs. Bertram Lewin, Edward Liss, Lawrence Kubie, Abraham Kardiner, and Paul Federn, a majority of the discussants. The two chief objections to my statements were that I used the term 'repetition compulsion' in a different sense from Freud, and that the 'repetition compulsion' was an unnecessary complication of the theory of instinct in general, and of my formulation of the 'instinct to master' in particular; that it was either a restatement of a simpler terminology, or altogether false.

Several arguments were contributed to the first criticism, that I misused or misunderstood Freud's theory of the repetition compulsion. I was reminded that Freud had stated the repetition compulsion to be a manifestation of the death instinct. Disregarding the possible speculation whether the instinct to master is itself derived from the death instinct, my answer is that Kubie's argument (24) appeals to me, that the phenomena attributed by Freud to the repetition compulsion are characteristic of all instincts, not merely of destructive ones. But Freud (12) did not say the death instinct proves the repetition compulsion; he used the evidence for the repetition compulsion (repetitive play, transference neurosis, traumatic neurosis, *Schicksalneurose*) as one argument for the existence of the death instinct and the process of fusion.

A more cogent criticism was voiced by Dr. Paul Federn, who said that Freud meant by repetition compulsion those expressions of instinctual needs which were independent of the pleasure principle, whereas I used it to characterize repetitive behavior that was pleasurable—particularly the infantile practice of partial function during the learning phase. This, I believe, is a correct statement of Freud's usual meaning. Even so, I would suggest that although the phenomena from which Freud himself induced the repetition compulsion are cases of instinctual activity apparently independent of the pleasure seeking motive, they may still be the expressions of the same basic drive to perform certain activities observed in the infant's need to practice partial functions. I suggest that the repetition compulsion in adult life is not so much the 'return of the repressed', described by Freud (12), in the sense of repetition as a substitute for memory of a specific experience, as it is the revival of that same property of instinct which is clearly observable in the need to learn how to master.

In this connection, I want to call particular attention to two passages in Freud's discussion (12) of the repetition compulsion (p. 42): 'It would then be the task of the higher layers of the psychic apparatus [ego?] to bind the instinct excitation that reaches the primary process [id?] . . . It is only after the binding has been successfully accomplished that the pleasure principle would have an opportunity to assert its way without hindrance. Till then, the other task of the psychic apparatus would take precedence, viz., to obtain control or to bind the excitation, not in opposition to the pleasure principle but independently of it and in part without regard to it.' (p. 24): . . . 'in child play the repetition compulsion and direct pleasurable satisfaction seem then to be inextricably intertwined.'

I should like to paraphrase these statements, substituting 'ego function' for 'higher layers of the psychic apparatus', and 'instinct' for 'primary process': *when the ego function [in the service of the instinct to master] is adequate, the pleasure principle may function; when it is not adequate the repetition compulsion is manifested; in child play the repetition compulsion and pleasure principle converge.* These theoretical considerations, and also the one example of infantile play cited by Freud, suggest that Freud could regard the phase of learning the partial function as a manifestation of the repetition compulsion, even though it were evidently pleasurable.

I do not, however, agree with Brickner and Kubie (2) and Kubie (24) in their conclusion that the repetition compulsion is a superfluous theory, and especially with the argument of the earlier paper (2) (p. 484): 'Whenever . . . the superego begins to demand certain rejected ritualistic performances apart from the direct and immediate urgency of instinctual need we have what is clinically recognizable as the repetition compulsions (. . . this definition would include Freud's use of the concept in connection with the play of children and the symptoms of the traumatic neurosis).' (p. 486): ' . . . the repetition compulsion is due to the direct and active manifestation of the superego.' Kubie aptly illustrates this by saying (24) (p. 393): '[Freud's induction] seems to be as unnecessary as it would be to invoke a repetition compulsion in order to explain the continuous escape of steam from a boiling kettle'. But Freud looked at this phenomenon from the different perspective of a counterpressure on a lid

which produces a phenomenon from which we can induce that the latent pressure of the steam existed before it was in evidence. From behavior which occurs when an instinct is not completely released, Freud concluded the repetition compulsion was a property of instinct, not a property of the frustrations which makes it manifest.

Kubie further objects that as all instinctual tensions recur, for example, the desire to suckle, repetition compulsion is a redundant and therefore unnecessary term. The distinction between recurrence of need and compulsiveness is the crux of the matter. They are not identical. Satiation, latency, and recurrence of drive is the normal sequence whenever the ego is adequate to perform the instinctual impulse; compulsive repetition when it is not. This situation is first apparent in the phase of the unlearned function whenever the simple reflex is itself insufficient. It is this very fact which is responsible for this discussion of the repetition compulsion.

Kubie's ultimate conclusion (24) (p. 401), however, is that evidence for the repetition compulsion, including childhood play, is evidence of the need to find a better solution for recurrent problems, because '*since the effort at mastery was unsuccessful, while the need for mastery persists, repeated expression of the effort must result*'. This statement, that the repetition compulsion arises from the effort to master accords fully with what I have presented. Kubie, however, concludes from this that the repetition compulsion really accords with the pleasure principle, and is therefore superfluous; whereas I conclude that so long as one follows Freud in defining the pleasure principle as the aim of the sexual instincts, the issue is still confused, but that if one ascribes repetition compulsion to an instinct to master, these several contradictions vanish. We are left with three debatable theories: Freud's, that the repetition compulsion may supersede the pleasure principle; Kubie's, that it serves the pleasure principle and therefore is a superfluous theory; and mine, that it is the expression of an instinct to master which serves the pleasure principle as claimed by Kubie, but not the pleasure principle in the service of the sexual instincts as claimed by Freud.

Needless to say, I am not positing the instinct to master in order to wriggle out of the dialectic argument about the repetition compulsion; but having found that the hypothesis of an instinct to master provides a basic concept for understanding the development of the ego and its functions in terms of the behavior of early infancy, it seems also to clarify the dispute concerning the repetition compulsion and its relation to the pleasure principle.

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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF PSYCHIC FUNCTIONS

Part II

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CHAPTER V

Freud described vividly how the traumatic experience of birth is connected with the physiologic symptoms of anxiety; yet in the earliest period of its life the infant does not appear to be at all conscious of danger. The desire, previously described, to get into as close a sensual contact as possible with all objects seems to prevail; all memories of the birth trauma appear to be obliterated. Only new painful experiences give evidence of making the mind of the young infant wary. We have to conclude from observation of infants that the birth trauma, although producing adequate physiological response (pulse, breathing) does not constitute a real experience, does not penetrate the infant's mind during birth. The receptivity of the sense organs may not be so far developed as to make a real experience of birth possible.

The characteristic behavior of a young infant is therefore expressive of its desire to experience as many objects with as many senses as possible. It is driven towards objects under the direction of the pleasure principle, in search of objective sensations to which to respond subjectively with pleasure. This urge to come nearer to a pleasant object, this instinctive movement towards objects, lends to the infant's behavior a quality of greed, of wanting to touch, to have, to possess, to incorporate, which is the origin of the tacit assumption that drives are essentially impulses which push us in the direction of objects.

In the instances when according to the pleasure-pain principle the psychic apparatus responds not with pleasure but with pain, the movement of the individual will be to escape, a withdrawal from the object. This is the most primitive

forerunner of what in the realm of reason is called negation. The important aspect of a painful experience is that it does lead to escape, that is, to a discontinuation of the sensual contact with an object.

An impulse to escape is, as a rule, not spoken of as a drive. It is usually referred to as an escape mechanism or an impulse to flight but there is no apparent reason why it should be differentiated from drives. It is only because we are accustomed to connecting 'drive', with a desired object towards which we feel driven. But there is no essential difference between the drives which pull us towards objects and the drives which push us away from objects. In both cases it is our energy which is set in motion according to the pleasure-pain principle.

In the reaction to a painful experience the sensual desire for contacting an object is exchanged for an equally sensual desire to find relief from pain. Cessation of the pain from a toothache is felt not only as a negative release but as a positive, an agreeable sensation. Aching from fatigue, if one stretches out in bed, the ache soon ceases and one feels the pleasant sensation of rest. *Pain makes us body-conscious.* In states of great pleasure we pay almost no attention to our bodies and are almost wholly object-conscious. We automatically ascribe the quality of pleasantness to the object and enjoy the object outside of the self. With pain, we close our senses to outside objects and focus them on the aching parts of our bodies. Thus the aching parts of the body become *objects* for our external senses.¹⁹ The aching body or tooth is treated as if it were an object. What should be stressed in these reactions is that the frontier between the inside and outside, between external and internal world becomes narrower, moves from the periphery towards the center of the body. Pain causes the body to become more and more like an external object which preoccupies the external senses, and thus displaces the external

¹⁹ This is described psychoanalytically as narcissistic 'libidinal cathexis' of one's own organs; hence it seems doubtful that self-love is the primary form of narcissism.

world from sensual perception. On an emotional level, painful affects such as fear, revulsion, and the like result in a similar displacement with reference to the ego. Such a concentration of interest and awareness on one's own body or on one's own ego, reacting to one or the other as if it were an external object, is called narcissism. The modification of the principle of sensuality that follows painful experience represents, therefore, the important fact that in the case of painful experiences the individual becomes narcissistic—treats himself as an object of his external senses.

Anxiety, an emotion which *anticipates* possible painful experience, thus moves into the center of the problem of pathology, and narcissism becomes a quality which is pathognomonic for neuroses when it transgresses those vague limits within which it is helpful for maintaining the security of existence. In as much as painful experiences are unavoidable, everyone must have a certain amount of narcissism to enable him to act in such manner as to escape major experiences of pain or discomfort without sacrificing so much of his striving for sensual pleasure that life becomes more a task of preventing pain than of creating pleasure. External reality itself can, of course, become sufficiently painful to cause this unhealthy condition. But when one considers what extremes of pain, privation, frustration and despair a healthy individual can bear, it is difficult to conceive of any but an extraordinary situation as apt to make life as unbearable as it becomes *sui generis* for the neurotic. Freud's reality principle is merely the modification of the pleasure principle in accordance with the demands of reality. The test of the reality principle is the ability to endure a present discomfort for a future gain. Thus hope, the direct antithesis of fear, serves to preserve at least a part of our minds for concentration on external objects without the necessity for retreating totally into narcissistic attitudes under the pressure of painful experiences.

With reference to reality testing, Zilboorg²⁰ commenting on

²⁰ Zilboorg, Gregory: *The Sense of Reality*. This QUARTERLY X, 1941, pp. 191-192.

the child's primitive relationship to external objects said, '... the child ... takes bites out of reality; it is tasting rather than testing.' This excellent observation is in accordance with our conception about the way the child becomes conscious of real objects; the way in which it corroborates different sense impressions with each other and relates them to objects, under the guidance of the pleasure-pain principle. And I do not believe that in higher states of mental development the reality test is much different from this primitive appeal to the senses. Just as a mathematical operation is based on statements derived from observed realities and has in its final result to revert to reality in order to be tested for its validity, so have we to revert to sensuality in order to test the operations of our imagination on reality.

Sensual elements derived from real experience and deposited in some form of engrams in memory are rearranged and recombined in imagination and are therefore subject to the pleasure-pain principle. The latter is as active in emotions as it is in sensation and therefore produces a tendency towards fantasy, because imagination is not controlled by objective perception.

Fantasy can be determined on the emotional level chiefly by the emotions of hope and fear. Fear is the more dangerous of these two emotions as a possible source of falsification of reality representations in the mind. For it is fear which drives us away from sensual experience, whereas hope drives us towards the sensory testing of our fantasies by reality. In instances of disappointment the reality test leads to frustration. But this frustration is at least real, whereas the failure to apply the test of reality to fantasy bars access to reality. Frustration itself does not necessarily lead to alienation from reality. It does so only if it causes fear of a repetition of the disappointing experiences. Only when it causes anxiety does it lead indirectly to disturbances of the individual's relationship to the real world of objects. But the immediate cause of withdrawal from the external world and the replacement within the ego of reality by fantasy (which is then narcissistically treated as if it were an external object) is anxiety. Anxiety is the emotion

which prevents us from using our senses to experience external objects. It is the center of a vicious cycle which leads to an increasing alienation from reality. Only by directing the senses to the external world of objects are we able to test reality and in this way discover whether our emotions are in accord with it. Anxiety alone prevents us from keeping turned towards reality.

CHAPTER VI

The unconscious provides subjective escape mechanisms which are effective at the cost of interference with the free reactions of our senses to certain stimuli. The primitive forerunner of repression is the impulse to remove by flight the senses from objects which threaten with pain. The approach of pain is experienced as danger which evokes fear. Fear, which is nothing but anticipation of a painful contact with an object which has been perceived by the distance senses (sight, hearing, smell) initiates action to avoid the expected painful sensation.

In the situation of perceiving an actually approaching danger, the intellectual functions play little part. To choose a simple example, a hen catching sight of an eagle approaching above her is moved to get away as quickly as possible. Two factors might operate to prevent such an escape: first, all ways of escape might be blocked; second, the wish to escape might be interfered with by the fear of some other danger presented by the escape itself. One may have to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea, or, it may be, between getting away not only from the source of danger but in addition from a source of great pleasure. The hen wants desperately to get away from the eagle but she wants at least as strongly to remain with her chicks.

Instances in which the avenues of escape are blocked by external obstacles leave the alternatives either of fighting or of becoming paralyzed from fear. This paralysis can lead to loss of consciousness which is essentially a fantasied escape.

In psychoanalytic terminology, the libidinal cathexis of the object is completely withdrawn.

Let us discard the theoretical assumption that drive is libidinal, and assume that drive energy is not directly 'attached' to a specific object but merely directed to it by sensual perception. We may then simply say that the senses are put out of action in order to escape a painful experience. This seems to be little different from Freud's formulation of cathexis; nevertheless it deletes the complicated auxiliary implications of the drive theory, especially the concept of the defusion of instincts. If the goal of drive is determined by sensuality, it is not necessary to assume a change in the quality of the drive when it is cut off from an object. There are then, merely changes in the direction of drives and not changes of quality. This formulation, emphasizing as it does the sensual character of the ego, does no violence to any basic psychoanalytic concepts.

The impulse to fight will take place in every case, when the avenues of escape are blocked, where loss of consciousness or paralysis do not occur. No matter how great the discrepancy between the forces of the attacker and the forces of the attacked, there will ensue a short fight which may be so brief as to appear negligible to an observer. Psychologically, even a fleeting attempt to put up a fight is important because it is the *Anlage* of aggressiveness. In this form it is a reflex, not yet backed up by the *desire* to get at the object *despite* the expectation of pain.

Let us consider the hen that does not escape, although it is possible, because she hates the separation from her chicks even more than she would love her own separation from the eagle. Her escape is not blocked by external obstacles but by internal ones. In this example it is not the hen but the chicks that cannot escape fast enough. The hen reacts in precisely the same way as if she and the chicks were inseparable. The chicks direct the hen's drive energies as strongly to the danger spot as the eagle directs them away from it. Two sensual motives for two different drives are in conflict with one

another. If the claims of the chicks prevail, the hen remains with them and fights. This fight is not the automatic defense of being caught alone, unable to escape. The hen with chicks prepares to fight before the eagle arrives. Unable to remove herself and the chicks, she tries actively to remove the eagle.

What is the difference between the attitude of the solitary hen and the attitude of the mother hen? It is evident that it is the presence of the chicks which changes the direction of the drive. One might say that life is valued according to the value of the positive objects one has.²¹ A soldier fights more valiantly if his own home is threatened. *Aggressiveness appears when a striving for pleasure cannot be diverted by the impulse to escape from a painful experience.* It is not fear which causes aggression but a positive wish which prevails over an existing fear; it is the pursuit of sensual pleasure despite danger and fear. The mechanism of aggression is, then, another instance in which the pleasure-pain principle is found to be the ultimate psychological basis of subjective individuation.²²

Aggression is usually thought to be simply a direct expression of destructive impulses. True that the aim of aggression is the removal of a source of unpleasant sensations which in many cases involves or is equivalent to destruction; but literal destruction is often brought about not by aggression, but by pleasure seeking actions. The act of eating involves destroying the pleasant object, food, by consuming it. This simple oral destruction is not the result of aggression. Far from seeking to destroy the object, it is the intention to come into closest contact with it, to incorporate it. The destruction

²¹ The recognition of this fact prompted Freud to abandon his previous contradistinction between libidinal and ego drives.

²² It is not essential for the evocation of aggression that the inhibition be an inner one, that is, springing from fear. When the inhibition is an external one the consequence is a frustration. So, for instance, aggressiveness arises when there is impatience about delay in gratification due to outside circumstances. But on closer examination it is again fear which is found to provide the psychological background of this aggressiveness. It is fear that the desire for pleasure will not be satisfied at all. It is of secondary importance whether that fear is caused by external or internal factors.

involved is from a psychological point of view accidental. This is not to deny that there is true oral aggression; however it is not its destructive effect which characterizes it as aggression. It is the conflict involved which leads to this psychological classification. Tease a dog sufficiently with a morsel of food and it will probably snap at it. The wish for the food is greater than the fear of punishment for snapping. This is the situation of the biting oral phase, where fear of punishment does not prevail over greed.

A similar conflict characterizes the anal aggressions as true aggressions. The contents of the intestines cause both pleasure and pain. If the longing for pleasure exceeds the desire to avoid pain, constipation results. On another level, the child knows that it is expected to retain its excrement. Here the conflict is that the desire to defecate may be stronger than the fear of punishment for untimely defecation. These factors make the anal conflicts as complicated and contradictory as they are. In one stage the prevailing pleasant tendency is to retain excrement. In another stage, the prevailing desire is to expel the excrement. I would propose to subdivide the anal phase in the same way as the oral phase is subdivided. The first phase is the discharge phase. After having learned to retain, the child experiences pleasure in retaining its excrement.²³ The pleasure in retention now prevails over the discomfort which it causes. This second phase may be called the retentive phase.

In addition to external dangers perceived by the senses, there are those situations where a danger is represented in the mind of an individual. This must be distinguished from instances where a danger is based on a misrepresentation in the mind of an outside reality. The former is a danger based on a true and verifiable representation of the outer world in our minds with no discrepancy between the danger anticipated in imagination, and the situation which eventuates if nothing

²³ The conversion of pain into pleasure which is the result of a need for protection against too strong stimuli (*Reizschutz*) is an important mechanism not only for the psychology of masochism, but for 'normal' psychology as well.

is done to alter the course of events. It is the state of mind of, for instance, a soldier who has received the order to attack the enemy the next morning. The danger which the soldier may imagine is, although a product of his imagination, no delusion but a situation to which he will very likely be exposed.

The anticipation of danger has the same effect as actual danger. The only difference is that not actual objects, but object representations are the objective factors to which the subject reacts. Here again we find all the possibilities open for the individual as in the actual danger situation, namely:

- 1 Escape (actual).
- 2 If escape is objectively impossible there is the choice between escaping subjectively or fighting.
- 3 If escape is objectively possible but subjectively impossible because of other interests which oppose escape, again the two possibilities of subjective escape or actually fighting are open.

If escape is objectively and subjectively possible, i.e., if neither outward circumstances nor inner interests conflicting with escape interfere, actual escape will be the choice which the individual will inevitably make. This possibility does not require discussion.

If escape is made impossible either by physical external circumstances or by subjective considerations which would make the escape more painful than facing the danger, the individual will face the danger, which is psychologically equivalent to fighting it.

The situation which is most interesting is the one in which the individual can neither escape from an anticipated and imagined danger, nor fight. He will then make a subjective escape from consciousness. This escape from consciousness in the case of a danger which is merely, for the time being at least, imagined, is much easier than when the object of fear is an object of actual sensual perception. In the latter case, loss of consciousness is the only effective escape. Such an extreme is not required if the danger is merely a mental representation.

One has then only to divert his awareness from the frightening mental images. Fear subsides, but anxiety is created, and at this point mechanisms like simple repression, displacement, isolation, etc., begin to operate. The effect of these mechanisms is to falsify the representation of the reality more and more because anxiety, as explained in the last chapter, will prevent reversion with the objective senses to the actual reality, i.e., adequate testing of reality. The mental representation of reality will differ more and more from existing reality which could be accurately perceived were not the use of the senses hampered by anxiety.

If real escape is possible without complications, the healthy individual will escape. If escape is possible, but would bring many frustrations of vital importance to the individual, the only healthy reaction is to put up a fight.

Fear is neurotic only when it is caused either by nonexistent or imagined dangers or—if the danger is existent—when it does not lead to a defensive-aggressive attitude. The latter is the case if an individual represses instead of making up his mind to defend himself, which is tantamount to becoming aggressive. The individual who represses escapes from consciousness of danger. He represses the inner wishes which threaten him, or he represses the representation of external danger itself. He cannot therefore any longer be described as having fear. The resultant state is one of anxiety which is a reaction to the danger which has become unconscious and to which the individual therefore cannot react by trying to escape or to fight.²⁴ *Anxiety is therefore a state of mind best described as a suspense reaction to an unconscious danger.*

What the individual gains by repressing the fearsome danger, is relief from reacting immediately to it. Suspense is therefore the gain of repression. By repression we defer a reaction

²⁴ *Anxious* commonly means both 'earnestly desirous', and 'being in painful suspense'. While aggression is the result of wish prevailing over fear, in anxiety neither wish nor fear prevail because both the objects of fear and wish are repressed.

by forgetting the situation to which we have to react. If, without forgetting, we merely postpone the reaction to a danger, we still see the danger, are alert to it, are afraid, but we do not feel insecure. We feel unsafe, that is true, but in relying on our ability to cope with it we can feel a certain sureness in knowing where the danger is and hoping therefore to be able to protect ourselves.

The danger situation once repressed, fear vanishes, but with it goes the feeling of security which resides in one's hope of protecting himself. Repression is conceivably of some usefulness when, without sufficient experience, we are unable to cope with complicated realities in which we find ourselves placed. With increased knowledge and experience we may later be able better to understand the situation and therefore, to rely on our ability to cope with it. But such immediate relief, entailing as it must a suspension of reaction by repressing the danger, has its great and decisive disadvantages. The inescapable anxiety which results becomes itself a danger. Instead of fear well defined by danger, anxiety with vagueness about the real danger situation is substituted. The individual now feels as if he had surrendered his arms, under pressure to a stronger enemy. The helplessness which caused the individual to repress the danger becomes a part of his personality and is an additional danger. There is no external danger which can be as disastrous to an individual as is a feeling of helplessness.

Anxiety, inner danger, puts the individual in the same position as if he were threatened by a danger which he could hear with his ears, see with his eyes. This danger is no longer an imagined one. It is a danger as actual and as powerful as any, and it is *as real* as any danger because anxiety always affects the pleasure-pain principle in the negative sense, causing the individual all kinds of unpleasant feelings which run the gamut from embarrassment to panic. These painful sensations are psychologically as real as anything which can threaten us from the external world. How real such danger is can be

observed from the many troubles in which an anxious individual may find himself.²⁵ Furthermore the individual cannot become conscious of his inner danger as such. Imagination is always based on external senses, and any sensation which we feel inside ourselves must be related to some object or object representation conveyed to us by our external senses. The attempt to understand internal sensations by ascribing them to external circumstances is the mechanism of projection.

As a matter of fact, anxiety is perceived by our senses although by the internal ones and not by the external ones. But like any sensual perception it is evident to us, and evidence is the last proof of what we call reality. Anxiety, which originally results from a specific suspended reaction, soon becomes generalized for the very reason that we do not know any more the danger which was repressed, and suspect it of coming from anywhere. This will cause in us the tendency to suspend reaction to more and more reality situations in which we find ourselves. This is the process of widening the scope of neurotic reactions as described by Freud in reference to obsessional neurosis. The mechanism of projection will

²⁵ It is gratifying to find recent confirmation from authors working from quite a different approach. In *The Status of the Emotions in Palpitation and Extrasystoles with a Note on Effort Syndrome* (This QUARTERLY, X, No. 4) Miller and McLean investigating the emotional basis of palpitations describe them as 'biological manifestations of fear in the face of danger'. Their clinical material proved that the object of fear in their patients was unconscious, i.e., that they suffered from anxiety, which is described as the inability either to escape or to fight. Miller and McLean come to exactly the same conclusion: '... the conflict apparently blocked the impulse towards flight as well as the impulse to fight' (p. 558). 'In all these situations the individual is driven by his active, ambitious attitude into an apparent danger which at the same time he feels an urge to avoid' (p. 558). 'As Dr. French has stated, they appear to be fixated on an obstacle which prevents them from approaching their goal, but from which they cannot retreat' (p. 559). I think that such a situation is the basis for all anxiety states in general and that in these cases the particular symptoms are dictated by special individual circumstances. It is also proof for another thesis stated in this paper, namely, that owing to narcissistic regression from a painful or threatening external reality, parts of the body are treated as if they were outside objects. In this case it is the heart of which, as the authors state, the individual becomes 'subjectively aware' (p. 558).

externalize the feeling of danger on more and more objects in the outside world, and the individual will react as though he were continuously in danger, continuously in the state of mind which engenders aggressiveness.

Aggression appears whenever there is a conflict between a striving for a pleasure and a fear of it or its consequences in which the striving for the pleasure prevails over the fear of it. After anxiety has established itself as a danger, every wish of an anxious individual will be interfered with by a fear of this inner danger. This Freud described as characteristic of neurotic anxiety: the fear of becoming afraid. We reformulate this as follows: anxiety becomes the danger of which an individual is actually afraid; it appears on every occasion when the individual sees the opportunity to get pleasure. If this anxiety becomes so pervasive that the individual cannot procure for himself any pleasure at all, the result will be that he escapes from all reality because he has to repress all reality, just as he repressed the original danger. This will then be a state of more or less complete loss of reality such as is found in psychosis. The individual retreats from the threatening reality on which he has projected the inner danger to the point of an absolute loss of reality.

All sensual functions are preconditions for pleasure, because the pleasure-pain principle is evoked whenever the senses are aroused. If the reality which arouses the senses is repressed, the pleasure-pain principle cannot be evoked and the individual does not function any more as subject. The panicky fear into which the individual is precipitated when he approaches the total loss of reality, is an attempt to reach the outside world with his senses because the danger of becoming nonexistent as a subject approaches a limit where it is stronger than the inner danger represented by his generalized anxiety. But it is too late. The sensual ties to reality are severed, and the only resort of the psychotic is to reach for the engrams, stored in his memory, of previous sensual perceptions. This is the reason why the unconscious seems to be laid bare on the surface as one hears a psychotic talk, especially in his acute

psychotic attack. What he talks about are not *things*. They have no connection through the senses with the outside world; they no longer have any representation of the real world. The engrams in his mind have replaced all actual sensual impressions. Since aggression appears whenever a wish prevails over a fear, the wish of the psychotic to retain some hold on reality, which is, after all, the mainstay of one's existence, becomes stronger than the inner anxiety and this is what releases the psychotic aggression in the plunge into an acute psychotic state. Although it is too late for the external senses to reach reality, they attempt to do so aggressively, as though they might reach out corporeally for the objects which they cannot perceive any more because they have vanished into a terrible darkness.

In persons whose anxiety is insufficient to prevent them from repressing all reality and all their wishes concerning reality, the point at which their wishes become stronger than their fears will be reached sooner. They will either repress only situations related to the original danger, or they will try to isolate the original danger from other dangers and therefore be able to feel their anxiety in certain directions less than in others. In those areas where they feel less anxiety, they will be able to make their wishes prevail over the anxiety and reach out for the desired object. Anxiety which is based on suspended activity will vanish when the individual makes up his mind actively to gratify his desire. He will then react as if he were in the original danger situation previously repressed, with the difference that his wishes now prevail over his fear. This explains why neurotics when they are at the point of overcoming their anxiety are so bold and aggressive. The same, with certain modifications, is true of most of the perversions.

Masochism alone seems to be an exception. It presents the reverse of the aggressive attitude when wish prevails over fear. That the natural impulse of an individual confronted with an object for which he longs, but which at the same time seems dangerous, is either to escape or to fight was the reason

why we considered aggressiveness the result whenever the wish prevails. In the case of masochism, it seems to be that escape is impossible because of the strength of the wishes; fight is also impossible because of the strength of the fear. It is the same situation which we described as leading generally to repression of the danger situation with anxiety as a consequence. The masochist also suspends action but evidently without suppressing the conflict between wish and fear. Both danger and fear remain directly or in a thin disguise *conscious*. This completely inactivates the individual; he becomes inert because his impulses towards either escape or attack neutralize one another. His activity neutralized, the individual hopes for outside help which would change the situation in which he finds himself.²⁶ Although it appears as if the masochist wanted to be attacked, he does not wish to be attacked. He longs for external aid in his state of mental inertia in which he is unable to repress either the wish or the fear and become aggressive. *He is a prey to both the pleasures for which he strives, and the pains which he deprecates.* It is not that pain becomes pleasant and is therefore sought as pleasure. The masochist is forced to accept pain because all his activities are paralyzed and he cannot do anything about the situation.

The masochistic reaction is a compound of repression, introjection of danger, and anxiety. It is generally a by-product of neurosis, but traces of it are to be found in healthy individuals. That one experiences a modicum of pain in the pursuit of pleasure produces what is called a 'thrill' or a 'kick'. This is not a sexualization or libidinization of pain; neither is it a transformation of pain into pleasure,²⁷ but a pain which is mixed with pleasure and gives the background for the pleasure. Thus it enhances the quality of a pleasure which from an objective point of view does not seem to warrant such

²⁶ Wilhelm Reich has a similar concept of masochism. Cf. his *Charakter-analyse*. Vienna: Published by the author, 1933, p. 271.

²⁷ Such a transformation takes place in the development of all individuals. By 'getting used' to a pain an originally unpleasant sensation can become a pleasant one. Thus it is that a cold plunge can become an actual pleasure.

a high content of pleasure. What makes the pleasure relatively intense is that it is experienced against a contrasting background of fear. Individuals who all the time seek 'kicks' and thrills are to that extent masochists.

This masochistic element in all perversions exists in part because such activities are forbidden and therefore dangerous. I do not believe there exists any perversion in which a basic masochistic attitude is absent. We have stated that a characteristic of masochism is the limited ability to 'escape subjectively', to repress. This is an additional confirmation of Freud's dictum that a neurosis is the negative of a perversion. Neurosis, based on a subjective escape from danger consciousness, is therefore a subjective negation of danger. The pervert does not repress the danger but clings in spite of it to his wishes. The outcome depends upon how much his activity is paralyzed by his fears. If it is nearly absolutely paralyzed, the result is extreme masochism. If he can find some way to obtain the pleasure despite the threat of pain, the result is perversion.

The healthy individual does not repress in the sense of the neurotic. Freud's distinction between successful and unsuccessful repression is vague. This distinction came from the misconception that drives are special inborn tendencies. It led to the conception that the word representation of the aim of a drive was repressed, while the drive itself, being unrepresentable, had to find some other way in which to express itself. The word, repression, should be reserved for pathological subjective escape from a real or imagined danger. The alternative to repression is the abandonment of a dangerous wish and its substitution by another wish which is acceptable. This is called sublimation.

Drive continues directed by wish after the latter is repressed. Repression alone cannot alter the power of a wish to motivate a drive. This great discovery of Freud permitted demonstration of how repressed wishes are linked up with conscious and preconscious elements which seem to be suitable substitutes for it, but which in turn succumb to secondary and tertiary repressions, thus creating the maze of puzzling neurotic symp-

toms. In all these complicated mechanisms, the drive is still associated with and motivated by the original repressed wish. What Freud called 'unsuccessful repression', it is here proposed to call simply repression.

In sublimation, drive is dissociated from a forbidden or dangerous wish which therefore has ceased to be a motivation for drive. The substituted wish is better adapted to the demands of reality than was the abandoned one. This substitute is generally closely related to the abandoned wish which makes it suitable to function as a substitute. But it is not to be estimated merely a disguised revival of the abandoned wish; it offers a direct outlet for activity and is therefore able to release drive which finds an unimpeded outlet.

If a child feels that clinging to a wish entails so many dangers that it cannot afford to pursue the striving, the child's resourcefulness determines whether it chooses repression or sublimation; and this will depend not only on the child's gifts but very much on circumstances, timing, the freedom left to it to choose another motivation for its drives, etc. We are accustomed to speak of this as 'strength of the ego'. But I believe this strength is not the cause, but the effect of the ability to adjust one's motives to reality. It is then the completeness of the sense of reality which makes the ego adequate. The readjustment of drive motivating wishes depends on the circumstances under which the child is exposed to its first typical conflicts, the how and when of these conflicts. These circumstances can be as various as there are individuals.

CHAPTER VII

According to our conception, drive is perceived as positive or negative tension of inner energy without specific aim except that of being released. Drive in itself has no other quality than intensity. For release it is dependent on motives presented to it by the senses. Such sensual motivations are 'objects'. Objects, by arousing our objective senses, become the (positive or negative) aims of drives. By this definition,

the usual psychoanalytic distinction among sexual, destructive or other drives is unnecessary.

The chief objection to this concept will come from the argument that there are certain inborn tendencies which seem to control the direction of drives before the individual has any opportunity to acquire enough sensual experiences to establish these 'instincts'.

The concept of instincts is a biological one and taken from the observation of animal life. That eels come from the four quarters of the globe to spawn in one spot in the ocean, that migrating birds leave on the same dates each year for faraway lands and return to their old haunts again the following spring—these phenomena we observe without physiological or psychological understanding. To conceal our ignorance, we have coined the word, 'instinct', which we give in explanation. But in itself, instinct has no psychological content and it is the pseudopsychological description of a fact which surmounts our comprehension.

To define similar instincts in human beings is difficult. We speak of herd instincts and many other similar general instincts, until the word connotes nothing but an understanding which is not achieved by conscious logical thinking, but by some other vague data conveyed to us unconsciously and creating in us certain psychological reactions. We say for instance that it is 'instinctive' to feel attracted by some persons or to feel distrust of others, or that we have the instinctive feeling that we are in danger and so on. In other words instinct is often used to describe some psychological reaction for which we do not know all the motives. This lack of understanding in the latter example comes from the fact that many of the data on which our 'instinctive' likes and dislikes, forebodings, warnings and so on are based, remain in the unconscious and cannot be recognized by our conscious minds. Instincts, then, are psychic acts in which drive energy is released although its sensual motivation remains partly or entirely unconscious.

This is purely a psychoanalytic explanation of the operation of what are called instincts in human beings. The greater the

number of unconscious motivations we are able to make conscious, the fewer the number of 'instincts' to survive. What should be emphasized is that repressed and therefore unconscious sensual data can serve as motives for drives.

An important question in this connection which needs to be pursued further is whether we inherit preformed drives which are not so nonspecific as is assumed in this discussion, but which tend to be discharged along lines determined not by individual sensual experience but rather by inherited mechanisms. If the latter could be established, it would be a confirmation of Freud's assumption that various drives have specific aims. But we would then only have shifted the problem from the word, drive, to the word, instinct, and would be back where we started.

Infants, during the first weeks of life, exhibit marked individual differences; this at a time when the ego certainly cannot yet be developed, and when sensory impressions are still so few and vague that we cannot assume these differences of 'personality' to be based on individual sensual perceptions of different surroundings or on different experiences.

The great examples of biological instinct like the migration of eels and salmon to spawn have one condition which must make them possible. These animals live in surroundings which change very little, if at all. Certain changes occur in the migration of birds because of the inroads of civilization into their haunts, but even these changes are not fundamental. The air remains unchanged and this is still more the case with aquatic animals. In surroundings which remain for countless generations essentially unchanged, nature is able to make one of her abbreviations in development. It is not necessary for each animal to have its own individual sensual experiences in order to get its bearings for the sort of life it is to lead.

If we assume that it is the stability of the surroundings of a race or a species which furthers the development of instincts, in the strictly biological sense, then those species which live in the most unstable environment have the fewest inborn instincts. The individual of such a species is born without many accumulated experiences of his ancestors because such

experiences are of little value to him on account of the quick change of environmental factors. The newborn of such a species will be most helpless, less fit to survive than the newborn of a species whose environment has been unchanging for ages. The species whose environment changes most is the human race. The human being does not accept his surroundings as they are, but tries to change them according to the pleasure principle, with his brains and his hands. The human infant is the most helpless because its intelligence has still to be developed; it has much more than the individual of any other species to start from scratch to build its mind. This is the reason why man shows greater differences in his individuality as an infant, compared with other species of animals.

The greater the number of inherited biological instincts, the greater the similarity of the individuals of a species. With few instincts, biologically speaking, the individual stands on his own. His bearings in his world depend on the functioning of the elements that constitute the ego, namely, the sensory apparatus including the subjective sense of pleasure and pain, and the representation of these functions in the sensory areas of his brain. Individual differences among newly born infants come more from variations in inherited qualities of the organs which lead to the formation of psychic mechanisms (for instance, sensitivity of the sense organs and the autonomic nervous system) than from instincts which are preformed psychic mechanisms, independent of objective experience. For example, all cats have keen vision but an imperfectly developed sense of smell. This fact alone plays a great part in causing cats to behave so differently from dogs, for instance, who depend on their sense of smell and hearing and whose vision is relatively poor. The dog's tendency to smell everything is not 'inherited instinct'; it is simply the outcome of his physiological constitution and he uses most that sense which conveys to him the clearest knowledge of objects obtainable for him. A person who is hard of hearing soon learns to depend less on what he hears and more on what he sees.

There are some environmental elements which do not change even for the unstable human race. The embryo spends

nine months of its life in a stable environment. Infant care, as Freud pointed out, imitates intrauterine existence. There is the eternal triangle of father, mother and child which is, among others, certainly a factor important enough to create similar forms of reactions and psychological situations in every child.

Recently a striking observation was made which, although isolated, has nevertheless important implications. It is the fact that a certain percentage of babies are born with a thumb sore from intrauterine sucking. This would seem to prove that here is a drive which is not directed by sensual perception of an object, the breast, which creates pleasure in sucking. Here must be a drive which one should call an oral drive because it shows the tendency to abreact by stimulation of the oral zone. We prefer, however, to consider this intrauterine thumb sucking as a mechanism established not by individual, but by the racial experience of all mammals for whom sucking at the breast is one of these eternally unchanging environmental conditions which spare each animal the necessity for establishing this experience individually. This conception is not unlike Freud's theory to explain the double onset of sexual development in the human race. While it is not specifically stated, the theory must assume that a very great number of repeated similar experiences of our remote ancestors in the glacial period precipitated preformed mechanisms which came to be inherited. Only when environmental factors remain stable for a very great number of generations can we assume that the experiences of the race are conveyed to the offspring, providing the individual with a sensual motivation which is not his own but comes from his ancestors.

There are relatively few of these stable environmental factors for the human race; hence we cannot assume that we have inherited many biological instincts. How the inheritance of such biological instincts is possible, is much more a biological question than a psychological one.²⁸ It will, however, do much

²⁸ We hazard the guess that inherited racial experiences are represented by association tracts in the central nervous system; in other words that instincts have an anatomical representation.

to clarify our thinking as psychologists if we limit the term 'instinct' to those few *inherited experiences* which direct our drives.

From true instincts, which are inherited psychic mechanisms, we should distinguish clearly inherited qualities, the rather wide margin within which the sensory organs, which make individual experiences possible, may be more or less sensitive. The human infant is more helpless, has fewer instincts, than the newborn of any other species, and for this reason inherited physiological qualities, represented chiefly in the functioning of the senses and the autonomic nervous system, come much more to the fore and account for the individual difference between different infants. The inheritance of a sound or a weak body, of a healthy or an impaired sensory apparatus also influences a person's experience and reaction, but such inheritance is not a psychic mechanism. Important differences in the value to the individual of his different senses will result in important differences in the qualities of the experience which is produced by those senses. The sensory apparatus includes not only those sense organs which convey objective data from external objects, but also the sensory apparatus which conveys data from the internal object, and the subjective sensations of pleasure and pain.

There are, then, two ways in which inheritance can influence the psychic functions. One, physiological, is the biological inheritance consisting of various qualities of the inherited sensory apparatus. The other is the psychological inheritance which consists of automatic psychic mechanisms which come to us from our ancestors, for which we reserve the word instinct (unconditioned reflex). From those true instincts we have to distinguish a large group of psychological reactions for which we merely do not know the motivation because it was repressed. The way, for instance, one reacts to certain individuals can often be analyzed as an unconscious displacement from another object. But to the individual who makes such a displacement, his like or dislike of the person will be something for which he cannot account and which he calls 'instinctive'.

These false instincts should be given another name. What

characterizes the lack of knowledge of the motives of these false instincts is based on the lack of ability to recognize them consciously as motives. This can be either genuine repression or one of those established mechanisms which serve the purpose of economy in our psychic apparatus by condensing former experiences into something which has a parallel only in the functioning of the intellect, where condensation of knowledge leads to what is called abstraction. It is difficult to find an adequate name for these pseudo instinctive reactions. 'Inadvertent psychic reaction' is an approximate though unsatisfactory descriptive phrase. These inadvertent reactions belong to the special psychology of individuals but are introduced here to distinguish them from true instincts. Since habits of language are difficult to change, I would propose to call the true inherited instincts the *phylogenetic instincts*, in contrast to the *ontogenetic instincts* which are inadvertent psychic reactions.

Biological variations in the various sense organs of the individual on the one hand, and the instincts on the other, constitute the chief inherited factors which influence the function of the psyche of an individual. These two factors need be taken into account in the analysis of psychic complexes. The development of libidinal strivings, according to the predominance of erogenous zones, shows that the individual psychic constitution contains both factors, instinctive as well as sensory physiological factors. The sensitiveness of the oral zone, the anal zone, etc., may vary greatly in intensity in different individuals. For instance, it is very difficult to induce one infant to suckle whereas another is born with a thumb sore from sucking inside the uterus. In this example is the suckling instinct as an inherited automatic reaction weaker in one child or is its oral zone less sensitive? A strong inherited instinct like suckling must contribute to the sensitivity of the mouth, using this zone as the bridge between phylogenetic experiences and ontogenetic reactions. From a practical point of view it does not seem to be of great importance to distinguish between inherited instincts and the inherited constitution of the sense organs. We may take it for granted that an indi-

vidual with certain inherited instincts will have a sensory apparatus developed in accordance with his needs. Hunting animals, like dogs, that rely on speed, develop sense organs which are adapted to these inherited mechanisms. Likewise, by investigating the function of the different sensory apparatuses of man we may conclude something about his inherited instincts. Even assuming that nature best develops the sense organs which serve the instinctive inheritance, nature is not equally successful in thus equipping all individuals. A disproportion between inherited sensorium and inherited instincts could place an individual in difficulties which might easily lead to a neurosis. A bird or a cat whose instincts require very keen eyesight will certainly perish if born with seriously faulty vision. Such aberrations are less probable in animals with an unvarying environment. Among human beings, great disproportions between inherited instincts and inherited fitness of the corresponding sensory apparatus occur with much less serious consequences. It may be conducive to the development of neuroses but is not likely to incapacitate the individual so much that he will not survive. The distinction between inherited instincts and development of the correlated senses is nevertheless most important because we may find here one of the obscure physiological conditions for neurosis and perhaps as well, a contribution to the still unsolved question of the choice of neuroses. It is a common observation that persons with keen senses (visual, auditory, etc.) are extroverts, whereas individuals who are near-sighted, a little hard of hearing, or both tend to be introverts. This may sound so simple as not to be worth mentioning; but the fact is that psychology has made little or no use of the paramount importance of the functions of the senses in psychic development.

Here is a foothold for pursuing investigations that will connect psychology with physiology, and with medicine in general.

This is the second of three articles by Dr. Herold on this subject. Part III will be included in the next issue of *This QUARTERLY*.

MELAMPUS AND FREUD

BY BERNICE SCHULTZ ENGLE (OMAHA, NEBRASKA)

The oldest Greek legendary physician, known even to Homer as an ancient personage, was Melampus. Among his patients was Iphiclus whom he cured of impotence.

Melampus, son of Amythaon, lived in Pylus, in the country. Before his house stood an oak tree, the lair of snakes. Melampus gave human burial to a pair of snakes that his servants had killed; the young ones he carefully reared. In gratitude they licked his ears one night as he slept and thereafter he could understand the language of animals, particularly of birds. He became a famous seer and leech, a disciple of Apollo.¹

Melampus had a younger brother, Bias, who wished to marry his cousin Pero, daughter of Neleus, king of Pylus. The effort to aid Bias's suit brought Iphiclus to Melampus as a patient. Homer² relates the bare outline of the story which is supplemented by two later writers.³

To keep off the horde of suitors for Pero's hand, Neleus, 'haughtiest of living men', demanded as a proviso from his daughter's successful suitor the cattle of Iphiclus which he claimed had been stolen from his mother Tyro by Iphiclus; some accounts say by Phylacus, father of Iphiclus. The cows were now kept in Phylace, in Thessaly, guarded by a dreadful dog which neither man nor beast could approach. Of the suitors, Bias alone tried to restore the cattle. After an unsuccessful attempt he appealed to his famous brother, Melampus, for help.

Although by his prophetic powers Melampus foresaw that

¹ Apollodorus: *The Library*, 1, 9, 11. Translated by J. G. Frazer, in two volumes. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1921.

² *Odyssey* XI, 287-297; XV, 225-238. Translated by G. H. Palmer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1891.

³ Apollodorus, *op cit.*, 1, 9, 12. Pausanias: *Description of Greece*, IV, 26, 3. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1918.

he would be caught in the attempted theft and put in prison for a year, he consented because he knew that he would ultimately get the cows.

At Phylace it happened as he had predicted. When the year of his incarceration was all but served, Melampus heard one worm tell another how little of the beam supporting the roof of his cell remained to be gnawed through. Hardly had Melampus been transferred at his request to another cell when the roof collapsed.

King Phylacus, hearing of this miraculous escape, perceived that his prisoner was a prophet whose release he ordered. He then appealed to Melampus to treat his son Iphiclus who could not beget offspring. Melampus agreed to treat the young man, exacting the cattle as his fee. Phylacus accepted the terms.

Melampus cut up two bulls and invited the birds to the sacrificial meal. From a vulture he learned that once when Phylacus was gelding rams 'he laid down the knife, still bloody, beside Iphiclus'. When the child, frightened, ran away, he thrust the knife into a sacred oak. The bark grew over the knife and hid it. If the knife were found and the rust scraped off and given to the young man for ten days he would beget a son, the vulture said.

To this engaging tale, ancient scholiasts add several diverting items.⁴ One annotator of Homer, citing the fifth century B.C. logographer, Pherecydes, as reference, says Melampus's prison guards were a man and a woman, the latter very cruel; that after hearing the conversation of the worms Melampus had called the guards and asked to be carried out, pretending illness. The man took hold of the head of the bed, the woman of the foot. As they bore him out the roof fell, killing the wicked female jailer.

In this account the vulture was not invited to the sacrificial meal and only after it had been summoned did Melampus

⁴ On Homer, *loc. cit.*; on Theocritus, III, 43; on Apollonius of Rhodes, I, 118. These scholia are included in Apollodorus, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 350-355. See also Propertius II, 3, 51.

obtain the desired information about Iphiclus. The vulture related that when Iphiclus was still a child Phylacus chased him with a knife 'because he was misbehaving'. One scholiast⁵ explains the boy's misbehavior as 'unseemly play with his hands' for which the father, doubtless in jest, made as if to 'cut off the guilty member with his knife'. Failing to overtake the boy the father had stuck the knife in a tree, a wild pear tree (Apollodorus is the only writer to call the tree an oak). As a consequence of his fright, Iphiclus had not the power to procreate.

Still another commentator, the much later Eustathius, quotes a passage from the scholium on Theocritus, no longer extant. Phylacus, it says, was not only gelding animals at the time he frightened his little boy by threatening him with the knife, but in raising the knife to drive it into the wild pear tree, he 'accidentally touched his son's genitals with it'. Another scholiast of Homer (on *Odyssey* XI, 290) also mentions this detail which Frazer considers an 'original and vital part of the narrative'. The one scholiast, he believes, omitted the item out of delicacy.

All accounts go on to say that Iphiclus followed the direction of Melampus and begot a son; that Melampus then received the cows which he drove back to Pylus, and that Bias married his Pero.

This legend corresponds to Freud's empirical discovery that disturbances of masculine potency result from man's unconscious fear of castration by the father. Psychoanalytic experience compels the reconstruction of Iphiclus' 'misbehavior' as masturbation with concomitant oedipus fantasies. Exactly this interpretation was anticipated by at least one of the ancient scholiasts who relates that the father chased Iphiclus with a knife and threatened to cut off the guilty member of the boy engaged in 'unseemly play with his hands'.

⁵ Licht, Hans: *Kulturkuriosa aus Altgriechenland*. Dresden: Paul Aretz Verlag, 1929, pp. 189-192, *Wie Iphiklos zeugungsfähig wurde*; based on *Frag-menta Historicum Græcorum* I, 89, 75, schol. on Hom. Od. XI, 289.

Eating, for ten days, rust from the dreaded knife is what Frazer calls a homeopathic cure, a magic cure by 'a hair of the dog that bit you'. Psychoanalysis discovered a similar principle and learned to put it to practical use in therapy. Freud many years ago ⁶ pointed out the importance of repetition and working through of a psychic trauma in order to master it. Alexander,⁷ in summing up the experience of many others, suggested repetition with insight as the fundamental principle of psychoanalytic therapy.

Simmel ⁸ once aided his own son to master a surgeon's direct threat of castration with scissors by giving the little boy scissors like the surgical ones to play with. Melampus's treatment enabled the young man to master his fear by repeating enough of the trauma to convince himself that it was indeed groundless.

The remedy was also a symbolic resolution of the œdipal problem. By eating the rust, Iphiclus gave up the fear and hatred of his father whom he thus orally incorporated. Identification and imitation could then replace the guilt of fantasied parricide. In addition, Iphiclus' undue attachment to his mother is symbolized by his illicit possession of the cows of which Melampus deprived him.

⁶ Freud: *Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*. Recollection, Repetition and Working Through. 1914. Coll. Papers, II, p. 366.

Freud: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. London: International Psycho-Analytic Press, 1922. Chapt. 2.

⁷ Alexander, Franz: *A Metapsychological Description of the Process of Cure*. Int. J. Psa., VI, 1925, pp. 13-34.

⁸ Simmel, E.: *A Screen Memory in Statu Nascendi*. Int. J. Psa., VI, 1925, pp. 454-457.

EGO STRENGTH AND EDUCATION OF THE EGO

BY MICHAEL BÁLINT (MANCHESTER, ENGLAND)

Since the publication of Freud's *The Ego and the Id* the conception of a 'weak ego' has become a commonplace. Yet, according to psychoanalytic theory, neurotic symptoms develop out of a conflict between the sexual instincts and the interests of the ego. If this is so, how can the neurotic ego, being so weak, represent its own interests so energetically that the result has to be a continuous compromise?

As early as 1926 in *The Problem of Anxiety* and only three years after publication of *The Ego and the Id*, Freud called to attention that the ego can be strong as well as weak. However only in recent years, coincident with increasing interest in the structure and function of the ego, has the concept come gradually to a focus, first, in the contributions to the Marienbad Congress in the symposium on the Theory of Therapeutical Results (1936),¹ and second, in the symposium on Strength and Weakness of the Ego at the International Congress in Paris (1938). At the latter Congress the need to gather data about strength of the ego was acknowledged. Hartmann² has approached the subject in terms of a general theory of adaptation, and Nunberg in terms of the synthetic function of the ego.³

The concept, strength of the ego, has never been clearly and exactly defined. It is of practical clinical consideration every

This article is an abridged revision of a paper printed in German in the *Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939.

¹ *Int. Ztschr. f. Ps.*, XXIII, 1937: Bibring p. 36, Nunberg p. 62, Alexander p. 78, French *passim*.

² Hartmann, Heinz: *Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem*. *Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939, pp. 62-135.

³ Nunberg, Hermann: *Ichstärke und Ichschwäche*. *Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939, pp. 49-61. [Ed.]

time the analyst in analyzing a patient asks himself with reference to an interpretation: is the patient ready for it at this point? The fear is that the patient may have to defend himself too energetically against the interpretation. Unless insight is gained gradually, a premature interpretation causes the ego suddenly to feel attacked by unwelcome or dangerous impulses from the id, and it therefore has to intensify its defense mechanisms. If in such an instance the analyst decides to wait, he certainly does not expect by gradually increasing insight to bring about a modification of the id. It is questionable whether in an adult the id is capable of being changed at all. What the analyst really hopes to accomplish is a strengthening of the ego. Whether or not he thinks of it in those terms, he estimates the current strength of the patient's ego and makes his interpretations according to that estimate.

Every effective interpretation or other technical measure imposes some strain or tension on the ego. This strain must not be so great that it mobilizes still greater defenses yet be sufficient to avoid not calling forth any reaction at all.⁴

A correct interpretation reveals a hitherto automatic form of defense. Henceforth that particular defense mechanism can be resorted to only with conscious awareness; otherwise, the interpretation will have to be repeated. This more or less persistent struggle is the process called 'working through'.⁵ When the specific form of defense can be abandoned, the ego has become capable of bearing a particular kind of tension. 'Strengthening of the ego' and 'working through' are conceptions which describe very similar if not identical clinical experiences. Working through is a gradual change of the ego. Its progress is commensurate with the altering capacity of the ego to bear increasing tension.

It is commonly said that the ego grows or that it shrinks. Freud defines as the task of analytic treatment: where id was,

⁴ Cf. Fenichel, Otto: *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique*. New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1941. Chap. IV.

⁵ Freud: *Ges. Schr.* VI, pp. 109, ff.

ego shall be.⁶ All topographical descriptions of 'making conscious' include the idea of growth of the ego. Federn⁷ speaks of broadening and of narrowing of the ego boundaries. Broadening of the ego is often used as a term synonymous with introjection; shrinking of the ego with projection.⁸ On the other hand Freud often pointed out that in an analysis it is especially the faulty points of the ego organization which have to be repaired. These originate from disturbances of ego development and are *loci minoris resistentiæ* which can either facilitate an undesired short circuit, or on the contrary have to be carefully guarded by reaction-formations.

According to the Lamarckian conception, properties of living beings can be altered by desire and practice. Whether or not this conception is valid in general, there can be no doubt that it is valid for certain functions of the ego. The ego functions involved in piano-playing or in skiing can certainly be altered by practice and desire. All education gives us convincing examples that certain psychic ego functions can, to a certain extent, be altered in a strictly prescribed direction.

A result of every successful analysis is strengthening of the ego. The ego can do, or refrain from doing, something of which it was formerly incapable. The process by which this new ability has been developed is one of *learning*. This word has two meanings. One is the reception and the correct registration of new sensory perceptions and new intellectual correlations. This is probably its newer meaning. In English, 'to learn' has almost this significance only. The second, and probably the older meaning is best demonstrated by the German compounds, *Aushaltenlernen*, *Ertragenlernen*, which mean to

⁶ Freud: Ges. Schr., XII, p. 234.

⁷ Federn, Paul: *Zur Unterscheidung des gesunden und krankhaften Narzissmus*. Imago, XXII, 1936.

⁸ First used by Ferenczi in *Introjektion und Übertragung* (1909). *Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse*. Vienna: Internationale Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vol. I, p. 19. Trans. in *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916.

learn to endure, to bear something, or to learn to evolve an ability which is often denoted in English by the verb 'to train'.⁹

It has been stated that 'strengthening of the ego' and 'working through' are closely related conceptions. Should 'learning' be included in the same group? At this point the objection may be raised that if 'strengthening the ego' be synonymous with 'learning' and 'training', then we shall have to conclude that psychoanalysis and education are correspondingly synonymous.

This is not a new idea. Anna Freud¹⁰ has described how children have first to be 'made capable of analysis'. Ferenczi¹¹ has written about Child Analysis in the Analysis of Adults in which he observes similar facts. In spite of initial resistances the necessity of educating certain types of adult cases as a preparation for analysis has become an established technical procedure.¹² And as psychoanalysis has ventured to approach the problem of the treatment of psychotics it has been found that in the first phase of their cure such patients have to be 'educated to analysis'.¹³

From the standpoint of the analyst, all patients whether children, neurotics, psychotics, have to be educated, trained to conform to the analytic situation (appointments, free associations, interpretations, etc.). In the terminology of ego psy-

⁹ The reconstructed stem of *Lernen* is *leir* = *ich habe erfahren, erwandert*; whence the factitive *leirjan* = *Lehren* = *erfahren, wissend machen*; and out of its participle originated *lirnan* = *Lernen* = *erfahren, wissend werden*. The related word *List* is used by the old-German and middle-high-German poetry in a praiseworthy sense as 'experienced'. (Cf. Kluge-Götz: *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*. 1934. I am obliged to Dr. E. Lueders for this reference.) In Hungarian the same verb has the stem *tanu* = witness. *Lehren* = *tanít* means therefore to change a person into a witness, and *Lernen* = *tanul* is to become a witness, to be changed into a witness.

¹⁰ Freud, Anna: *Einführung in die Technik der Kinderanalyse*. Vienna: Internationale Psychoanalytische Verlag, 1929. Trans.: *The Technique of Child Analysis*. New York: Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1928.

¹¹ Ferenczi, Sándor: *Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse*. Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, Vol. III. 1939. Trans. Int. J. Ps., XII, 1931.

¹² Fenichel, Otto: *loc. cit.* pp. 25-26.

¹³ Zilboorg, Gregory: *Affective Reintegration in the Schizophrenias*. Arch. of Neur. & Psychiat., XXIV, 1930, pp. 335-347.

chology, their egos are not strong enough to meet the demands of analytic treatment; therefore the first task of analysis is to strengthen the ego.

There are, then, four closely related conceptions, each clinically well founded: 'working through', 'learning or training', 'education for analysis', and 'strengthening of the ego'.¹⁴

In the first edition of the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud wrote that the free floating energy of the primary process is bound tonically by the secondary process until it can be discharged in a way that is adapted to the demands of reality. This statement has often been quoted but it has never been used as a working hypothesis. Since the establishment of the superego functions, all forms of endurance have been ascribed to obedience of the ego to the commands of the superego. The dependences of the ego have been emphasized to the neglect of its own structure, its own functions. While the ego is much under the dominance of the superego, there are many occasions when the ego endures for its own sake, without or even against the commands of the superego. The simplest example is in the field of sports, where from simple hiking to acrobatic mountain climbing, from easy training for keeping up an old boy's condition to the keenest contestant, the individual subjects himself to strain and endures denial merely for the expected, ensuing pleasure.

Rank,¹⁵ I believe, was the first to call attention to the fact that man tries to increase pleasure by creating internal resistances. For present considerations it is unimportant whether each of these internal resistances is an introjection of external commands or not. Without these resistances, available pleasure remains small because only small amounts of excitement

¹⁴ French, Thomas M., in *A Clinical Study of Learning in the Course of a Psychoanalytic Treatment*, This QUARTERLY, V, 1936, describes similar ideas on learning and working through. French does not, however, point out the interrelation between these two concepts and that of the strength of the ego. He stresses the fact very clearly that analytic treatment perpetually puts the patient to various tasks, but does not draw the conclusion that analysis and education must be in some sense related.

¹⁵ Rank, Otto: *Der Künstler*. First Edition. Vienna: Heller, 1907.

can be accumulated; without a sufficiently strong ego, small quantities of excitement have to be discharged at once.

The best sphere for studying these relations is the orgasmic function.¹⁶ The pleasure in orgasm depends on the height of sexual excitement attained during the act. The 'endurance' of increasing sexual excitement is a trial of which only persons with healthy egos are capable. The ego here behaves like an electrical condenser, easily accumulating small quantities of energy without any danger of a haphazard discharge; but should a spark really be wanted, it will be much more powerful than any which the same source of energy would have been able to produce without the condenser.

The deliberate increase and prolonged endurance of sexual tension during coitus cannot be described as obedience to the commands of the superego. It may be in some instances rather a triumph of the ego over the superego connected with, and partly produced by conscious infringement of several of its commands, such as shame, disgust, etc. A further proof is given by the analytic cure of *ejaculatio præcox*. Analysis in these cases has certainly not strengthened the superego; yet sexual excitement is better endured because the ego has become stronger. The endurance of tension as a function of the ego may be independent of pressure from the superego.

The aim of every analytic treatment is indeed to modify the severity of the automatically functioning superego and to develop in the patient an ego able to bear heavy burdens too. This indicates that analysts have always known that endurance may be an endogenous function of the ego.

Psychoanalysts have been wary of combining psychoanalysis and education because every analytic hour brings them new evidence of the disastrous results of faulty education. The analyst too must be very cautious of what he says to the patient because his every word carries an immense authority with patients in analysis. Analysts have therefore been very wise in avoiding such a responsibility in view of the fact that despite

¹⁶ Bálint, Michael: *Eros and Aphrodite*. Int. J. Ps., XIX, 1938, p. 199.

years of most intensive work by some of the best psychoanalytic investigators, we are certain only that for the present there exists no generally practicable psychoanalytic pedagogy.

Psychoanalysis has influenced education chiefly if not exclusively in the direction of correcting the experiences that lead to the development of a too severe or a too weak superego. Psychoanalytic pedagogy has therefore been chiefly a pedagogy of the superego. This is probably due to the fact that much of psychoanalytic theory has been derived from the study of obsessional neurosis and of depression. Although hysteria was the starting point of psychoanalytic investigation, it has been more and more neglected in recent years. In the *Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*,¹⁷ Anna Freud does not even mention among the ten forms of defense, the two which are characteristic of hysteria: conversion and displacement. This omission well characterizes the present tendencies of psychoanalytic theory.

The obsessional neurotic has as a rule a rather well developed ego with a considerable capacity for enduring tensions. One of the main conditions for the formation of an obsession being that the tension, though divided into small quantities, remains within the ego, neither repressed nor converted, this is possible only with an ego of a considerable power of tolerance. With an obsessional neurosis therefore, after having made conscious the unconscious pathogenic elements, the analysis seldom has to deal with the extra task of strengthening the ego. Almost invariably, however, the analyst is confronted with this task in the analysis of hysteria, hypochondria, and related pathological forms. It is instructive in this connection to recall that having consciously remembered all the pathogenic events, Anna O., Breuer's famous first patient, exposed herself intentionally to a reproduction of the former pathogenic situation.¹⁸ In doing so, she inaugurated the intermingling of analytic and educational methods. As is well known, her illness was a classical hysteria.

¹⁷ Freud, Anna: *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*. London: Hogarth Press, 1937.

¹⁸ Breuer-Freud: *Studien über Hysterie*. Third Edition. Vienna, 1916. p. 32.

Psychoanalytic ego psychology too has been chiefly built upon the study of obsessions and depressions. More closely considered it reveals itself as a psychology of dependences. It contains a certain amount of psychology of the id, but in the main it is a superego psychology. In it the ego itself is little more than a battleground for whose possession there is a struggle between id and superego. As psychoanalytic ego psychology and psychoanalytic pedagogy are nearly of the same age, each has considerably influenced the other's development, and both have been dominated by too exclusive emphasis on the rôle of the superego. If there is to be a fruitful development of ego psychology and its extension into the field of education, it will have to be much more complicated than the study of the function of the superego. Everything connected with the superego remains within the boundaries of psychology. The ego is, above all, a body ego; the problems arising here overflow into biology, and make the 'mysterious jump' into the organic. This complication has undoubtedly been one of the reasons why psychoanalysis has occupied itself less with this sphere, although here is to be found the answer for such important problems as auto- and alloplasticity, sublimation, talent, and above all the discharge of initial as well as of terminal pleasure. What we know about these processes and their laws is really very little, especially as compared with our knowledge of the primary process.

As stated, 'to learn' does not denote only the introjection of commands. On the contrary, 'to learn' means in the original sense 'to become experienced', to enrich, to develop the ego, which is the aim of every psychoanalytic treatment. The very important process of making the unconscious conscious is a part of the process of strengthening, of broadening the domain of the ego. The unconscious elements that are brought into consciousness differ in each individual. The strengthening of the ego is the ever constant element of analysis, independent of the individual history, of the psychopathology, and of the prevailing mechanisms, etc. This represents a task of education,

as defined in this paper, education of the ego in contrast to education of the superego.

To avoid possible misunderstanding it should be emphasized that education of the ego is not a technical measure specially applicable during analytic treatment; it is rather an immanent factor of every analysis of which the analyst should be aware. Avowedly or tacitly the educational process involved in analysis has been regarded as modification of the demands of the superego upon a passive ego.¹⁹ This concept has also dominated the attitude of psychoanalysts towards the formal education and the rearing of children.

The grave defects of traditional education and the failure to date of attempts to evolve a practicable psychoanalytic pedagogy have tended to cause psychoanalysis to abandon without examination everything that has shown any resemblance to pedagogy. This impasse has been chiefly the result of an almost exclusive concentration of attention on the function of the superego, completely neglecting the proper functions of the ego itself. It can be hoped that in the more minute study of the processes within the ego involved in 'working through', in the 'preparation for analysis', during 'learning', and other processes of strengthening the ego, a psychological basis will be laid for a sound theory and system of education. This can best be accomplished by a concentration of attention on the mechanisms involved in hysteria and related pathological forms.

¹⁹ The difference between strengthening the ego ('training the instincts') and superego formation has been described by Alice Bálint: *Versagen und Gewähren in der Erziehung*. Ztschr. f. psa. Pädag., X, 1936.

BOOK REVIEWS

A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Gregory Zilboorg, M.D., in collaboration with George W. Henry. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1941. 606 pp.

Dr. Zilboorg has written a unique book which demands the gratitude of his colleagues and of the medical historian as well as a large general reading public. Many books dealing with particular phases of psychiatry exist, but until the publication of this history, no book has covered the total period from Hippocrates to our time—much less achieved a synthesis of scientific and historical data, pertinent biography, social and cultural background.

This history is by no means a simple chronicle of events. The unfolding of the development of medical psychology in these pages is a fascinating adventure. The author, being both a psychoanalyst and a sociologist, brings an unusual critical appraisal to bear on the estimation and interpretation of the procession of events, ideas, people.

Reading these pages brings into sharp focus the vicissitudes of new ideas. Great discoveries are made, then vanish; later they reappear briefly, only to disappear again for centuries.

The chief defect of this work is its limitation to 600 pages. The text is substantial, but the subject enormous. We finish the book with the conviction that Zilboorg now has an obligation to give us a complete history of psychiatry in ten volumes.

Following an introduction into the psychiatry of oriental medicine, the school of Hippocrates begins the abandonment of mythological conceptions. The observation of patients becomes more accurate; religion, magic, begin to yield to science. The Greco-Latin school has a real sense of humanity. Different forms of mental diseases are distinguished. Great progress is made in therapeutics. We are constantly aware of the background of a high civilization. Celsus and Aretæus are interesting as 'modern' psychiatrists.

Unfortunately, the Roman Empire becoming too large, this progress was interrupted by an influx of oriental ideas. Then came the German and Arabic invasions and with them the night of the Middle Ages. All progress, slowly acquired, disappeared.

People were no longer mentally sick; they were, instead, possessed by the devil. At first with some compassion, the priests exorcised the devils from the unfortunates. Later, hundreds of thousands perished at the stake. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries began the first Renaissance, from contact with Arabian medicine and the rediscovery of Greek manuscripts; but scholars were too deeply rooted in tradition for any change in the attitude towards the mentally sick.

We have to wait until the sixteenth century to find personalities appearing to denounce the brutality and the ignorance of custom. This phenomenon Dr. Zilboorg calls the First Psychiatric Revolution. Outstanding among these men were Juan Luis Vives, the father of modern psychopathology, Paracelsus, a curious monk who had extraordinary intuitions, and Johannes Weyer, the courageous scholar. This reviewer would have added the figure of T. Bright, author of *The Treatise on Melancholy, Containing the Causes Thereof and the Strange Effects It Worketh in Our Minds and Bodies* (London, 1586). This book was the guide of Shakespeare and later of Burton when he wrote his *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

Despite the courageous voices of those pioneers of modern psychiatry, belief in demonology and witchcraft stubbornly persisted. Some of the seventeenth century physicians who were important in furthering the gradual changes were Charles Lepois, Daniel Sennert, Thomas Willis, Théophile Bonet, Jacques Ferrand, and Georg Ernst Stahl, the founder of Vitalism and of German psychiatry.

Willingness to consider psychoses as illness and to approach them from a medical point of view increased during the eighteenth century. Two Frenchmen are here of special interest: first, Boissier de Sauvages who also was a botanist and who essayed a complete classification of mental diseases; second, Pinel who was the leader of what Dr. Zilboorg calls the Age of Reconstruction. After Pinel, physicians, at least, were ready to admit psychiatry as a branch of general medicine.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychological medicine took three different directions: in England, the question asked was: 'What can be done for the mentally sick?'; in Germany: 'What is the essence of madness?'; in France: 'What are the forms of mental disease?'. Beginning with Kræpelin, these

three questions were considered together, and psychiatry became international.

The readers of *This QUARTERLY* will be particularly interested in the brief review of American psychiatry which covers the period beginning with Benjamin Rush to their contemporaries: Adolf Meyer, Smith Ely Jelliffe, A. A. Brill. In the concluding pages, Zilboorg stresses the still incalculable impact of freudian psychology—psychological determinism, the rôle of the unconscious, in brief, psychoanalytic psychology and psychopathology—under the heading, *The Second Psychiatric Revolution*. The discoveries of Freud revolutionized not only the whole concept of psychopathology, but gave a new direction to psychiatric development which had heretofore been confined to futile subtle differential diagnosis or unfruitful anatomical research.

The author has given a penetrating picture of the different periods of the history of psychological medicine. One of his great achievements has been to see and communicate his enormous and complex material as a continuum. This gives his history the quality of an epic.

In a single volume covering so large a field, the author has had to make choices. Here and there one might wish for more details; those who are interested in the history of medicine may resent the omission of their special 'finds' or enthusiasms. Nothing is said of the modern psychiatry of Russia, Italy, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Spain, Roumania. But these would be carping criticisms. Dr. Zilboorg has made his choices excellently well and with fine judgment for essentials.

In the two last chapters, Dr. George W. Henry writes an excellent history of general paralysis and a very good survey of the development of the mental hospitals.

RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE (NEW YORK)

PSICOANÁLISIS DE LOS SUEÑOS. (Psychoanalysis of Dreams). By Angel Garma, M.D. Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1940. 235 pp. This book was written as a thesis to revalidate the author's Spanish doctor's degree in the Argentine. At the same time Dr. Garma took the occasion to go beyond the official requirements and to present to the Argentine public an authoritative account of Freud's theory of dreams and of psychoanalysis as a therapy, with emphasis on the rôle of dream interpretation during treatment. The latter

slant distinguishes this book from the work of Freud himself and in general from other books which limit their attention more or less to the psychology of dreams. Thus, though to a certain extent Dr. Garma follows Freud's plan of setting forth the prefreudian history of dream interpretation and notes the views of the Greeks and of Mourly Vold, Maury, and Scherner, and goes on to explain the various terms and mechanisms introduced by Freud, when it comes to exemplifying his exposition, he does not report his own dreams, but instead presents a long list of dreams of patients. The author is thus compelled to go into the psychology of the neuroses and to outline the 'three contributions'. The dream interpretations are interesting and informative, but they appear somewhat abbreviated and formal; they lack the exhaustive associative material which Freud so tellingly brings to bear on his own dreams. And by their close connection with the quite fantastic symptomatology of the patients, the reader encounters the danger of thinking of dreams as pathology in the old fashioned sense, rather than as the universal vehicle of the unconscious in everyone. Except for this restriction the author's account is very successful and should enlighten the limited public to which it is addressed. An original theme is an effort to see the working of traumatic situations and the ensuing disagreeable content in dreams of persons without full blown 'traumatic neuroses'. The book is concluded by a chapter on the great Spanish classic, Calderon's *La vida es sueño* (Life Is a Dream), in which the similarity of dream life and schizophrenia is made evident.

B. D. L.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND COURAGE. By Edward Glover. New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1940. 150 pp.

Glover's new book is small and may be read over the week-end. It is a great book and contains many statements that will arouse enthusiasm. Here an analyst talks to a nation and her allies. What he has to say and how he says it is an example of the rôle psychoanalysis can play in the life struggle of a nation. Glover does not talk down to his listeners (most chapters are publications of actual broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Company) and he does not talk over their heads. He uses the language of the people who are listening and reading his book.

Britain's 'secret weapon' and her 'secret armour' is her morale.

To maintain it, two golden rules are given. 'These are first, not to conceal from ourselves any real causes for uneasiness, and, second, to detect and control those unreal alarms, suspicions and superstitions which tend to make us weak-kneed and infirm of purpose during a crisis.' The British morale is a peacetime morale and this has to be changed. 'We must become not only defenders but crusaders. Defence will consolidate a nation; only a crusade will carry it to victory. We must not be ashamed to develop for the time being a crusader's passion.'

One of the best chapters is 'Women in Wartime'. 'Once the women are demoralized, the end is near. . . . The real danger about women's morale is that the war may widen the breach between the family and the state.'

In the analysis of the problem 'to hate or not to hate', Glover states: 'We are fighting for our families, our lives, our cups and saucers, for our glass of beer, not to mention democracy. We are fighting also for the right to inward peace, for freedom from the blackout, from gas masks, from fear, and not primarily because we hate the enemy. We begin to hate the enemy when we realize that he threatens these possessions. From that point we begin to fight against something. But it would, perhaps, be truer to say that we are more indignant than hating. There is a kind of anger, slow to arouse, but which once aroused has something of the healthy energy of a boiling kettle.'

Reading this book makes it clear that the English are going to fight this war in their way, not with the methods of the Germans.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (CHICAGO)

A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRIC ACHIEVEMENT. By Nolan D. C. Lewis, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1941. 275 pp.

This book adds nothing to psychiatric history or to its author's reputation. Historical writing is a discipline that cannot be trifled with. It demands the same thorough investigation as any other field for research. Dr. Lewis, I fear, has not given the subject the careful thought he bestows on the work which has won him prominence.

The book comprises the Thomas W. Salmon Memorial Lectures delivered by Dr. Lewis last year. The head of the New York State Psychiatric Institute graciously accepted the lectureship

on very short notice. Under the circumstances one wonders why he chose history as his topic instead of contemporary research, a field in which he has done outstanding work. As it is, the only interesting and enlightening part of the book is the last third, where Dr. Lewis happily leaves history behind and launches on a survey of contemporary psychiatric research and a forecast of the future. Here he stands on firm ground, and the reader who has managed to wade through the historical part is rewarded with a vigorous, informed panorama of current activities in the study of mental disease.

Dr. Lewis's excursion into psychiatric history ranges far and wide, from ancient times to the present, sometimes like a rudderless ship on a stormy sea. The writing is pedestrian; the subject is handled loosely and formlessly. Disjointed statements are strung together like items out of a student's notebook. Unconnected names follow one another in rapid succession as though they were picked out of a hat at random. There are errors and dubious interpretations, especially in the section on the medieval period. Frequent use is made of secondary, tertiary and other sources that have no rating at all. A bibliography at the end of the book refers mainly to periodical articles, and does not include a single first-rate reference work in psychiatric history.

What a valuable book this could have been, were it devoted entirely to a survey of the contemporary scene, as the last third is!

It is hard for one who has this reviewer's deep respect for Dr. Lewis as a personality and a leader in American research, to make such critical observations on his book. But it seems to me that men of his stature are even more blameworthy than those of lesser note for lending their names to such feeble works.

ALBERT DEUTSCH (NEW YORK)

THE ORGANISM. A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man. By Kurt Goldstein, M.D. New York: American Book Company, 1939. 533 pp.

There are two main currents in neurological thought of the present day. The older, continental, classical neurology is primarily interested in the science of signs and symptoms, so that an accurate diagnosis of the cerebral lesion can be made with precise localization. This school has achieved its greatest prominence in French neurology, which has developed an unusual skill in diagnosing the

locations of lesions in the central nervous system. The other school, which largely found its expression in the teachings of Hughling Jackson, is interested in the changes wrought by disease in the whole organism, and attempts to determine the nature of these changes.

Following the first World War, Kurt Goldstein became well known for his attempts to understand the exact nature of changes which took place in soldiers in whom there were extensive cerebral injuries. In spite of the extraordinary ample material which he had in his hospital, he limited himself to an extensive study of a few patients. He was one of the first neurologists to utilize a careful psychological analysis of his patients, and the present book is an expression of his ideas. His point of view coincides so strikingly with the methodology of the psychoanalyst, that one is tempted to quote his exact words:

'The procedure of investigating the patient, which Gelb and I have described as a case of visual agnosia, may provide an example. On the basis of our first examinations, which were not sufficiently exhaustive, we had formed a hypothesis which was not quite adequate. Further examinations drove us to the formulation of a new hypothesis which did justice to both old and new facts. The further we advanced with the examinations, the more clearly delineated did the functional disturbance in this case become. Finally, we have progressed so far toward constructing the total picture of the patient that we can predict with relatively great certainty how he will behave in any situation, even in respect to tasks which we have not yet examined. Only cases which have been investigated with such thoroughness should be used in the formation of a theory. One single extensive analysis of this sort is much more valuable than many examinations involving many patients, but yielding only imperfect conclusions.'

From this the author concludes that an accumulation of a large number of imperfectly examined cases can, in no way, guide towards recognition of the true facts. There is no alternative but to examine each patient as fully as one may be able to do so. In addition, although it may be very desirable to seek repeated confirmations of one's findings through new case material, such confirmation adds nothing essential to one's knowledge. This is a striking departure from the demands of the objective scientist, who insists that only in statistics can a verification of theories be found.

In the first chapter the author postulates certain general laws of organismic life which are observed in patients with brain injuries. The main thesis of the chapter is the fact that there are

two kinds of behavior observable in human beings. There is the 'ordered' behavior in which responses are constant, correct, adequate, and where the performance is smooth and accomplished with a good deal of satisfaction in its execution. In other words, the behavior has a definite order or a pattern which is true for the individual and the species. The other type of behavior is 'catastrophic' behavior, which is disordered, inconstant, and accompanied by physical and mental shock. The shock is experienced not only by the person himself, but projected onto the outside world. The most important thing is the fact that every individual who has had a cerebral injury tends to normalize his behavior and make it as orderly as possible.

Assuming these two main attitudes, the author discusses various types of cerebral lesions and the disturbances in perception which arise from these lesions and the attempts of the organism to assume again orderly behavior after the 'catastrophic' reaction.

The author takes up the problem of reflexes in the human organism, a general theory of the function of the central nervous system, modification of the function due to the impairment of the organism, and gives certain physiological conclusions about the function of the organism as a whole. Since he deals with 'catastrophic' reaction he brings up the question of anxiety, which is of great interest to the psychoanalyst. When, as a result of a cerebral injury, the patient is faced with an unsolvable task, he shows a 'catastrophic reaction'. This reaction has all the earmarks of anxiety. The patient is not really aware of the fact that he is unable to solve the task facing him. Thus, his anxiety has no content and is lacking in objective. All the patient is aware of is an utter impossibility of establishing any reference to the world around him. Fear is a warning sign that anxiety may be forthcoming. The person who is afraid infers from certain indications that a situation or an object may bring on anxiety. As contrasted with anxiety, the person who is afraid is in excellent contact with the world. Fear sharpens the senses, whereas anxiety paralyzes them. This is an interesting point of view but the reviewer is still unable to understand that the person who fears is afraid of anxiety rather than the object which causes anxiety.

A discussion of anxiety leads the author into a discussion of psychopathology in general. He discusses in detail the problem of ambivalence and states that a neurotic individual is ambivalent

about all sorts of things, including sexual problems. He feels that ambivalence to one's father is one of the many ambivalences which the neurotic patient shows. Psychoanalysis makes a methodological mistake when it stresses the œdipus complex as the central problem of a neurosis. According to the author it is merely one of the ambivalences of the neurotic. Unfortunately, the author forgets the factors leading up to the formation of an œdipus complex, and hence, his objections, valid as they may be in principle, cannot be sustained. Further, the author takes Freud to task for interpreting pleasure as a release from tension. The author maintains that, in addition to the 'lust' of release, there is also pleasure in tension. The normal human being gets a kick out of his struggle with the environment. Freud's point of view is too narrow and does not give too much consideration to the so called 'conscious phenomena'. This may be a very valid point and relates to the present trend in analysis for a better understanding of the functions of the ego. The author is probably quite correct when he states that the emphasis on the id and the superego gives us a better understanding of disease than of the functions of the normal person.

The last few chapters are entirely philosophic and deal with the subjects of health and disease. Disease is a disordered behavior of the organism which implies a defective responsiveness. To become well means a change in the essential nature of the organism. A recovered individual is a different individual.

In spite of the fact that the presentation of the author suffers from too many generalizations, the volume is of great value in that it gives us the meaning of the motor and postural reactions of the organism, it gives us an interesting point of view in understanding organic disease, it provides an extremely valuable source of material for evaluating lesions of the central nervous system—all of which make it an extremely important contribution to neuropsychiatric literature.

J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

SCIENCE FOR THE CITIZEN. By Lancelot Hogben. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938. 1082 pp.

This 'self-educator based on the social background of scientific discovery' is an unusual popularization. It is unbelievably comprehensive and is written in a stimulating, almost racy style. It is a survey of the bases of modern science, developed historically.

It covers not only the physical sciences but also the biological and psychological. And it does this always against the background of the essential social problem of man's ability to live with his fellows in peace and plenty. The author vigorously attacks the artificial separation of pure and applied science and shows that science is a unity of theory and practice. Thermodynamics followed Watts' steam engine. 'Today we look upon Joule's determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat as the cornerstone of "thermodynamics". Thermodynamics, which has now superseded the mechanics of Newton, is the queen of theoretical science. The position it occupies was not won by discoveries made within the framework of the preëxisting social culture. The researches which led to the determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat were directly prompted by new social requirements, and the leaders of contemporary theoretical science were extraordinarily reluctant to explore their implications. Indeed, the Royal Society refused to publish the greater part of one of Joule's most epoch-making contributions.' Not only are pure and applied science, scientific theory and practice an inseparable unity, but the 'Dividing line between progress in science and progress in morals is not clear cut. Our moral attitude to witch-burning is not unconnected with advancing scientific knowledge of chemistry, and advancing scientific knowledge of medicine is not unconnected with social mores concerning the health of the masses. So the social use of science is not exhausted by material welfare, as the term is ordinarily defined.'

The book is the second of the *Primers for the Age of Plenty*, the first being *Mathematics for the Millions*. It is stimulated by an appreciation of the plenty that science has made possible. But the power to shape the future to the satisfaction of human needs, depends, says the author, upon an understanding of the impact of science upon society. And he includes the psychological sciences for he realizes, although he does not perhaps express it so acutely and forcefully as some of his other observations, that there is something in man's make-up which drives him to utilize the advances of science for cruelty and destruction. But he believes that the scientist can no longer escape to his laboratory and shirk the social consequences of his work. His hope is for a new social contract of scientific humanism, based on 'the recognition that the sufficient basis for rational coöperation between citizens is

scientific investigation of the common needs of mankind, a scientific inventory of resources available for satisfying them, and a realistic survey of how modern social institutions contribute to or militate against the use of such resources for the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. The new social contract demands a new orientation of educational values and new qualifications for civic responsibility. In so far as our narrative has exhibited the place of advancing scientific knowledge in the progress of civilization and the impetus which science has received from expanding opportunities for the satisfaction of common human needs, Science for the Citizen is a modest contribution to the new orientation.' But he sees little hope that a realistic study of '... how social institutions assist or impede the satisfaction of human needs united to an inventory of scientific instruments now available for satisfying them...' will come from the universities in Britain '... where the teaching on current social problems is dominated by the dreary futilities of deductive economics'. One question that arises in reaction to the author's interesting ideas and hopes for a new social contract based upon scientific study is whether he does not overestimate the force of reason in human affairs at the present time at the expense of the part played by human greed, selfishness, and violence. One has a little the feeling that for him to understand all is to rectify all. Nevertheless his program includes the scientific study of human needs and as this progresses, the psychoanalyst too must hope that reason will be strengthened and some of the edge taken off the cruelty of some of these needs.

The book is indeed an education and so colorfully written with such a wealth of miscellaneous references, applications, and illustrations that despite a natural awe of a nearly eleven hundred page tome, once begun it is difficult for anyone with any scientific bent to put it down.

LEON J. SAUL (CHICAGO)

THE PARENTS' MANUAL. A Guide to the Emotional Development of Young Children. By Anna W. M. Wolf. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941. 331 pp.

In this book the author takes up the usual problems presented by the developing child but she does so in an unusual way. It is the latter which gives the book distinction. The discussions reflect

sound understanding of the psychology of human behavior plus a long experience in practical dealing with the problems of real children and the questions raised by real parents. One of the chief attributes of the book is the author's appreciation of the complexity of parent-child relationships and her awareness that much is still to be learned in regard to them. She knows that we do not 'know all the answers'. Those which she gives are stated simply and vividly. For example, 'Remember always that the goal is not "to get food in" but to foster whatever leads to pleasure in eating', or in speaking of the only child, 'Only means lonely'. Again, 'As is well known, a taste of power goes to the head of even the very young'. In discussing sex instruction she says, 'Children rarely want to know anything at all about the sex life of birds, bees and wild flowers. They are concerned with events within their immediate experience—with their own bodies, and with practices and experiences encountered in other children. These, then, are the places to begin. Comparative biology can wait.'

Some may say that the book will be of use to the parent who is well adjusted and who only needs clearer understanding of how to bring up his child soundly, but that it offers little to the parent who is neurotic. To some extent this is true. However, statements which would ordinarily be painful to the latter parent are made with such rare understanding that even some of the poorly adjusted parents will find the book of help.

The chapter on The Forgotten Father leaves something to be desired in the analysis of the underlying factors in the matriarchal trend in the United States. Also the description of the typical, busy modern father is more characteristic of the father in the commercial metropolis than in our country as a whole, but this is of relatively minor consequence. More important, it is gratifying to find that a manual for parents has gone into the question of the vital part which the father plays in the psychosexual development of the child and has discussed the specific contributions which he makes in this connection. The author's Personal Opinions regarding the position of woman in modern society reflect serious thinking on the question and are commensurately provocative.

Summarizing, the book is obviously the work of an author who has a sound knowledge of psychology, a large experience in practical dealing with parents in search of help in regard to their

children, unusual ability for apt delineation and an ever present awareness of the importance of bringing up children to face reality. It is an excellent manual.

MABEL HUSCHKA (NEW YORK)

INTELLIGENCE AND CRIME. A Study of Penitentiary and Reformatory Offenders. By Simon H. Tulchin. A Behavior Research Fund Monograph published by University of Chicago Press, 1939. 166 pp.

This little book with its many tables represents the summary of a long continued study by Tulchin and his colleagues. In the opinion of reviewer, this contribution should close the chapter on the subject since the previous findings of Herman Adler, Murchison, Root and Doll are pretty well confirmed and any further research would seem unnecessary.

The main conclusion is that there is very little difference between the intelligence levels of inmates in the penitentiaries and reformatories of Illinois and the male population that was examined by intelligence tests in that State during the first World War draft. Since it has been so frequently alleged that criminals, by and large, are individuals of inferior intelligence, the results of these careful examinations of more than ten thousand inmates are exceedingly noteworthy. Tulchin seems to have demonstrated conclusively that criminologists must look to other factors than low intelligence for an explanation of crime.

In his thinking on the subject the reviewer has always been impressed by the uncontested fact that in institutions for juvenile delinquents the proportion of the mentally defective is far higher than in the general population. Why not then in the institutions for adult offenders? Can it be that the mentally defective are more apt to benefit by correctional school training, either educationally or by the punitive aspects of such commitment? Of course we know that some defectives do become habitual criminals, but on the whole they seem to be as reformable if not more so than those of higher intelligence.

Some of the details of the findings have special interest. For example, over eleven per cent of the inmates in the penitentiary were found to have superior intelligence. All forms of crime with one exception were found to be committed by individuals of

varying grades of intelligence. The exception is that men sentenced for sex crimes ranked lowest in the scale.

The text and the tables throw light on other problems besides those of intelligence as related to crime. The author has included facts with regard to nativity, physical conditions, socioeconomic situations, etc. Taking it all in all this book stands out as an excellent reference work.

WILLIAM HEALY (BOSTON)

SEXUAL PATHOLOGY. A Study of Derangements of the Sexual Instinct. By Magnus Hirschfeld. (Revised Edition). New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1940. 368 pp.

Magnus Hirschfeld's 'Sexual Pathology' has been condensed into one volume in this new edition. The shadow of *fin-de-siècle* psychiatry lies over its pages, as the tides of dynamic psychology failed to sweep the eminent sexologist off the shoals of his humoral prejudice. The book is replete with keen and accurate observations in the tradition of classical psychiatry, but these are uncorrelated save by the rigid organicism which characterized Hirschfeld's viewpoint. He was content with the hypothesis that such sexual abnormalities as fetishism, nymphomania and impotence may be explained by the aberrant functioning of the endocrines or the presence of special sensory end-organs, assisted perhaps by the effects of 'limited [conditioned] reflexes'. He makes short shrift of Freud in an early chapter and never mentions him again thereafter, even when he finally admits that impotence is chiefly a psychogenic phenomenon. A quotation, by no means exceptional in its turgidity, sums up his point of view: 'And thus it goes, from without on the sensory track outwards and then always further centripetal sensory, centrifugal motory, now known, now unknown, now interrupted, now not interrupted, in steps, until through the summation of the stimuli there is an increasing erotization of the brain cells and so gradually the peak of desire is reached unless a stop has been called on one of the lower steps by the interference of some external influence.'

With the concepts of the unconscious and of infantile sexuality ruled out *a priori* one is not surprised to find the numerous case histories lacking in the most elementary detail and full of naïveties. These deficiencies are not pardonable when one considers the profound changes that were taking place in methods of psychiatric

examination during the first decades of this century. Thus the author appears to have been satisfied by the assurance given him by a medical colleague who 'suffered from an unconquerable aversion to the female breast' that he had 'thoroughly investigated the possibility of a "*choc fortuit*" but could discover nothing to which his antipathy could be attributed'. This unfortunate man was considered the victim of 'a strange and painful antifetishism'. Another patient 'observed in himself quite suddenly, at the end of his fourteenth year, a strange urge to handle rubber air cushions, to blow them up tight and hold them against his body. *He was totally unable to figure out the reason for these mysterious manipulations, since he had no knowledge whatsoever about sexual things.*'¹ The following quotation illustrates Hirschfeld's conclusion: 'That infantile impressions cannot be influential here is shown by the fact that fetishists often incline to objects which in their youth were absolutely not present.' With such an approach it is inevitable that categories should be substituted for hypotheses about phenomena which deserve more consideration. Thus, 'the pungent reek of a cavalryman's sweating feet (at first) caused a strong revulsion in a lady of the strongest desire. Here one can almost speak of an antifetishism-fetishism.'

One need hardly dwell upon the fatalistic implications of such views in the matter of therapy. Nowhere is this so evident as in the chapter on impotence. There, after a tendentious account of numerous 'types of impotence manifestly organic in origin', the author is compelled to confess that the etiology of this condition is usually psychogenic. This embarrassing situation is to be dealt with by means of 'psychotherapy', but while there is much insistence upon 'specific' means of treatment, a few vague remarks on hypnosis and suggestion summed up in a page or two serve to dispose of the matter. It is, incidentally, interesting to record that an important step in treatment in 'almost every case' of impotence is to prohibit sexual intercourse.

The first quotation cited is a fair example of the inadequacy of the translation. Literal translations from the German are the rule while the use of words like 'sickly' for 'pathological' lend a curious air of anachronism to the already pedantic style. Too, when one discovers among numerous other gaucheries that the term 'limited reflexes' refers to 'conditioned reflexes', one is justified in questioning the medical background of the translator. Magnus Hirschfeld

¹ Reviewer's italics.

deserved better; for with all his shortcomings as a psychologist, he occupies an outstanding position in the history of sexual research and reform.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

CONSCIOUS ORIENTATION: A STUDY OF PERSONALITY TYPES IN RELATION TO NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSIS. By Dr. J. H. van der Hoop. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939. 352 pp.

By 'conscious orientation' the author refers to the quality of awareness experienced by the individual towards the outside world and towards his own inner life. He attempts to arrange the varieties of awareness into an array of types, following principally Jung's rubrics of extraverted, introverted, instinctive, intuitive, thinking and feeling. He recognizes the improbability of the existence of any of these types in pure culture, as it were, and lists a number of factors which may give rise to variations within a given type. Among these is the freudian 'complex'.

The major portion of the book is given over to an effort to apply the results of this exercise in typology to the task of understanding mental ailments of every variety. To the present reviewer, this endeavor results in an extreme confusion in which the manipulation of verbiage takes the place of productive thought. As to fundamental viewpoint, it is difficult to tell whether the author means to say that certain mental ailments are the outcome of certain corresponding types of 'conscious orientation', or that the various mental disease entities may supervene in any of these types, in which case the clinical picture will vary depending upon which type the given individual may belong to.

As may have already been gathered, this reviewer does not regard the book as having value for the clinician.

WILLIAM V. SILVERBERG (NEW YORK)

THE MEASUREMENT OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE. By David Wechsler. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1939. 229 pp.

This book deals with the construction and use of the Bellevue Adult Scale which the author has spent seven years in developing and standardizing. The chief advantages of the Bellevue Scale as a diagnostic instrument are held to be that it covers a wide range of intellectual abilities, motor as well as verbal; that it can be modi-

fied in cases of sensory defect or unusual environment; that it is standardized over the age range of seven to seventy on a selection typical of occupational and educational distribution at every age; and that it is simple in administration, objective in scoring and highly reliable.

The chapter headings give some idea of the author's approach to his task: The Nature of Intelligence; The Need for an Adult Intelligence Scale; The Concept of Mental Age and I.Q.; The Classification of Intelligence; The Concept of Mental Deficiency; The Problem of Mental Deterioration; The Selection and Description of Tests; The Population used in Standardizing Tests; Standardization and Results; Limitations and Special Merits. The chapters dealing with the nature of intelligence, the classification of intelligence and the concepts of mental age and mental deficiency constitute especially fine summaries of certain theoretical and practical considerations in clinical psychology which deserve to be better understood by psychiatrists who are too often handicapped because their training in psychology has been limited in both extent and character.

In the last part of the book is given The Manual of the Bellevue Intelligence Tests, including general instructions for the use of these tests and directions for the individual tests. The Manual is followed by a concise exposition of the special statistical methods which were used to treat the material and to make the necessary corrections in the process of standardization. This is followed by a series of carefully prepared tables of intelligence quotients for the various age levels and for both performance and verbal scales.

The footnotes throughout are to the point and most illuminating in amplification of statements in the text proper. At every point the author reveals that he is in touch with the work and accomplishments of other important investigators in this special field, and his evaluations exhibit a remarkable and refreshing degree of objectivity.

Dr. Wechsler's book represents a piece of painstaking research, well tabulated, concisely reported, and with valuable practical implications for any psychiatrist whose training has afforded a certain degree of mastery of the techniques of clinical psychology. It should also be directly or indirectly useful to judges, juries, educators and lay executives.

CLINTON P. MC CORD (ALBANY)

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING. By Madelene E. Ingram, R.N.
Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1939. 428 pp.

This summary of psychiatric nursing is written for students just entering the field. It is an adequate collection of the present day knowledge and technical methods of psychiatric nursing as practiced in the majority of hospitals in the United States.

Too much of the book is devoted to the average nurse's everyday knowledge of personal relationships and the physical aspects of custodial care.

Although there are some excellent descriptions of unconscious mechanisms scattered throughout they are inadequate in scope. Very little attempt is made to show the etiologic relationship of these mechanisms to the patient's symptoms.

WILMA KLEIN WIGGERS (NEW YORK)

AN OUTLINE OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By E. Fretson Skinner. London: H. K. Lewis and Co., Ltd., 1939. 173 pp.

The author calls his book a small treatise on medical psychology. Based almost entirely on psychoanalytic psychology, it tells us nothing new and, indeed, according to the preface, it does not purport to do so.

The first part is devoted to a survey of our physiological knowledge about the central nervous system, and gives valuable hints concerning the soul-body problem. Part 2—Psychopathology—and Part 3—Clinical Aspects—are illustrated by a number of well selected case histories.

We should be grateful for the fact that the book has nothing to do with classifications and omits the usual amount of terminology. The psychoses are mentioned infrequently and then only casually.

I think that in the chapter about the psychology of anxiety the author has oversimplified the problems. Only the traumatic situations and experiences of childhood are discussed while the instinctual impact is left out. This is a gap which we regret.

Every medical psychology based on the fertile grounds of psychoanalysis is welcome. This book will be useful for students who want and need clear, brief information about the topic.

FRITZ MOELLENHOFF (PEORIA, ILLINOIS)

ELEMENTS OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Leo F. Kuntz. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edward Brothers, Inc., 1939. 318 pp.

In twenty-two chapters the author gives an extract of the present day clinical psychiatry, its classification and symptomatology. Chapters 1 to 3 deal with the human personality, with the different psychological types and the normal individual. In addition, the various schools and theories are mentioned in the usual oversimplifying textbook manner. Borderline conditions and disorders form the contents of the chapters 4 to 9. The functional and organic psychoses are then discussed, followed by the symptomatic disturbances, hormonal pathology and bacterial infections. The material is highly condensed and includes even a discussion of differential diagnoses and therapeutic procedures.

The author is a Ph.D. and an associate professor of education at the University of Notre Dame. His Catholic training comes to view at different places in the book, especially in his discussion of psychotherapy. The 'science of ethics' and strictly moral conduct are recommended as the basis for determining the question of what is normal. 'Confession and the reception of the sacraments are indispensable aids to the sincere efforts of correcting character defective in regard to such an urge as that of sex.' And 'the vicious sex habits must be broken'. This religious attitude makes the book colorful but not colorful enough to cope with the pallor and dryness from which it suffers.

Textbooks of abnormal psychology, written by Ph.D.s, all too frequently lack the immediateness of clinical experience which, in my opinion, cannot be replaced by either interest in the subject, zest for teaching or by industrious intelligence. They strike us like reviews of books but not like books themselves. The present work is no exception.

FRITZ MOELLENHOFF (PEORIA, ILLINOIS)

DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Individual and Group Differences in Behavior. By Anne Anastasi. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. 615 pp.

In this volume the author has given a comprehensive treatment of the problem of psychological differences among individuals and groups from the point of view of general psychology. A critical survey of the vast amount of research that has been done on related

subjects is effectively presented. Numerous experimental studies by various investigators are described, the methods employed critically evaluated, and possible sources of error carefully examined. Throughout the book, the relative influence of environment and heredity as determining psychological differences or behavioral variations are estimated, with the weight of evidence, according to the author, preponderantly on the side of environment. The author repeatedly demonstrates the rôle of cultural and environmental influences, or 'experiential background', in determining human diversity.

The work is competently planned and realized. More than half of the volume is devoted to a consideration of fundamental principles of individual variation, in which a wide range of scattered psychological data is coördinated. Here are to be found illuminating discussions of mental testing, measurement of personality and mental growth, as well as critical observations on measurement technic, in general. There are interesting chapters on General Family Resemblances, Special Family Relationships, The Effects of Training, etc., containing information pieced together from a variety of sources, with special emphasis on factors and conditions involved in producing variation.

Most of the remainder of the book is taken up with an analysis of major group differences, which deals with such topics as the Subnormal, Genius, Sex Differences, Racial Comparisons, and Rural and Urban Population. This part of the study is pursued primarily, the author explains, as an adjunct to the investigation of individual differences in general; for, says the author, 'from the standpoint of behavioral development, the effective groupings are stimulatory and not biological. It is not the race, sex, or physical type—that determines his psychological make-up, but the cultural group in which he was reared, the traditions, attitudes, etc.'

The last chapter, *The Individual as a Member of Multiple Groups*, attempts to summarize some of the main conclusions of differential psychology and 'suggests a mechanism whereby the individual may rise above his group' and thus achieve 'the fullest development of individuality'. The 'mechanism' suggested is arrived at by mathematical deduction rather than by elucidation of the interplay of dynamic forces. In fact there is no reference anywhere in the book to intrapsychic factors as related to human behavior. In this respect the book suffers from the limitation of

academic psychology in general, which does not concern itself with the provinces of human motivation, or psychodynamics of any sort. As a result of this lack, the book does not afford any significant addition to the understanding of the mental phenomena under consideration.

On the whole, however, the student of the various aspects of general psychology will find this work a valuable source of reference. It is lucidly written, with an attractive, readable style, and affords a careful, systematic survey of exact quantitative methods which have been applied to the study of human nature, behavior and education. For the student of clinical psychology and psychiatry it can have little value, except perhaps as background material. There is an extensive bibliography following each chapter and detailed author and subject indices at the end of the book.

ALBERT SLUTSKY (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES. By Robert S. Woodworth. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1939. 421 pp.

Professor Woodworth, who may well be called the Dean of American experimental psychologists, celebrated his seventieth birthday in 1939. This book, which reprints twenty-five of his papers, was edited by his colleagues to celebrate the occasion. Woodworth's professional life has been long and active (the appended bibliography contains around two hundred items with entries for nearly every year since 1897); his psychological interests have been catholic (the individual papers come from the fields of systematic, abnormal, differential, experimental and educational psychology), and his methodological bias has been eclectic. (He writes in his Autobiography, 'My bogey men were those who assumed to prescribe in advance what sort of results a psychologist must find'.) Thus his greatest services to American psychology have been as an integrator and interpreter of the whole field rather than as an individual discoverer. He realizes this himself when he writes in his autobiographical sketch, 'I have done comparatively little investigation on my own account. Probably my bent is more toward weighing evidence and "seeing straight" than toward active enterprise. I should have liked to be a discoverer, so that anyone asking, "What did Woodworth do?" would be promptly answered, "Why, he was the man who found out" this or that! It is likely that many other psychologists have the same feeling of disillusionment.'

But it takes all sorts of workers to make a science and, as this carefully selected, well edited and beautifully printed collection of his papers reminds us, Professor Woodworth's value to psychology has perhaps been greater than that of many individual discoverers.

Woodworth has had an open mind and in the course of over forty years he has had something to say on nearly every psychological problem. Naturally psychoanalysis, behaviorism and gestalt psychology come in for comment. The reviewer has been able to find some errors of interpretation in his early writings on both gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. When one considers the many silly critical attacks on both these schools, however, Woodworth's writings even on these controversial issues stand out for their astuteness and restraint. And Professor Woodworth is certainly not through yet. His monumental *Experimental Psychology*, perhaps the best thing he has done, appeared in 1938. We may hope to have more contributions from him in the future, and if he still hankers after a 'discovery', this reviewer hopes that he succeeds in making one.

J. F. BROWN (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. Edited by E. G. Boring, H. S. Langfeld, and H. P. Weld. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1939. 652 pp.

Introduction to Psychology grows directly from an earlier book, *Psychology: A Factual Textbook*, by the same editors, which appeared in 1935. The central aim of the earlier book was the production of a 'factual' textbook unembarrassed by 'theories'. In order to achieve this end, nineteen men wrote nineteen chapters in their special fields. These chapters were unified by Boring, Langfeld, and Weld as editors of the book.

The present volume started out as a revision of the earlier Textbook. However, in the process the revision became so heroic that it became essentially a new book although the aim and the method of execution of the old one were retained. Boring, Langfeld, and Weld have again acted as organizing, unifying and rewriting editors. Five new men have joined the original group, while the work of six of the earlier contributors has been rewritten. This brings the collaborating staff of the Introduction to twenty-four men.

Like its predecessor, this book tries to avoid 'theories' and

present 'facts'. It does avoid the appearance of evil by avoiding the precise words and concepts of particular 'schools'. Casual examination of the book fails to reveal the words 'gestalt' or 'configuration', and the words do not appear in the index. However, such controversial concepts as 'reflex arc', 'reflex circle', 'conditioned response', 'instinct', 'drive', 'association', 'attitude', and 'set' do appear. This avoidance of an explicit systematic position will undoubtedly endear the Introduction to some circles and perhaps damn it in others where systematic presentation is more highly regarded.

The Introduction differs from the Textbook in three main things: it includes new material, it omits or condenses certain of the old materials, and it generally reorganizes the presentation. These changes are no doubt attempts to answer some of the chief criticisms leveled against the Textbook. New chapters on the social functions of the individual, personality, individual differences, and motivation have appeared. Much of the material upon sensation and perception has been condensed, and a new chapter on spatial perception has been added. In the matter of organization, the editors inform us: 'We have turned the old book hind part to, beginning with the consideration of conduct and ending with the treatment of perception'. While this is an innovation for the editors, such an arrangement was used twelve years ago by R. H. Wheeler in his *Science of Psychology*, and the device has been copied by several introductory textbook writers since that time.

The Introduction to Psychology in general does offer a better balanced survey of the field of psychology than did its older relative the Factual Textbook, and it has the virtue of being 'factually meaty', for there is no doubt that a great deal of information is crammed within its 652 pages. Even where a systematic point of view is stressed in introductory courses, the new Introduction should prove to be of great value as a collateral text or for reference reading.

FLETCHER MC CORD (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMON SENSE. By A. A. Roback. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Sci-Art Publishers, 1939. 350 pp.

The author of this book has written many volumes purporting to discuss various serious subjects of psychological import. These have been written in a popular and authoritative rather than a scien-

tific vein. This volume follows the same trend as the previous ones but is somewhat more loosely organized. Although its title would indicate an integration of subject matter, the book consists of fourteen separate 'essays' with little in common.

In the preface there is an attempt to claim a unitary whole for the papers. The author suggests that the theme of 'reason' runs through 'most of them', and that 'common sense' is the basis of this reason. He even claims that this volume might be used as a text for the 'philosophy of common sense'. He apologizes for the use of the term 'common sense' as perhaps too indefinite a subject and too popular a concept, but nevertheless he attempts to define it as a quality 'shared by the majority of mankind . . . which enables us to act soundly at any one time'. Later, however, he offers some contradiction to this definition by stating that it is very rare, as evidenced by mass and individual behavior. In a second definition he claims that common sense consists of general objectivity which can offer the truth of an undemonstrable fact mainly by '*consensus omnia*', or 'the core of public opinion when shorn of its prejudice, propaganda, imitation, suggestion and ignorance'.

Thus justifying the title by this explanatory preface, the essays proceed as a series of descriptions of the author's opinions upon a motley array of subjects including love, graphology, technocracy, psychological quacks, neurosis, sanity, the childishness of American people, and so forth. These opinions are written in a charming popular style which is enriched with frequent and pertinent quotations, indicating the erudition of the author. As a group of essays of opinion the book should offer a few hours of pleasant reading, but as a text on 'psychology' it offers nothing. In a scientific journal, such as this, it would not be pertinent to outline in any detail the content of the opinions and prejudices expressed by the author, but a few examples might be interesting. In relation to sex and marriage he believes that sexual adjustment in the modern world is bad, as evidenced by the number of frigid women, and feels that before any solution can be offered one needs more data and less personal reserve. He gives Freud credit for aiding in the removal of sex taboos, but states that Freud's psychological theories are too artificial and too tight. Without even mentioning the value of free association in psychoanalysis as a method of obtaining data on sex behavior, he decries the use of

animal experimentation or the questionnaire and offers human experimentation as a solution, suggesting—satirically I hope—the use of eunuchs as observers. A neurosis is defined as ‘a logical twist or perversity caused, probably, by an affective knot’ and the neurotic person is described as one who defeats his own ends, will not listen to reason and destroys his own chances.

MARGARET W. GERARD (CHICAGO)

THUS WE ARE MEN. By Sir Walter Langdon-Brown, M.A., M.D.
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939. 343 pp.

A physician of fine scholarly attainments, Sir Walter Langdon-Brown appears as familiar with anthropology, literature, philosophy, art and the history of religion as with medicine. This book, delightful in the urbanity of its style, consists of a series of addresses in which is reflected the author's predilection for the philosophy of emergent evolution. The keynote is sounded in the opening chapter, *The Biology of Social Life*. Here Sir Walter presents the concept that the next step in evolution is logically ‘the coöperation of free individuals for the common weal’. In the seventeenth century Sir Thomas Browne had said, ‘Thus we are men and we know not how’. Sir Walter Langdon-Brown devotes a good part of his book to filling the void Sir Thomas so keenly felt. He evidently believes that ‘knowing how’ is a necessary precondition for ‘the coöperation of free individuals’.

Even if this reviewer were not profoundly sceptical of the practical value of such an approach to the social problems which press us today with such dreadful urgency, he would look askance at the author's technique for ‘knowing how’. With that bent towards religious mysticism so characteristic of certain eminent English physicists Sir Walter leans to the psychology of Jung, with its ‘more humanistic, broader conceptions’. To him Jung ‘appears to see life steadily and to see it whole’. If he is ‘vaguer and sometimes not quite comprehensible’, this does not disturb the author for ‘are our minds capable of comprehending all the mystery of life?’. Jung, forsooth, ‘is most likely of all others to reconcile materialism and metaphysics, to restore our sense of values’.

Like Sir Thomas Browne who noted that ‘Man, the great Amphibian, lives . . . in divided and distinguished worlds’ the author suffers from ‘a dualism of thought’. It is with approval that he quotes Professor Alexander who conceives of God, like man

himself, as being 'in the making'. An ardent exponent of evolution, the author concludes a chapter designated *Some Gods and Their Makers* with the following remark: 'Theology should be at least as capable of development and expansion as physics'. The psychology of Adler with its 'simpler methods' is recommended to practicing physicians as a working tool. Whither this leads the author may be guessed by his citation of the following case:

'The patient was a young woman who had had an unhappy childhood; her parents quarrelled incessantly; her mother was drunken and vicious. She then had a happy time as a schoolmistress, for this satisfied her evidently strong maternal instincts. She married a man much older than herself chiefly from motives of pity. She had a great shock on finding that he was determined not to have children. He would not even allow her to have a dog. She began to suffer from severe abdominal pains.

'I came to the conclusion that she was deliberately constipating herself because the resulting physical pains distracted her mind from mental pain. I taxed her with this, and having gained her confidence she told me the facts I have mentioned and admitted the point. She got very much better, and free from pain, but unfortunately became obsessed with the advantages of self-starvation. She became easier in mind but much weaker in body. I saw her again after an interval of two years and was shocked by the change in her, but she was now quite bright and apparently happy. Asceticism had provided her with a way of escape from mental woes. She adopted the Salisbury treatment and took the most meticulous care in cleansing the meat from every trace of fat or connective tissue. Her small meal required about two hours to prepare and even longer to eat! I strongly suspect these self-starvers and purifiers to be haunted by an obsession of sin, though in this case it may have been prompted by a desire for vicarious sacrifice.'

We are not surprised to find an abundance of observations such as the following: 'In some the unconscious is Ariel, in others Caliban, but in either case the conscious, Prospero, must be in control. If the conscious and unconscious are at war with themselves a psychoneurosis will result.' 'Sooner or later any fixation leads to regression.' 'His [Freud's] view that the unconscious thinks in symbols is very likely true, but his claim, which has been exaggerated by his followers, that these symbols are the same for everyone is not likely to stand.'

The author's grasp of modern psychology, while satisfactory in its emphasis upon the psychobiological approach, lacks the scholarlyness which seems otherwise to characterize his knowledge.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

YOUR UNKNOWN DOCTOR. By Rolph Alexander, M.D. Canada, Cranbrook, B. C.: Published by the Author, 1939. 166 pp.

Dr. Alexander spent some time in India studying the religious and spiritual practices of the East. He believes that the essence of wisdom has been described in the sacred books of Asia, and that Western science has merely rediscovered and in the future will continue to rediscover the laws known in the East many centuries ago. In this book he tells of the Eastern way of overcoming all ills and of attaining health and well being. His style is turgid, grandiose and often ludicrous because of the gap between the sublimity he strives for and the ridiculous effect he achieves.

'Prana', which is the Sanskrit word for soul or breath, the author modernizes as an electrical energy in the body, the life force which supplies the power for the mind's sending and receiving 'wireless sets' for 'station Y-O-U'. If one worries, he tunes in on all the worry thoughts in existence, which are then taken as bad suggestions by the 'instinctive mind'. In the same way good thoughts tune in on the harmony of the spheres. One must learn to operate the switch of the imagination at will, by practice in dwelling on worthy thoughts and avoiding or discarding bad ones.

The soul is a spiritual entity inhabiting the body as a person inhabits a house. Just as a tenant might be tempted to move if a house fell into bad disrepair, so the soul might (and does) move out if the body gets into serious disrepair. The soul lives on through eternity because it is destined to pass through newer and higher experiences which unfold its exalted nature. To avoid having the soul move out of the body, one must make one's instinctive mind repair one's body at the command of the soul.

To become well one must truly desire it. This is achieved by imagining the body in a perfect state of health. The sufferer from tuberculosis must not tell his 'instinctive mind': 'Repair the lesion on my lung', but 'My lung is perfect!' It is essential to keep absolutely silent about the desire for health because talking of a desire releases it. The author explains that this process is the reverse of psychoanalysis where forgotten desires are talked about until the instinctive mind no longer harbors them.

The essence of the process is the striving to become one with the all powerful, divine Father who created one. Techniques are

described for attaining a self induced hypnotic state of identification with the Creator. In brief, obey father, and identify with him, then he will protect you and you will share in his strength.

EMANUEL KLEIN (NEW YORK)

BEAUTY IN NATURE AND ART. By Edward Howard Griggs. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1939. 72 pp.

This mellifluous little volume is intended for high school students, and consists in an elaboration of lectures given to them upon the subject of æsthetics.

The tenor of the book can be caught in the following quotation from the last chapter whose theme is that life itself is 'the art of arts' and which opens with some rather far-fetched analogies between art and life: 'All of us are called every day of our lives to this loftiest and all-inclusive fine art; and the need is thus to create and enjoy beauty in daily life' (p. 69).

In the opinion of the reviewer, much of this inspirational writing turns out to be sheer fudge. The post-Victorian high school student cannot get in this book a very comprehensive view of what modern æsthetics has to say about 'beauty in nature and in art'.

HARRY B. LEVEY (CHICAGO)

GETTING MORE OUT OF LIFE. By Joseph Jastrow. Revised Edition. New York: Emerson Books Inc., 1940. 312 pp.

Joseph Jastrow, former president of the American Psychological Association, is the author of a series of books with titles similar to his present one. His purpose, he declares, is to proclaim the benefits of the sensible life, including the 'commonsensible'. The author reveals himself to be a kind, well intentioned man with a rather liberal outlook on life. He offers no dearth of good advice. He sums it up by saying, 'Be normal!', have as your motto, 'Sanity first'.

He gives a brief account of what might be a severe case of anxiety hysteria in an intelligent girl, a college graduate, who holds a responsible position. He states that as soon as this girl will cease to fear the situations in which her jitters make themselves manifest, her success will inspire confidence and the battle will be won. He advises against being determined, three times

a day, to overcome one's jitters, because that would make one think of them too much. 'The better policy is to take that handicap lightly—to ignore it. Don't brood over your jitters.' No-where is the statement made that this girl's jitters might yield to psychotherapy. (Incidentally he defines this word as a 'long name for the favorable and the harmful action of mental states upon bodily conditions'.)

Related to this problem is the author's ambivalence to psychoanalysis. On the one hand he says of it that 'the logic of the argument is weak, often perverse; the speculations are unwarranted by anything we know of brain or mind; the practice is fraught with serious danger. . . . The structure as a whole—and above all the present practice—is questionable. . . . The freudians become character readers on a far-fetched system that, though scientific in intention, is as unreal, as arbitrary and often as cheap as that promulgated by physiognomists with no standing whatever.' At the same time he regards Freud as a 'pioneer explorer in an important field. Freud modernized our ways of looking at the great problems of sane living; he exposed the deep lying motives of behavior and their hazards.' He says about psychoanalytic treatment, 'In an emergency, yes. There are cases in which wisely administered psychoanalysis may be the right step in getting at the bottom of obscure mental symptoms. But the technique of psychoanalysis can do indefinite harm and has done so.'

EMANUEL KLEIN (NEW YORK)

THE EXPLORATION OF THE INNER WORLD. By Anton T. Boisen.
Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1936.
322 pp.

Dr. Boisen is a chaplain of the Elgin State Hospital and Lecturer in the Chicago Theological Seminary on the Psychology of Religion. It is largely through him that work in psychiatric hospitals has been made possible for theological students. He started this work first in the Worcester (Massachusetts) State Hospital where he was chaplain. Since 1933 more than one hundred and sixty men have had one or more summers of clinical experience with him and five have undertaken the study of medicine, two have gone into psychiatric social work, and several are teaching or are preparing themselves to teach theology, psychology

or sociology. The great majority are either pastors or preparing themselves for the pastorate. It is to help them and equip them that he is especially interested.

The author relates his experiences of sixteen years ago when he suddenly became extremely disturbed. He was taken to a psychiatric hospital where he was diagnosed as catatonic dementia præcox. The period of acute disturbance lasted about three weeks. His description of the psychiatric hospital makes melancholy reading. There was no occupational therapy in the hospital and the patients 'were on the whole a rather discouraged lot of men'. The doctors did not believe in talking with the patients about their symptoms which they assumed to be rooted in some as yet undiscovered organic difficulty. 'The longest time I ever got was fifteen minutes during which the very charming young doctor pointed out that one must not hold the reins too tight in dealing with the sex instinct. Nature, he said, must have its way. It was very clear that he had neither understanding nor interest in the religious aspects of my problem.'

Dr. Boisen recovered from his psychosis with the deep conviction that the functional psychosis is a problem-solving effort on the part of the mind. He is convinced that 'acute disturbances represent a certain type of religious experience. They are problem-solving experiences which are definitely related to those eruptive solutions of inner conflicts' which occur in religious conversion experiences.

He discusses the psychosis that John Fox, the founder of the Quakers, suffered from, and also the psychosis of John Bunyan. He quotes Professor Josiah Royce, formerly professor of philosophy in Harvard, who says that John Bunyan accomplished his work in life despite his morbid emotional state, but Dr. Boisen definitely disagrees with this. He says that John Bunyan's psychiatric experience enabled him to gain spiritual insight which was the basis of his success in his writings and in his preaching.

The author, however much his theories may vary from the beliefs of the psychiatrist, is clearly a man of deep compassion and insight. He says that the function of the minister is to recognize the fundamental need of love in those who are mentally and spiritually sick, to bring to them the meaning of forgiveness through faith. This, rather than any particular technique, is the minister's function.

Dr. Boisen has had the advice and counsel of Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan and Dr. H. Flanders Dunbar in preparing the manuscript.

This book should be on the reading lists of ministers and I feel that it would also be helpful to psychiatrists as giving the viewpoint of a well trained minister who also has had some training in working with the mentally ill.

SMILEY BLANTON (NEW YORK)

ABSTRACTS

Insight and Distortion in Dreams. Thomas M. French. *Int. J. Ps.*, XX, 1939, pp. 287-298.

The ability to postpone the tendency to discharge every tension immediately is the prerequisite for a correct judgment of reality. This basic concept of the structure of the reality principle is proved again by French in a new way. French discusses dreams in which an important interpretation of the analyst is stripped by the patient 'of all intellectual content by reacting to it, not as an interpretation, but as a disturbing noise or some other kind of disagreeable stimulus'. He relates two dreams of this type from the same patient. In the first dream the insight in question appears in a projected form as the dreamer's brother; in a second dream, the insight is denied much more decisively. The ego of the patient was still not able to accept the interpretation. The tendency to repress had made some progress in the interval between the first and second dream. The author believes that the synthetic function of the ego is subject to quantitative limitations. The fact that the ego, influenced by repressive forces, is still incapable of complete insight and tries to accept this insight only 'on simpler and less conflictful terms' is then discussed in more detail. The most interesting factor is that the second dream has a much greater motor orientation than the first; it is more distorted and more directly aimed at discharge. 'It is interesting to take note of the fact that such an alternation between insight and discharge of tension also plays an important rôle in waking life. Planning alternates with activity. In favorable cases one first plans, then executes one's plan. In other cases one becomes impatient of planning and discharges tension in motor activity before one has decided upon a rational course of action.' Rational behavior postpones discharge until the synthetic function of the ego can grasp the conflict; irrational behavior acts too quickly without insight.

OTTO FENICHEL

The Psychoanalysis of Affects. Edward Glover. *Int. J. Ps.*, XX, 1939, pp. 299-307. Many difficulties in psychoanalytic psychology of affects are rooted in the insufficiency of our knowledge of the real emotional experiences of early childhood. Many problems related to that field are still unsolved. For instance: 'Study of the affective reactions following frustration of different component impulses provides a valuable line of inquiry. Variations in the distribution of libido or aggressive charges throughout the different body organs or zones are responsible for characteristic affective experiences. And no doubt these could be traced back to differences in the nature of sensory excitation and of stimulation of the sympathetic system.' A distinction must be made between simple and composed affects, and a composition may in turn be of a different nature:

'The concept of fusion of affects has to be distinguished from that of "mixed" affect or again from simultaneous experience of affects of different origin.' Many affects which seem to be simple are really complicated, e.g., depression. Glover proposes a subdivision of affects into 'tension affects' and 'discharge affects' as he did previously in his book, *Psychoanalysis*. (The reviewer thinks that in principle 'discharge affects' are more primary than 'tension affects'.¹) As an example of a tension affect the frequent sensation of being disrupted is investigated in detail. The result of this investigation is as follows: 'Psychic feeling of disruption is a typical and very early tension affect, which in course of development may become fixed in different forms ("canalized" by association with fantasy systems) according to the experiences and the unconscious ideations of different developmental periods.' In this connection, says Glover, Jones' conception of 'aphanisis' has to be studied. In the sphere of affects much research has still to be done, and Glover concludes: 'There is certainly ample scope for investigation since it is, at any rate, plausible that there are as many primitive affects as there are primitive ego nuclei.'

OTTO FENICHEL

Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health. Heinz Hartmann. *Int. J. Psa.*, XX, 1939, pp. 308-321.

In his comprehensive paper, *Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem*², Hartmann discussed, among other problems, the conception of 'normality'. In this new paper he continues this discussion. It is very difficult to find a definition for 'psychic health'. Hartmann limits himself to criticisms of definitions, possible and proposed. Psychic mechanisms as such can never be used as criteria for abnormality; normality certainly is not identical with the average; lack of symptoms is not sufficient proof of health; other proposed formulations are not practical. It becomes clear that the conception of health always includes subjective and moral factors. Among the usual definitions of health there are two extremes. Attempts have been made to establish rational behavior and freedom of instincts as the decisive criteria. Both proposals are ambiguous, especially the conception of 'freedom'. Certainly it is not possible to identify 'conflictual' with 'pathological'; 'conflictless' with 'healthy'. Hartmann confesses that he too is unable 'to formulate a concept of mental health in simple unequivocal definite terms', but hopes he has helped discern in which direction his prolegomena to an analytical theory of health need further to be developed.

OTTO FENICHEL

Suicide as Wish Fulfilment. Ives Hendrick. *The Psychiatric Quarterly*, XIV, 1940, pp. 30-42.

This paper is about the analysis of a thirty-eight-year-old lady, who tried twice to commit suicide. The analysis deals mainly with the underlying causes of the second suicidal attempt.

¹ Cf. Fenichel, Otto: *The Ego and the Affects*. *Psa. Rev.*, XXVII, 1940.

² *Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939 (Abstr. in *This Quarterly*, IX, 1940, pp. 444-447).

The patient, a professional woman, had been extremely attached to a brother two years older who was idealized by the family for his talents and for his asexual life. He died, an aviator in the World War, his plane having fallen into a woods where he was buried. The suicidal attempt of the patient was a repetition of the brother's death. Like the brother in his airplane, she drove 'round and round in circles' before attempting suicide. She had dressed in clothes associated with her childhood identification with him in playing baseball, and she wanted to die as he did in the woods. The place of her suicidal attempt was the home of a man who was 'very brotherly' towards her.

The patient had had several homosexual love affairs during adult life. Chief among these was an overt homosexual relationship with an older woman whom she later hated. This woman is identified with both her mother and her older sister and reawakened an intense, lifelong resentment for them. She broke this ambivalent relationship, choosing a younger woman as her partisan against the older, thus repeating the seduction of her younger sister to an alliance against her mother. On the evening before the second suicidal attempt she had seen her beloved speaking with this older woman. After a night frenzied with hatred and jealousy, her homicidal fantasy became a suicide plan. The suicide was the expression of her desire to kill the mother surrogate who endangered her love with the sister surrogate. In her fantasies the beloved was consciously thought of as a dominant man and unconsciously as both father and brother, to whom she, the patient, would bear a child. The catastrophe was not merely caused by fear of losing the love partner; she also was unable to cope with the loss of a psychotically created happiness. At a deeper level the younger woman represented the patient's narcissistic fantasies of herself both as man and woman. In her fantasy of dying like the brother her own possession of phallic omnipotence and mastery of the mother are at last attained.

The suicidal attempt in Hendrick's case represents an escape from aggression, libidinal frustration and anxiety rather than an act of self-punishment. 'In contrast to the domination of the ego by the superego, which Freud and Abraham recognized in melancholia, this suicide is a consequence of the domination of the ego by instinctual forces which are organized only to the extent of dictating the specific form of fantasy which is gratified by the suicidal act.'

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

The Use of Psychoanalytic Principles in Out-Patient Psychotherapy. Harlan Crank.
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, IV, No. 1, 1940.

The author shows how psychoanalytic principles can be utilized in the treatment of patients where, for various reasons, psychoanalysis is contraindicated. He points out that one should not expect alterations in the fundamental character structure, but by utilizing the psychoanalytic principles more accurate diagnosis may be established and more rational treatment carried out.

CHARLES W. TIDD

Psychoanalysis of Antisemitism. Otto Fenichel. *Amer. Imago*, I, 1940, pp. 25-39. Methodologically and conceptually, Fenichel has made a valuable contribution. He has avoided the pitfall of uncritical application of mechanisms operating in individuals to society and, as in some of his former publications, emphasizes the importance of 'sociological, historical and political points of view' for all investigations of mass psychology. Psychoanalysis in 'coming of age' adds sociological viewpoints to its basic psychological and biological aspects without losing track of the basic significance of the latter.

In accordance with this method, Fenichel investigates the irrational reasons for the position of the Jew in modern society as a scapegoat for both the oppressor and the oppressed. The oppressor offers him to the masses, and the oppressed gladly use him as a target for their resentment against oppression and oppressor. For Fenichel this derives from the circumstance that the Jew (for archaic and actual reasons) is a foreigner in his gentile environment, as foreign and uncanny to those around him as is the unconscious to the individual ego. Consequently the Jew well serves to become 'unconsciously for the antisemite, at one and the same time, the one against whom he would like to rebel and the rebellious tendencies inside himself'.

These observations are not presented as the single ultimate explanation of a complex problem, but as one timely contribution to psychoanalytic research. Fenichel reviews briefly the hypotheses of Freud and of other authors.

More recently, the point of view, developed on the basis of historical and psychoanalytic studies, and not incompatible with Fenichel's findings, has been presented by W. V. Silverberg that the Jew represents an unloved, oversevere superego.

FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN

Psychology and Treatment of Depersonalization. Fritz Wittels. *Psa. Rev.*, XXVII, No. 1, 1940.

Fritz Wittels who, in an earlier paper¹, *Unconscious Phantoms in Neurotics*, introduced a psychology of phantoms, tries to explain depersonalization by this phantom psychology. He says, in reference to observations made on various cases, '... it seems to me that the cause of depersonalization is an unusually great number of phantomatic figures leaving the ego in such a position that it cannot decide which one of the figures has to be acknowledged as its representative'. In terms of the libido theory we might say that 'insufficient ego libido is invested in any one of these phantoms. Hence they are all grey and colorless surrounding a perplexed and swaying personality.' And later he finds that, '... it does seem as though the superego is responsible for the disintegration of personality, by condemning all of the phantoms without exception as unreal'.

As an explanation of the libidinal basis of the still enigmatic phenomenon of depersonalization, this does not appear to be adequate. With depersonalization, very delicate ego psychological relations are bound to be disturbed. Cathexes of receptive organs of perception for interior and exterior processes are hardly

¹ This *QUARTERLY*, VIII, 1939, pp. 141-163.

sufficiently explained on the basis of a conflict between identification phantoms. Such a multiple identification might well be one of the ways of occasioning the phenomenon of depersonalization, which must, however, in the last analysis, still be considered as a process of ego defense.

RICHARD STERBA

A Theory Concerning Free Creation in the Inventive Arts. Harry B. Levey. *Psychiatry*, III, 1940, pp. 229-293.

This is the third in a series of studies by Harry B. Levey on the problem of sublimation. The first paper, *Poetry Production as a Supplemental Emergency Defense Against Anxiety*, was published in *This QUARTERLY* (VII, 1938, pp. 232-242). The second paper, *A Critique of the Theory of Sublimation*, appeared in *Psychiatry* (II, 1939, pp. 239-271).

After summarizing philosophical and other speculative explanations of art creation, the theory of art creation as transformed sexual instinct energy is discussed.

'The artist's "sublimation" does not idealize the flesh; it materializes the spirit. It is not an anchorite's mummification of the sexual instinct, nor yet his confession of guilt over unconscious incestuous fantasies; it is the artist's *vis medicatrix naturae*, compounded of synergistic and serial unconscious mental processes through which he transcends the miseries of recurrent mobile depressions. Then transfigured, and at one with his conscience and impulses, the artist steps from his world of forms to the world of human relationship where he can experiment anew with bending love and hate among these according to his needs. The artist's creativeness is a station in his excursion from a faulty sense of reality to a reality of the same kind; for the artist has not changed himself in any fundamental way through creating. He has only healed, with the balm of creating beauty as an æsthetic salvation, that excess guilt, dread of the loss of love, and anxiety over generative integrity which resulted from his latest explosion. As soon as he again considers his defense needs sufficiently threatened with thwarting, he will react with rage; and, cloistered once more in the grip of a mobile depression, he will deliver himself from it eventually by moving through the cycle of suffering, free artistic invention, and the harmonious reclamation of human ties.'

It is to be hoped that the contributions of the author, so important for psychoanalytic theory of creation in arts, may be available in book form. If then the author would use the opportunity to correct his somewhat ambivalent and therefore misleading review of Freud's art theories, with which Dr. Levey deals less objectively than with the work of the English school, then the author would improve the foundation upon which all his deductions are based and his own contribution would become even clearer.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Anorexia Nervosa: A Psychosomatic Entity. John V. Waller, M. Ralph Kaufman and Felix Deutsch. *Psychosomatic Med.*, II, 1940, pp. 3-16.

After a short review of the literature, going back to 1694, a clinical picture of anorexia nervosa is given, centering around the symptoms: reaction to food,

constipation, and amenorrhœa. In these cases the act of eating is symbolically equated with sexuality, particularly with fantasies of impregnation. The complete rejection of eating is understandable only in terms of its symbolic significance and not of its original biological function. Gratification of the pregnancy fantasy may be expressed by overeating. Two excellent case histories are given as illustrations. The symbolism of eating as impregnation is clear and unambiguous. The wish to be impregnated by mouth results in compulsive eating or in guilt and consequently in rejection of food, constipation and amenorrhœa. The amenorrhœa may also be part of the direct denial of genital sexuality. Overeating preceded anorexia in each case. The syndrome of anorexia nervosa involves not a physiological system, but rather a functionally coordinated unit. It is not the system, but the function in terms of the patient's fantasies that is of importance.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

A Supplement to the Castration Complex: The Sphere of Fantasies Relating to the Os Priapi. Imre Hermann. *Int. J. Ps.*, XX, 1939, pp. 322-329.

The frequent fantasy of a bone in the penis has not been the subject of a special psychoanalytic investigation. We owe a debt of gratitude to Hermann for collecting clinical and anthropological ('magic bone') material about this fantasy. Hermann is of the opinion that the fantasy of the penis-bone is not only a symbol of the phenomenon of erection; he connects this fantasy with the fact that many animals, especially the phylogenetic ancestors of man, the anthropoides, actually had such a bone. He believes that the unconscious idea of castration may be connected with the fact that man, phylogenetically, has lost the penis-bone. A somewhat confusing supplement compares the fantasy of the penis-bone with the 'holistic' unconscious equation penis = (penis-bone =) organism; after having had the fantasy that the penis represents the whole body, insight into the true nature of the penis is disappointing. The penis appears as bereft of its totality, as 'castrated'. The reviewer has the impression that Hermann takes secondary fantasies in the realm of the castration complex as the primary cause of the idea of castration.

OTTO FENICHEL

Freud and Psychology. Edna Heidebreder. *Psychological Rev.*, XLVII, 1940, pp. 185-195.

'Like Copernicus and Darwin—the comparison has become inevitable—' Freud 'put the facts of common observation in a setting which profoundly altered their meaning, and which introduced into both science and common knowledge radically new perspectives. But unlike Copernicus and Darwin, Freud presented his theories in a form unsuitable to scientific verification and use. The situation abounds in difficulties and recalls the half despairing advice given by William James in another connection: "The only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you possess and to be as candid as you can".'

This concluding sentence is elaborated in a fair, clear, and stimulating way. Many well-known facts, presented in a new light, as well as a number of new details, make the article worth reading.

SIEGFRIED BERNFELD

Respiratory Plateaux in 'Day-Dreaming' and in Schizophrenia. William Corwin and Herbert Barry. *Amer. J. of Psychiat.*, XCVII, 1940, p. 308.

Using a Sumner pneumograph and Marey tambour, the authors obtained spiograms under experimental conditions on a series of one hundred subjects over a period of five years. Fifty-two of these were college students and forty-eight state hospital inmates with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Upon being directed to daydream, eleven of the college students (21.1%) produced apneic pauses at the end of respiration of over five seconds duration, and one (1.9%) over ten seconds. Of the forty-eight schizophrenics, nineteen (39.6%) produced such pauses of over five seconds duration and five (10.4%) over ten seconds in duration. The difficulties of knowing the degree of compliance with directions by the subjects is discussed. Similar apneic pauses were obtained in six of the college students during directed thinking. The spiograms published in this article show a very clear cut effect. The authors call these pauses 'respiratory plateaux'. This term seems to the reviewer to have certain disadvantages. The word suggests not a repetitive phenomena of relatively short duration but rather a shift in respiratory level. It was for this reason among others that Alexander and Saul called this effect an 'expiratory pause'. It is interesting that four of the seven college students who showed this effect upon daydreaming developed difficulties in adjustment before leaving college. This coincides with the statement of Alexander and Saul that this effect was found by them almost exclusively in the more severely disturbed cases. The authors state that the effect 'might possibly be a result of the attention devoted to daydreams rather than to any direct respiratory changes following fantasy'. The significance of the effect remains obscure.

LEON J. SAUL

The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace. Franz Alexander. *Amer. J. of Sociology*, XLVI, No. 4, 1941.

Rather than seek the causes of war, it is perhaps more profitable to attempt to discover the conditions under which peace is possible. The American continent offers an opportunity for this type of study. Where organized groups coëxist without conflicting interests, or with supplementary interests, peace is possible and the adjacent groups may fuse into a single economic and political unit. The fact that personal conflicts within a group are settled by law or by norm is encouraging in suggesting the possibility of extending this type of settlement to intergroup conflicts. A democratic state requires a more socialized kind of human material than a social order based on suppression and coercion. In considering Freud's statement that wars result from man's innate destructiveness, it should be borne in mind that human aggression frequently finds sublimated outlets. There are two important conditions for peace: (1) human beings must be united in one large, well-integrated social organization; (2) there must be a technique for settling conflicting interests. A future league of nations must recognize the necessity for coercion until consensus is established. Although the democracies should lead this supernational organization, they are averse to the use of force. They must recognize their call to assume leadership.

MARTIN GROTHJAHN

Beiträge zur Psychologie der Eifersucht. (Contributions to the Psychology of Jealousy.) Edmund Bergler. *Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. u. Imago* XXIV, 1939, pp. 384-397.

After reviewing the psychoanalytic literature on the subject, the author elaborates three aspects: first, the jealous person enjoys the pleasure of peeping. Second, the painfulness of jealousy is caused by feelings of guilt because the loved person represents the ego ideal; thus the jealous person is disappointed by his own ego ideal. Third, activity or passivity decide whether the jealous person attacks the rival or the loved object. The author does not present clinical material to confirm his views, but refers mainly to his earlier studies.

K. R. EISSLER

Zur Deutung eines sumerischen Siegel-Zylinders (The Interpretation of a Sumeric Signet-Cylinder.) Max Kohen. *Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939, pp. 434-445.

Kohen interprets a Sumeric signet-cylinder found in 1879 by Ernest de Sarzec in the Sumeric town of Lagash. It is the description of an oedipus scene. A son has caught his parents unaware in sexual intercourse and has killed the father, probably at the instigation of the mother. In connection with this plausible interpretation Kohen discusses the strange institution of the 'sacred murder of the king'. This institution exhibits the same motive wherever the sphere of influence of the Sumeric-Babylonian culture reaches. Kohen continues with other mythological and literary documents including the story of Candaules and Gyges, the story of the Parthian King Phraates IV, South-African findings, and evidence from the North European Bronze Age, to emphasize the universality and timelessness of the oedipus. The basis of most of the material discussed seems to be the old Mesopotamian myth of Tammuz, and Kohen concludes: 'Our result points to an identity of destiny which makes the Mesopotamian Tammuz comparable to the Greek Oedipus. Like the latter the former was originally a phallic god who was resurrected again and again to fall into sin, and who had to die again and again to atone for the sin. Oedipus, who was recognized by mythological research as a phallic demon, is a parallel figure to Adonis whose phallic nature is evident. But since the myth of Oedipus is nothing but a later elaboration of the old legend of Tammuz, the essential similarity between Tammuz and Oedipus becomes apparent.'

OTTO FENICHEL

Der Traum ein mögliches Leben. (A Dream as a Possible Reality of Life.) Theodor Reik. *Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. u. Imago*, XXIV, 1939, pp. 373-383.

The author attempts to understand a dream which seemingly contradicts the conceptions of the dream as wish fulfilling. A young woman, who shortly before her marriage went through a period of promiscuous relations with men, dreams during her first pregnancy that she does not know who the father of her child might be. She cried very much during her dream and her despair overshadowed the following day. Analysis showed that the patient, who in reality was very happy with her husband and who had no reason to doubt that he was the father of her child, depicted to herself what her life would have

been if by her marriage it had not taken such a favorable turn. The previously well justified fear of becoming pregnant and being disgraced had never before been conscious. This dream presents not a simple and direct form of wish fulfilment but a mastering of an experience not fully digested by the ego at the time. This dream is comparable to dreams of traumatic neuroses wherein the trauma is repeated until it has lost its horror. Beyond this function of discharge, such dreams have the task of gratifying masochistic tendencies.

ANNIE REICH

The Examination as Initiation Rite and Anxiety Situation. J. C. Flugel. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 275-286.

Following the thesis in the excellent paper by Stengel,¹ Flugel discusses the relation between modern examinations and archaic initiation rites. In the middle ages examinations at universities displayed this connection still more clearly. Flugel shows that the tasks which the hero has to fulfil, especially the riddles to be solved by him, belong in the same realm; the same is true for 'trial by ordeal' procedures. This author is by no means the first to see a connection, not only between earthly court procedures, but also the last judgment, and university examinations: 'As early as the thirteenth century Robert de Sorbon, the founder of the Sorbonne, in a sermon that has come down to us, drew an elaborate parallel between the earthly and the heavenly examinations. In both cases the trial is severe and the possibility of rejection is very serious.'

OTTO FENICHEL

Schizophrenic 'Deterioration'. Samuel R. Lehrman. The Psychiatric Quarterly, XIV, 1940, pp. 140-156.

A review is given of the concept 'deterioration' in schizophrenia. Quoted are the opinions of various authors: Krapelin, Bleuler, Freud, Meyer, Jelliffe and others.

The author investigated 20 cases of schizophrenia, all males, 60 years of age or over. Cases of this type were selected because it could be anticipated that such patients would most probably prove the existence of deterioration if it really occurred in schizophrenia. From the study of these cases two facts emerge, namely, that deterioration is not inevitable in schizophrenia, and that the schizophrenic process is reversible. The author arrives at the opinion that the word 'deterioration', first used by Krapelin, later by Meyer, cannot correctly be employed as a synonym for dementia præcox. In this he agrees with Bleuler, who stated the same opinion in 1911; also with various French authors. The deterioration observed in certain old cases is not a true one, but the result of lack of interest in external reality and lack of use of old assets, resulting in a profound loss of the utilization of the assets.

The word 'deterioration' should be applied only to organic disorders and the concept 'regression' (Freud) should be applied to schizophrenia. If deterioration should occur in a psychosis one has to assume that the process is of an organic etiology.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

¹ Stengel: *Prüfungsangst und Prüfungsneurosen*. Ztschr. f. Psa. Pädagogik, X, 1936.

Psychoses Resembling Schizophrenia Occurring with Emotional Stress and Ending in Recovery. Harry A. Paskind and Meyer Brown. *Amer. J. of Psychiat.*, XCVI, 1940, pp. 1379-1388.

Five cases of a psychotic type occurring under emotional stress and ending in recovery are presented. These cases resemble schizophrenia but differ from it in some aspects and in their course. The resemblance to schizophrenia consists in defects of attention, hallucinations, delusions, impairment of judgment, etc. The difference from schizophrenia is the invariable presence of emotional stress at the time of onset, the rapid beginning, the occurrence of disorientation and of amnesia for the period of psychosis and, finally, recovery. The authors believe it not unlikely that these psychoses are produced by stresses of civil life and that the recognition of such cases may materially change statistics regarding remissions of treated and untreated patients with schizophrenia. In reviewing the literature on this subject, the authors found the first similar case in the German literature (Ganser, Delbruck, etc.) eighty-five years ago. Only four papers dealing with this question were found in the literature of the last fifteen years. They see another reason for the publication in the fact that the subject is not unrelated to 'current psychiatric [psychoanalytic?] thought'.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

Problems of Shock Treatment in Schizophrenics. Fritz Kant, Paul L. Phillips, and Ralph M. Stolzheise. *J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, XCI, 1940, pp. 329-340. Modern shock treatment is discussed from a more clearly defined psychiatric viewpoint than is usually encountered in the current literature on the subject. Diagnosis, prognosis and remission in their relation to shock treatment are the main points of discussion.

K. R. EISSLER

Observations on the Behavior of Schizophrenic Patients Undergoing Insulin Shock Therapy. Conrad Wall. *J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, XCI, 1940, pp. 1-8. This study investigates the progressive changes in the behavior pattern of four schizophrenic women patients treated by insulin. The author observes a change from oral to genital manifestations during the hypoglycemic state and finds that usually the latter manifestation is accompanied by general improvement. He believes that such studies will succeed in establishing definite criteria for discontinuing treatment. He recommends his paper to all those who are interested in the psychological aspect of insulin treatment.

K. R. EISSLER

The Relationship Between Early Schizophrenia and the Neuroses. Wilbur R. Miller. *Amer. J. of Psychiat.*, XCVI, 1940, pp. 889-896.

The author describes a group of patients with relatively stable personalities who, under repeated assaults upon their attempts at meeting life, retreat gradually more and more, first becoming maladjusted, then showing pronounced neurotic symptoms and finally breaking down into a schizophrenic state. Reference is made to studies by Freud, Adolf Meyer, Zilboorg and Myerson.

A few detailed histories accompany the paper, one especially interesting because the patient had shown neurotic symptoms for about sixteen years prior to the schizophrenic episode. The author discusses the question of whether this group of patients was schizophrenic from the beginning, but feels that the prepsychotic phase has to be considered as neurotic in nature. The schizophrenic reactions were a further step in the effort of the personality to find a balance between inner driving forces and the demands of reality. 'The final psychotic reaction labeled schizophrenia may be reached in a variety of ways. One of those ways, we have found, appears repeatedly in certain patients not exhibiting the schizophrenic or shut-in type of personality, and this is through the route of neuroses.'

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

The Respiratory Response of Psychoneurotic Patients to Ideational and to Sensory Stimuli. Jacob E. Finesinger and Sarah G. Mazick. *Amer. J. of Psychiat.*, XCVII, 1940, p. 27.

This paper is the continuation of a study reported by Finesinger in 1939. In this he conducted a series of experiments in which psychoneurotic and 'normal' individuals were attached to the Benedict-Roth basal metabolism apparatus for the purpose of recording their spiograms and calculating their minute respiratory volume, which is the product of the rate of respiration and the depth of respiration. While recording the spiograms it was suggested to them that they think of unpleasant ideas and later that they think of pleasant ideas. Twenty-seven patients in Group One with diagnoses of hysteria, phobia, or anxiety neuroses all showed much greater changes (increases) in their minute volumes than did the eleven patients in Group Two who had diagnoses of hypochondriasis, reactive depression and compulsion neuroses. The reaction of the normal group was intermediate between these two. The experiments reported in this paper were conducted in the same way except that instead of ideational stimuli, physical stimuli were used. These consisted of intracutaneous injections of saline, pin pricks, and local electric shocks. The minute respiratory volume was again used as the main index of the respiratory response. After the administration of the pain stimulus the patient was asked to think of it ('recall period'). In addition to the change in minute volume the amplitude of the respirations, average oxygen consumption and percentage of points and rounds at expiration were noted. Again much greater changes predominantly in the direction of increase were observed in Group One than in Group Two. The control group (fifteen) was slightly more reactive than Group Two but much less than Group One. The paper presents a clear precise study of the respiratory changes upon the application of painful stimuli and of the patient's recalling the stimulation.

LEON J. SAUL

Some Observations on Anancasm. Helen G. Richter. *Amer. J. of Psychiat.*, XCVI, 1940, p. 1459.

The collective term 'anancasm' is used to include compulsive, obsessive and phobic symptoms and character traits. Three cases are presented in which the patients' 'anancasms' are illustrated. Such traits may be nonconstructive,

purely symptomatic, or may be socially constructive. The article ignores the dynamics or mechanisms of the 'anancasm'.

LEON J. SAUL

Educational Therapy in a Psychiatric Hospital. Peggy Ralston. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, IV, No. 2, 1940.

This is a report of the use to which 'educational therapy' has been put at the Menninger Clinic. The author describes the classroom arrangement and the planning of the curriculum. As in other activities at the Clinic, special emphasis is placed on the individual needs of the patient. In addition to classroom facilities which are made available, the director of the program takes advantage of the educational facilities outside the Clinic. The need for close coöperation between the teacher and the patient's physician, as well as with directors of other activities, is emphasized.

CHARLES W. TIDD

The Psychopathology of Hair Plucking (Trichotillomania). Hyman S. Barahoe. *Psa. Rev.*, XXVII, No. 3, 1940.

This article begins by drawing attention to the important rôle which hair has played in the beliefs and rituals of primitive peoples. The author calls attention to the taboos which attach to the cutting of hair among various tribes, its ambivalent and magical significance in many rituals, its importance as an expression of grief or mourning and its symbolic value for both sexes in the representation of strength and beauty. Assuming that the explanation of hair plucking may be discovered more easily by the psychogenic approach, the author seeks to deduce the phallic significance of hair from a perusal of folklore and mythology, and to understand the meaning of this symptomatic activity by its underlying relation to the œdipus and castration complexes. The older designation of monomania (*tic de l'épilation*) is rejected as inappropriate. Sixteen cases of hair plucking in psychotic patients are given with superficial explanations of the phenomenon. This series, which is not very illuminating, serves chiefly to indicate that hair plucking is not limited to any particular psychosis, and may occur in 'apparently unrelated emotional states'. The author has not made a sufficiently thorough study of the psychoanalytic literature on the subject.

SYDNEY G. BIDDLE

Acute Heterosexual Inadequacy; II. In the Female. Jane E. Oltman and Samuel Friedman. *The Psychiatric Quarterly*, XIV, 1940, pp. 194-204.

In a previous publication (1938) these authors described what they termed 'acute heterosexual inadequacy'. The first article on the subject dealt with the reactions of males, reared in strict homes by possessive mothers, who were unable in adult life to free themselves from incestuous fixations, and when confronted with heterosexual relationships showed panic reactions.

In the present article the authors cite briefly five very illustrative cases of females who all show the same behavior pattern, namely, an inability to

respond normally to a situation which demands an adequate degree of heterosexuality. Confronted with such situations the individual becomes panic-stricken, and develops either an anxiety hysteria or an acute psychosis. The reaction in the female is, in principle, similar to that in the male. Variations are due to the different sociological position of the female and to the fact that 'women renounce the feminine rôle with relatively little psychological conflict or opprobrium, whereas a comparable transposition in the male, especially if it proceeds to the extent commonly seen in that sex, is regarded as pathological'.

At the end of the rather superficial paper the authors discuss Karl Menninger's similar observations.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

The Course of a Depression Treated by Psychotherapy and Metrazol. Roy R. Grinker and Helen V. McLean. *Psychosomatic Med.*, II, 1940, pp. 119-138.

'Metrazol-induced convulsions may explode the diencephalon, opening up blocked pathways to the cerebral cortex from which verbal formulations and symbolic acts may be expressed, releasing at the same time repressed psychological content. Repetitions of such explosions may groove or facilitate a pathway of permanence through which aggressive and libidinal drives may proceed without excessive interference by inhibitory obstructions. The same effect has been reported in patients who have had very severe psychological explosions without metrazol, as in those who fail in suicide attempts by some violent physical means. The mechanism may be the same as that postulated for metrazol in that the psychological tension so created reaches a quantity which is sufficient to break into the inhibited pathways. Permanency of this pathway can be furthered by reconditioning, psychologically, the cortex or ego to acceptance of the psychological content and thus not only is the depression lifted but a freer, more normal personality achieved. Under this heading of anatomicophysiological theories we have speculated on two possibilities both involving a change in the dynamics between cortex (ego) and diencephalon (biological drives). Both indicate a concept of primary alteration of physiological status with concomitant change in psychological tension. . . . For the large group of depressions metrazol is probably of great value. . . . In depressions convulsions induced by metrazol produce a psychosomatic alteration of a condition which is probably a psychosomatic process of inhibition and regression. This treatment thus need not be considered as a promise or a threat to any single group.'

MARTIN GROTHJAHN

Selma Lagerlöf, ihr Wesen und ihr Werk. (Selma Lagerlöf, Her Personality and Her Work.) Eduard Hitschmann. *Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. u. Imago*, XXIV, No. 3, 1939.

After introductory observations about the principles of application of psychoanalytic method and findings to poets and poetry, Hitschmann devotes the second part of his paper to a childhood phobia of Selma Lagerlöf. He describes the part played by a bird phobia, its possible childhood origin, the way in

which it was overcome at a later age and what a very important part was played by the mechanism which Anna Freud has described as 'the transformation of the feared animal into a friend'.

The third chapter, Hitschmann has devoted to the poet's father and her relationship to him. The kind, gentle, humorous father was her greatest inspiration and the memory of his personality was of the utmost value in her creative work. A chapter is devoted to Selma Lagerlöf's mother, whose personality can be felt throughout the works of the poet. She is described as the model for the poet's ethical and religious superego. The repressed, negative emotions of the daughter for the mother are seen by Hitschmann in the different stepmothers who are represented as bad tempered, avaricious, treacherous and jealous. The poet's infantile compulsion neurosis and her childhood anxiety are also represented as expressions of her relationship to her mother.

In the following chapters, Hitschmann evolves the formation of the superego and the unconscious aggressions of the poet, maintaining that the greed, hot temper and obstinacy Selma Lagerlöf describes in her childhood memories are, in the adult personality of the poet, transformed into reaction-formations of compassion and tenderness. In her poems, however, in innumerable passages, these emotions regress to their original cruelty. The anxiety depicted in the poems is demonstrated by Hitschmann to be castration anxiety.

The author tries in the eighth chapter to explain the processes by which Selma Lagerlöf developed into a poet. He finds as a fundamental characterological basis a capacity, bordering almost on the pathological, for submerging herself in memories and for visual reproduction. Identification with her father, who loved story-telling, plays a decisive part in this. Her poems also represent to some extent fantasy children produced as it were through a spiritual union with the father. The writing itself signifies a magic compensation for infantile disappointments. The economic function of the poetic production consists in the binding of the anxiety through creative work and, furthermore, in finding expression and outlet for the unconscious whereby, owing to the educational, ethical and religious effect upon the reader, an unconscious feeling of guilt is removed.

RICHARD STERBA

The Psychopathology of Drinking Songs. Weston La Barre. *Psychiatry*, II, 1939, pp. 203-212.

The persiflage of authority in general and especially atheism in limericks is explained on basis of the oedipus complex. The author states, in analyzing drinking songs, that men are more narcissistically preoccupied with their own sexuality than with the female sex. Oral and anal perversions and sado-masochism predominate. Tenderness seems entirely lacking; women and genitality are disparaged. All this is quoted as a proof of the fact that the conception of repression is applicable to 'normal' as well as to neurotic individuals.

GÉZA RÓHEIM

The Measure in 'Measure for Measure'. Hanns Sachs. Amer. Imago, I, 1940, No. 1.

In Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, that comedy which is no comedy since it dispenses with all pleasant qualities, one senses almost all the time what Sachs calls the 'tainted atmosphere of the jail and the brothel'. The keynote of the comedy which has an unexpected and, we feel, an unjustifiably happy ending, is extremely pessimistic. The comedy is of the same period as *King Lear* and *Othello*, the most pessimistic period of the great poet. The content is briefly that Angelo, the representative of the Duke of Venice had, during the latter's absence, sentenced a man named Claudio to death on the strength of a long disused law because, through him, his fiancée had become pregnant. When Isabella the sister of the condemned man comes to Angelo to plead with him for her brother, he himself falls desperately in love with her, having never really been in love before, and promises to let her brother go free if she will give herself to him for one night. The Duke, disguised as a friar, learns the truth and the evil intentions and arranges circumstances so that Angelo, instead of being shown Claudio's head, is shown another, the decapitated head of a man who had just died, as proof that the execution had taken place. Angelo's abandoned fiancée is substituted for Isabella and spends the night with him without being recognized; but Angelo, in spite of his promise, does not keep his word and orders Claudio's execution all the same. Through the Duke, however, everything turns out happily and no disaster occurs. The punishment for Angelo's wicked plan to deliver Claudio to the executioner and for violating his sister under cloak of the false promise that he would liberate the brother, is, astonishing enough, that he marry his abandoned fiancée. This is the *Measure for Measure*. Hanns Sachs shows us the deeper significance of the strange comedy. It is, 'Judge not that ye be not judged'. The mildness of the judgment pronounced is attributable to the recognition that unconsciously we all bear in us the same guilt of lustfulness, injustice and aggression, that we are like *Œdipus* who, setting out to detect the hidden crime for which the Thebans are being punished by death and famine, finds that he himself is the criminal, the murderer of his father. Sachs shows us the inner parallels to be drawn, not only between the hidden content in Shakespeare's comedy and the drama of *Œdipus*, but also that of Heinrich von Kleist's, *Der zerbrochene Krug*, and Dostoyevsky's 'Brothers Karamazoff'. As Hanns Sachs indicates the deeper background and connections in the comedy, it loses its harshness and 'unfairness' and we realize that 'not justice, mercy only may bring some rays of light into the abysmal darkness while it "will breathe within your lips".'

Through his conclusions regarding the more profound interrelationships, Hanns Sachs places this work of Shakespeare's in a clearer, stronger light, and the constructive enlightenment on the deeper layers of the problem enhances the enjoyment of this strange comedy. Hanns Sachs' paper will serve as an example of how productive and valuable analytical investigation of literary work can be, when it is pursued in a constructive, synthetic spirit and with true human understanding.

RICHARD STERBA

An Anthropological Note on the Theory of Prenatal Instinctual Conflict. Karl Menninger. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, IV, No. 2, 1940.

Dr. Menninger first discusses objections that have been made to the instinct theory, but points out that no other theory can account for the facts, mentioning especially the death instinct. He extends this theory to a consideration of prenatal life on the basis of an anthropological finding which indicates that the Mohave Indians in Arizona believe that there are certain unborn children who are especially destructive. After birth the same children show special destructiveness and in later life become Shamans (medicine men). The author states, 'It is as if the Mohave intuitively recognized or at least believed that healing was in part determined by "reaction formation" against overdevelopment or overstimulation of the death (destructive) instinct, an overdevelopment which according to their theory is evidenced by the future Shaman while still in the womb of his mother.'

CHARLES W. TIDD

Primitive Psychiatry. I. A Note on Method. II. *Hiwa:itck*. George Devereux. *Bull. of the Inst. of History of Med.*, VIII, 1940, pp. 1194-1213.

In this, the first of a series of papers dealing with mental disorders in preliterate tribes, Devereux refers mainly to certain subjective experiences which strike modern psychiatrists as neurotic or psychotic, even though they are considered socially acceptable in certain preliterate cultures and, either not pathological at all, or else remotely connected with other experiences which these cultures recognize as abnormal and socially unacceptable. The latter phenomena include shamanistic experiences, trance states and lycanthropy, which are all part of these cultures and play in them a significant rôle.

According to the author, primitive psychiatry is a functional part of native culture and must be connected with the social-cultural context. Why one type of subjective experience should be recognized as 'abnormal' and another should receive social sanction and approval, depends on the organized preferences of a given culture and the compatibility or noncompatibility of these subjective experiences with the culture pattern. Thus, it is 'psychotic' behavior to mention the name of the dead or talk to one's mother-in-law, if the specific culture prohibits these modes of behavior. The author's viewpoint, therefore, on mental disorders in primitive society, is that of the history of medicine, that is, the viewpoint of the social sciences.

In the second part the author discusses some of the social-cultural implications of certain subjective experiences and the modes of behavior corresponding to them among the Mohave Indians who live on both banks of the Colorado River between Needles, California, and Parker, Arizona. The type of subjective experiences described is recognized as abnormal by the Mohaves who apply to them the term, *hiwa:itck*, which may be freely translated as 'heartbreak'. The term is applied to certain psychotic or possibly neurotic episodes which occur most frequently when an elderly Mohave man is deserted by his young wife. It rarely follows the desertion of a Mohave husband by a wife approximately his own age.

In discussing the social background of Mohave marriages, it is pointed out that they are extremely unstable and like all other interpersonal relations in that tribe, are characterized by a weak object cathexis. Marriage implies nothing more than common residence and divorce means simply that one of the spouses moves out. The libido and the aggressions are distributed relatively homogeneously over the tribe as a whole and, therefore, no single individual is invested with a strong amount of object cathexis. Romantic love is rejected socially and sex functions are merely an outlet for dammed up economic frustration. There is a genuine generosity and human sympathy with the suffering individual and the result is a delicately balanced ambivalence of public opinion. The last is illustrated by Mohave equivalents of the so called Orpheus type of myth.

The author, after describing this myth, cites cases of *hiwa:itch* obtained from shamans with their interpretations. Three of the four cases had subjective experiences symptomatic of mental disorder. The Mohaves distinguish sharply between *hiwa:itch*, which they consider a mental disorder, and suicide with or without murder, due to disappointment in love, which they do not consider a form of insanity. The types of breaches in marital or love relationships are then discussed from the various angles of age discrepancies, infidelity and desertion.

When a carefully built up defense (i.e. marriage to a young wife) breaks down, the Mohaves find themselves in a highly precarious position without emotional anchor, without the security of social integration or of marital companionship in old age. Although the Mohaves have practices devised to dispel insanity, they lack therapy for cases of *hiwa:itch*.

ISADOR H. CORIAT

Literature and Personality: Analysis of the Novels of D. H. Lawrence, Part II.
Harold Greier McCurdy. *Character and Personality*, VIII, No. 4, 1940.

This is the third of a series of articles. The author has attempted to analyze the thirteen major novels of D. H. Lawrence. He attempts to classify most of the characters of all of Lawrence's novels into three types: (a) those acting as important centers of consciousness; (b) those who are physically dark, pronouncedly sexual and emotional, and close to animals and the earth; and (c) those who are physically blonde, and occupied with industry or business and society. Beginning with the hypothesis that imaginative literature is a projection of the author's personality, he applies this viewpoint to his study of Lawrence. He concludes that a continuity between the novels can be demonstrated and that the kind of information about the personality of the author which can be extracted from the material may be valid without reference to external facts. He finds a close correlation between his findings thus obtained and the known facts of Lawrence's life.

Inferences are drawn regarding patterns in the psychosexual development of Lawrence which tend to confirm psychoanalytic theory regarding the importance of early family influences in the later life of the individual.

EDWIN R. EISLER

Psycho-Dynamics of Chewing. H. L. Hollingworth. New York: Arch. of Psychology, No. 239, July 1939.

The process of chewing is carefully studied in its relation to pulse rate, metabolism, mastication and muscular tension; to strain and relaxation, writing pressure, speed and accuracy of typing, and output of routine work. The author's conclusion (p. 90) is that chewing serves as a means of reducing tension, and to some degree reintegrates the relaxation of mealtime. The remaining parts of the picture follow from this reintegrated posture of relaxation.

MARTIN GROTHJAHN

A Comparison of the Medical and Surgical Treatment in Hypertension with Special Reference to the Importance of Psychic Factors in Evaluating the Results. With a Report on Ninety-two Cases Treated Medically. S. K. Robinson. J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis., XCI, 1940, pp. 157-174.

Dr. Robinson is in favor of psychotherapy in combination with medical measures in the treatment of hypertension. He objects to surgical procedures whose success he believes to be due to some indirect mechanism such as shock, bed rest after the operation, psychogenic factors, release of renal spasm. The author demands a return to the clinic for the study of the factors which cause disturbances of physiology in man. The ease with which physiological disturbances can be demonstrated in the laboratory and reproduced in animals, too easily distracts interest from clinical study.

The author, holding that hypertension is of central origin, suggests that we should not consider it a disease *sui generis*, but just one outward manifestation of a much broader disease process including somatic and mental disorders and frequently associated with such entities as diabetes, heart disease, hyperthyroidism, glomerulonephritis, arthritis, asthma, neuroses, melancholia etc.

K. R. EISSLER

Mental Hygiene in the State Health Department. Victor H. Vogel. Public Health Reports, LVI, No. 1, 1941.

This report quotes with approval the statement Freud made in 1918 advocating that mental treatment should be made available to everybody through institutes and consultation centers as is surgical aid today. Referring to statistics Dr. Vogel demonstrates the great need for psychiatric care and the lack of psychiatric clinic facilities to provide it. Communities tire of being told what mental hygiene can do without ever being actually shown what it can accomplish. Two specific primary steps are proposed in organizing a mental hygiene program: (1) establishment of a department of mental hygiene or mental health, headed by a full time psychiatrist of special qualifications, in each state under the direction of the state health department; (2) organization of a mental hygiene or psychiatric clinic in every community. Larger cities must be encouraged and aided in the formation of full time mental hygiene units. Small communities should be furnished with centralized service in the form of traveling or part time clinical units. Training programs for

the personnel must be inaugurated. Reference is made to the necessity of preventing overloaded clinics by keeping registrations down to the point where therapeutic results may be obtained.

BERNHARD BERLINER

A Program for Civilian Mental Health. Watson B. Miller. Public Health Reports, Vol. LVI, No. 29, 1941.

The psychiatric program in the national emergency for selecting those fit for service in the armed forces can be a case-finding mechanism for the improvement of civilian mental health. The writer proposes that those who are rejected because of mental conditions have psychiatric assistance through the community to make a better adjustment to civilian life. A wider application of psychiatric concepts to the employment and placement of workers is advocated. The improvement of a difficult or neurotic home situation is not an individual problem; it is important as well for the efficiency of a worker and his associates. Readjustment to civilian life after the demobilization will be a most serious problem which psychiatry can help to solve. Suggestions are made for the improvement of mental hospitals, for public education by psychiatrists, and for the promotion of a new concept of preventive psychiatry.

BERNHARD BERLINER

NOTES

THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE colloquia on Psychosomatic Medicine were held December 6th and 7th, 1941. The topic for discussion was The Biology and Psychology of 'Instinctual' Processes. First session: General Introduction. Moderator, Lawrence K. Frank. Dr. W. S. Hunter: Theoretical and Experimental Background of the Theory of Instincts. Dr. F. Fremont-Smith: A Review of Some Recent Experimental Studies of Metabolic Influences on Instinctual Processes. Second session: The Sexual Instincts. Moderator, Dr. Harold G. Wolff. Dr. Philip Bard: Neural Mechanisms in Emotional and Sexual Behavior in the Female. Dr. F. A. Beach: Mechanisms in the Sexual Behavior in the Male. Third session: Embryological and Endocrine Influences on Instinctual Processes. Moderator, Dr. Henry A. Murray. Dr. Davenport Hooker: Foetal Reflexes and Instinctual Processes. Dr. Carl Hartman: Endocrine Influences on Instinctual Processes. Discussion opened by Dr. Ephraim Shorr. Fourth session: Social and Cultural Implications. Moderator, Lawrence K. Frank. Dr. Margaret Mead: Anthropological Data on the Problem of Instincts. General Survey of Analytic Implications. Members of the Panel: Drs. Gregory Bateson, Carl Binger, George E. Daniels, Felix Deutsch, Flanders Dunbar, Kurt Goldstein, Heinz Hartmann, Ives Hendrick, M. Ralph Kaufman, Lawrence S. Kubie, Bertram D. Lewin, H. S. Liddell, Bela Mittelman, Gardner Murphy, Lois Murphy, Henry A. Murray, Robert F. Pitts, Ephraim Shorr, Robert Waelder, Harold G. Wolff, R. W. Dawson, Adolf Meyer.

THE MENNINGER FOUNDATION¹ was organized and incorporated under the laws of Kansas in April, 1941, with headquarters in Topeka. The purposes of this new nonprofit psychiatric foundation are fourfold:

1. Provision for psychiatric education, especially the training of young physicians in psychiatry. The shortage of well-trained psychiatrists will presently become acute in relation to the requirements of World War II and the postwar period.
2. Stimulation of research in psychology and psychopathology.
3. Making psychiatric treatment available to patients in the low income bracket.
4. Prevention of mental illnesses, especially through development of child psychiatry and the application of psychiatric knowledge to the education and rearing of children.

In addition to local officers, the trustees of the Foundation are: Dr. Winfred Overholser, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.; Mrs. Albert Lasker, New York and Chicago; Dr. John C. Whitehorn, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore; Mrs. Lucy Stearns McLaughlin, Santa Fé, New Mexico; Dean J.

¹ For more detailed information the reader is referred to: *The Menninger Foundation for Psychiatric Education and Research: An Announcement*. Bulletin of The Menninger Clinic, V, No. 6, November, 1941.

Roscoe Miller, Northwestern University Medical School, Chicago; Mrs. Sidney C. Borg, Jewish Board of Guardians, New York City; George E. Hite, Jr., Milbank, Tweed and Hope, New York City. The Menninger Foundation has already initiated several projects from financial gifts which have enabled it to make a modest beginning. Grants have been made for a ten-year study of the place of occupational therapy in psychiatric treatment; for a seminar and special Bulletin on Military Psychiatry and the distribution of this information to the physicians of the Medical Advisory Boards throughout the country; for research in the use of hypnosis as an emergency psychotherapy and for supplementing newer psychiatric techniques. Other projects are to follow.

THE PHILADELPHIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY elected the following officers at the annual meeting on June 3, 1941: President, O. Spurgeon English, M.D.; Vice-President, Gerald H. J. Pearson, M.D.; Secretary-Treasurer, LeRoy M. A. Maeder, M.D. Educational Committee: Chairman, Sydney G. Biddle, M.D.; Vice-Chairman, LeRoy M. A. Maeder, M.D.; Members, O. Spurgeon English, M.D., Lauren H. Smith, M.D., George W. Smeltz, M.D. Active members of the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Society are Kenneth E. Appel, M.D., Sydney G. Biddle, M.D., Morris W. Brody, M.D., O. Spurgeon English, M.D., G. Henry Katz, M.D., LeRoy M. A. Maeder, M.D., Gerald H. J. Pearson, M.D., George W. Smeltz, M.D., Lauren H. Smith, M.D. Affiliate members are Ray H. Abrams, Ph.D. (elected 1941), Phyllis Blanchard, Ph.D. (elected 1941), Edward Weiss, M.D. The Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute gives comprehensive courses of lectures, seminars and clinical conferences for members, students in training, physicians and other scientifically qualified persons. For full information address: LeRoy M. A. Maeder, M.D., Secretary-Treasurer, Chancellor Hall, 206 South 13 Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION will be held at the Hotel Statler, Detroit, Michigan, on February 19, 20, and 21, 1942. Copies of the preliminary program will be sent upon request. A registration fee will be charged for nonmembers.

THE JOSIAH MACY JR. FOUNDATION, which was founded in 1930 by Mrs. Kate Macy Ladd in memory of her father, has just released a Four Year Report for the years 1937 to 1940 inclusive. Income and transfers for the four years covered by the Report totalled \$1,079,144, and cash disbursements amounted to \$951,512.61. 'Of the total amount disbursed, seventeen per cent was in support of studies in medical education; twenty per cent for studies of growth, development, maturation and aging; twenty-two per cent for study of psychosomatic disorders; twelve per cent for social research concerning health and sickness; and twenty-nine per cent for medical research in various fields.' This Foundation, from its inception, has been primarily interested in the problems of health focussed upon the patient as an individual, functioning as a psychosomatic unity. 'While scientific knowledge is providing unparalleled instru-

mentalities for achieving an orderly and humanly significant social life, science cannot minister effectively nor safely to man and his society until it is oriented to our contemporary social life and coördinated into the complex functioning of our culture. Today ignorance of human behavior and social organization, and the prevailing unawareness of the functioning of our culture are blocking the full utilization of scientific knowledge. Thus we have the ironic and tragic spectacle of science contributing effectively to man's physical comfort or to his destruction, but seemingly helpless to advance his social and cultural aspirations.' 'It is clear that medical education must give the physician of tomorrow an awareness, if not a technical understanding, of city planning, housing, nutrition, education and recreation, employment, and the many other seemingly unrelated, but vital, aspects of group living through which medicine can contribute its knowledge of health care and of individual and group well being. The awakening of medicine to its larger social responsibilities does not imply a medical control over society, but rather the recognition in medical research, education and practice of these broader social and cultural aspects of illness and health care and more especially of the need for the development of medical leadership, fully cognizant of the larger social-cultural readjustment necessary for the achievement of human welfare in an integrated society. Indeed it may be said that some of the larger problems of health care can be effectively undertaken only by reorganizing those areas of our traditional culture that now foster illness and disorders in individual patients. This focus upon social and cultural conditions will increasingly revive the traditional concern of medicine for social-emotional-spiritual factors in the appraisal of diagnostic and therapeutic problems and will also enlarge the meaning and dimensions of medicine to embrace the concept of health care.'

An urgent request from the Soviet government for American medical books to supplement the Central Medical Library has been received at the offices of RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF, INC., 535 Fifth Avenue, New York City. The list, comprising almost one hundred titles, includes books on brain, spine, and neurological surgery, on which topics the United States can furnish the best and most modern information; in addition it asks for books on public health such as Bourne's *Nutrition and the War*, and *Virus and Rickettsial Diseases*, a symposium from the Harvard School of Public Health. Other urgently needed volumes in the listing are F. H. Albee's *Bone Graft Surgery*, Brock's *Injuries of the Skull, Brain, etc.*, and Hetzlet's *Surgical Pathology of the Mouth and Jaws*, all of which are particularly important in view of the high percentage of shrapnel casualties.

ERRATA in Volume X, No. 4, 1941.

In the sentence beginning 'At these later periods in life, however,' sixth line from the top of page 614, the word 'psychological' should read 'physiological'.

In the second paragraph of page 674, 'The Collaborator for Psychoanalysis' should read 'The Collaborator for Phyloanalysis'.